Georgia State University

ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Communication Dissertations

Department of Communication

Summer 6-26-2013

Profit Margins: The American Silent Cinema and the
Marginalization of Advertising
Jeremy W. Groskopf

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/communication_diss

Recommended Citation
Groskopf, Jeremy W., "Profit Margins: The American Silent Cinema and the Marginalization of
Advertising." Dissertation, Georgia State University, 2013.
doi: https://doi.org/10.57709/4313936

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Communication at ScholarWorks
@ Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Communication Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@gsu.edu.

PROFIT MARGINS:
THE AMERICAN SILENT CINEMA AND THE MARGINALIZATION OF ADVERTISING

by
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Under the direction of Kathryn H. Fuller-Seeley and Ted Friedman

ABSTRACT

In the early years of the twentieth century, the unique new medium of motion pictures
was the focus of significant theorization and experimentation at the fringes of the American
advertising industry. Alongside the growth of the nickelodeon, and the multiple shifts in the
American cinema’s business model in the ‘transitional era,’ various individuals at the margins of
the advertising industry attempted, and most often failed, to integrate direct consumer-goods
advertising regularly into motion picture theaters. Via techniques as diverse as the glass slide,
the commercial trailer, and the advertising wall-clock, cinema patrons of the 1910s witnessed
various attempts by merchants and manufacturers to intrude upon their attention in the cinema
space. Through research in the trade presses of the cinema, advertising, and various consumer

goods industries, along with archival ephemera from the advertising companies themselves, this
dissertation explores these various on and off-screen tactics for direct advertising attempted in
silent cinemas, and their eventual minimization in the American cinema experience. Despite the
appeal of the new, popular visual medium of cinema to advertisers, concerns over ticket-prices,
advertising circulation, audience irritation, and the potential for theatrical ‘suicide-byadvertising,’ resulted, over a mere fifteen years, in the near abandonment of the cinema as an
advertising medium. As a transitional medium between the 19th century forms of print and
billboarding, and 20th century broadcasting, the silent cinema was an important element in the
development of modern advertising theories.

INDEX WORDS: Advertising, Silent cinema, Transitional era, Film exhibition, Film
spectatorship, American cinema, Magic lantern, Trailer, Animation
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A moving-picture audience ought to be an inspiration to an advertising man.
I have sat in a moving-picture theater full of kids and grown-ups and have thought,
'If I only knew how to reach these people, I would know all about advertising.'
- Don Herold, September 1915
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION: THEATERS, COMMUNICATION, AND ADVERTISING
IN THE AMERICAN SILENT CINEMA

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a much remarked turn in the American cinema
experience occurred. Often described (erroneously) as an intrusion upon a previously
uncontaminated medium, direct consumer goods advertising in motion picture theaters began its
meteoric rise in the United States. The formation of Screenvision and the National Cinema
Network (soon to become National CineMedia [NCM]) for the purposes of pre-film slide and
trailer advertising in the late 1970s, the boom in product placement in the wake of Reese’s
Pieces’ star turn in E.T.: The Extra Terrestrial in 1982, and the accelerating use of cinema
advertising at the turn of the 20th century following advertiser’s fears of the fading effectiveness
of television,1 have combined to produce a sense that a venue once dedicated solely to onscreen
entertainment has been colonized by the ever expanding American advertising industry. This
sense of newness is common not only among spectators, but also among scholars and advertising
practitioners and proponents. Kim B. Rotzoll, author of one of the earliest studies of cinema
advertising after its rebirth, mentioned in passing that “there was some [cinema advertising]
present in the ’50s,” but appears to have been aware of no other precursors.2 Advertising Age
columnist Matthew Grimm gave the appearance of an even shorter lifespan for cinema
advertising when he asserted, in 2003, that “turning the big screen into a cross-category ad

1

Deron Overpeck, “Subversion, Desperation and Captivity: Pre-Film Advertising in American Film Exhibition
Since 1977,” Film History 22.2 (2010): 220-221, 224; Kerry Segrave, Product Placement in Hollywood Films: A
History (Jefferson, NC, and London: McFarland & Company, 2004), 140; and Michael T. Ewing, Erik du Plessis,
and Charles Foster, “Cinema Advertising Re-Considered,” Journal of Advertising Research 41.1 (January/February
2001): 78.
2
Kim B. Rotzoll, “The Captive Audience: The Troubled Odyssey of Cinema Advertising,” Current Research in
Film 3 (1987): 82.
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medium did not happen until the mid-1990s.”3 Marketing scholar Herbert Jack Rotfeld, in 2006,
declared vaguely that “cinema advertising for unrelated products or services…is relatively new
in the USA.”4 In that same year, Joanna Phillips and Stephanie M. Noble’s research into
audience sentiments about cinema advertising revealed, among many preconceptions, the same
sense that the intrusion of advertising was recent, with one respondent claiming that “prices for
the movies keep going up, and now there is advertising that you got to put up with.”5 In the
eruption of studies of the promise and problems of cinema advertising that has appeared in
advertising oriented journals, the reader frequently encounters the assumption that cinema
advertising is a new field.6
Marginalized in many analyses, then, is the fact that the techniques currently enjoying
such a wave of popularity among advertisers are actually more than 100 years old. Product
placement dates at least as far back as the Edison Company’s ubiquitous train films of the
1890s.7 The pre-film digital advertising slides and trailers circulated by Screenvision and NCM
have roots at least as far back as the physical advertising slides circulated by Boston’s Preston

3

Quoted in Joanna Phillips and Stephanie M. Noble, “Simply Captivating: Understanding Consumers’ Attitudes
Toward the Cinema as an Advertising Medium,” Journal of Advertising 36.1 (Spring 2007): 81.
4
Herbert Jack Rotfeld, “Misplaced Marketing: Movie Theaters’ Suicide-by-Advertising with Income from Abusing
Customers,” Journal of Consumer Marketing 23.7 (2006): 481.
5
Joanna Phillips and Stephanie M. Noble, “Simply Captivating: Understanding Consumers’ Attitudes Toward the
Cinema as an Advertising Medium,” Journal of Advertising 36.1 (Spring 2007): 88. Emphasis added. As the article
was published in Spring of 2007, I presume that the response was given sometime in 2006.
6
A small sampling: Keith F. Johnson, “Cinema Advertising,” Journal of Advertising 10.4 (1981): 11-19; Jason
Dunnett and Janet Hoek, “An Evaluation of Cinema Advertising Effectiveness,” Marketing Bulletin May 1996: 5866; Alain d’Astous and Francis Chartier, “A Study of Factors Affecting Consumer Evaluations and Memory of
Product Placement in Movies,” Journal of Current Issues and Research in Advertising 22.2 (Fall 2000): 32-40; Pola
B. Gupta, Siva K. Balasubramanian, and Michael L. Klassen, “Viewers’ Evaluations of Product Placement in
Movies: Public Policy Issues and Managerial Implications,” Journal of Current Issues and Research in Advertising
22.2 (Fall 2000): 41-52; Michael T. Ewing, Erik du Plessis, and Charles Foster, “Cinema Advertising ReConsidered,” Journal of Advertising Research 41.1 (January/February 2001): 78-85; Joanna Phillips and Stephanie
M. Noble, “Simply Captivating: Understanding Consumers’ Attitudes Toward the Cinema as an Advertising
Medium,” Journal of Advertising 36.1 (Spring 2007): 81-94.
7
Jay Newell, Charles T. Salmon, and Susan Chang, “The Hidden History of Product Placement,” Journal of
Broadcasting & Electronic Media 50.4 (December 2006): 580, 590.
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Lombard in 19088 and the film-trailer advertisements of Houston’s Southern Film Service in
1914.9 Concerns over the effectiveness of given techniques feature equally well-worn tropes.
The attitudes which Joanna Phillips and Stephanie M. Noble connect to ‘Reactance Theory’
(combative behavior resulting from the sense of curtailed freedoms), ‘Equity Theory’
(decreasing attendance due to a sense that the cost of a ticket exceeds the pleasure derived if
advertising is added to the cinema experience), and ‘Expectancy Disconfirmation Theory’
(displeasure resulting from the cinema experience failing to meet preconceptions)10, were being
voiced, albeit in different terms, about cinema advertising throughout the ‘transitional era’
(roughly 1908 to 1917).11 In this study, I contend that advertising and the cinema not only have
a long history of interrelation, but that, until Depression era radio, they were mutually defining
institutions. Cinema advertising of the transitional era, as an overt foil for many cinema
commentators, played a formative role in the American rebranding of cinema as a highbrow
entertainment. Simultaneously, the marginalization of these practices from the mainstream
theaters established a cultural hostility to direct advertising in new media which would require
years of broadcasting experience to overturn.
8

Display Ad, Moving Picture World 2.15 (11 April 1908): 329.
Display Ad, Moving Picture World 19.10 (7 March 1914): 1330.
10
Joanna Phillips and Stephanie M. Noble, “Simply Captivating: Understanding Consumers’ Attitudes Toward the
Cinema as an Advertising Medium,” Journal of Advertising 36.1 (Spring 2007): 82-83.
11
Periodization of the American silent cinema generally reduces the era to three hazily dated phases: the ‘cinema of
attractions,’ the ‘transitional era,’ and the ‘feature film era.’ During the time when cinema was an ‘attraction,’ the
fact of film mattered more than the content, as the very act of seeing a film was noteworthy. In the ‘feature’ era,
most of the practices we recognize from pre-World War II American cinema, except for the use of pre-recorded
sound – major studios, feature films, vertical integration, the Hays Office, etc. – were already in operation or shortly
to be born. The ‘transitional era’ in between thus encapsulates the institutionalization of the cinema, as the original
practices were abandoned, sometimes in multiple phases, resulting in the mature industry of the 1920s. For a
detailed study of the vagaries of periodization, see: Charlie Keil and Shelley Stamp, “Introduction,” and Ben
Brewster, “Periodization of Early Cinema,” both in American Cinema’s Transitional Era: Audiences, Institutions,
Practices, ed. Charlie Keil and Shelley Stamp (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press,
2004). See also: Tom Gunning, “Cinema of Attractions,” Early Cinema: Space, Frame, Narrative, ed. Thomas
Elsaesser (London: British Film Institute, 1990), 58-59; Tom Gunning, D.W. Griffith and the Origins of American
Narrative Film: The Early Years at Biograph (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1991); and David
Bordwell, Janet Staiger and Kristin Thompson, The Classical Hollywood Cinema: Film Style and Mode of
Production to 1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).
9

4
For cinema studies, this dissertation on the direct advertising tactics used in transitional
era cinema – including slides, trailers, and offscreen materials like advertising clocks – reveals a
new breadth of local cinema experiences which were slowly pushed into the margins by the
vertically integrating industry. For an era in which the tension between mass and class audiences
was a driving factor for innovation (leading, for example, to the creation of feature films and
palatial theaters), cinema advertising was a key way in which cinema theaters were
differentiated. Though cinema advertisers were eternally chasing the affluent, cinema
advertising itself became a marker of lower class and independent theatrical experiences.
Opinions about poor quality cinema advertising – cracked slides, cheap animation, and light
polluting clocks – became entangled with the notion that advertising was inherently lowbrow.
The entire field was increasingly condemned as a boorish intrusion on the refined American
cinema of the future. By examining the history of transitional era American cinema advertising,
through the lens of supportive and critical rhetoric, this study reveals how the American film
industry intentionally divorced itself from commercialism. This dissertation thus contributes to
our understanding of the ways in which the “business pure and simple” of American cinema was
distanced from alternative exhibition practices in order to strengthen its new institutional
standing as an art.
For the history of American advertising, this study of silent era cinema advertising erases
the dissonance in canonical advertising history caused by juxtaposing the proliferation of direct
advertising via periodicals and billboards at the turn of the century, with the hesitation about
direct advertising on radio throughout the 1920s. What appears to be simple hesitation in the
face of a new technology is revealed to be the legacy of the failure in the cinema. As Kenneth
Lipartito has said, in the history of technology and ideas,

5
failures…contribute to the construction of the frameworks of meaning that guide
decisions in an open-ended technological world. They fit into a narrative about
technology that helps to shape the range of choices we can make.12
Cinema advertising is thus an important failure, in which the faltering dream of an advertising
supported cinema sowed seeds of doubt about the suitability of direct advertising in new media.
The American silent cinema is, thus, a missing link in the history of the advertising industry’s
relentless 20th century expansion – a largely failed attempt to colonize the first moving medium,
which, by the very fact of its failure, directly influenced developments to follow.
Much like the concepts of pre-recorded sound,13 color photography,14 and widescreen
aesthetics,15 cinema advertising is not an era but an idea, threaded through the history of both the
American cinema and advertising industries – now present, now absent, but always in the air as
an option. The cultural antagonisms bound up in the history of cinema advertising – audiences
vs. advertising, exhibitors vs. studios, the film industry vs. the advertising industry, and
advertising agencies vs. non-print media – are still with us, as are many of the preconceptions
which developed around the experimentation. In the interplay between onscreen and offscreen
space, audience captivity and audience hostility, downtown and neighborhood theaters, and the
many attempts to culturally define the cinema, advertising in American film theaters shaped
future conceptions of what modern advertising and the cinema experience could be.

12

Kenneth Lipartito, “Picturephone and the Information Age: The Social Meaning of Failure,” Technology and
Culture 44.1 (January 2003): 57.
13
James Lastra, Sound Technology and the American Cinema: Perception, Representation, Modernity (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2000); Richard Abel and Rick Altman, ed., The Sounds of Early Cinema (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 2001); and Rick Altman, Silent Film Sound (New York: Columbia University Press,
2005).
14
Richard Misek, Chromatic Cinema: A History of Screen Color (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010); and
Joshua Yumibe, Moving Color: Early Film, Mass Culture, Modernism (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press,
2012).
15
John Belton, Widescreen Cinema (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); and Harper Cossar,
Letterboxed: The Evolution of Widescreen Cinema (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011).
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Topics and Terms
Before going any further, it is important to introduce the exact subject of this dissertation.
While ‘consumer goods advertising in American silent theaters’ may seem quite specific,
advertising can be researched from a number of angles. This dissertation will not focus, to any
large degree, on the aesthetics of advertising content, the growth of consumer culture, or the
importance of government regulation to advertising proliferation. Though short discussions of
all of these elements will be included where relevant, my focus will be on the debate surrounding
the adoption of the motion picture theater (in both the on and offscreen spaces) for direct
consumer goods advertising. Cinema advertising ‘agents,’ film audiences, and exhibitors will be
the predominant human subjects. The central subject of the study will, thus, be the silent motion
picture theater and the theories and practices of film consumption. If cinema is a ‘medium,’ it is
a medium made of wood and brick, and must be conceptualized through the interplay of spaces
and crowds. To quote Andre Gaudreault, cinema is not a device, but “a social, cultural,
economic, etc. system.”16 Shifting focus from the screen to the venue allows us to reconsider
cinema as a gestalt entity. Before the sound revolution, the cinema was a multiple media
environment. Reconsidering transitional era cinema from the perspective of advertising allows
us to see the ways in which American silent cinemagoing was an untidy event, in which a
number of divergent experiences coalesced.
Therefore, various tactics for integrating direct advertising into a cinema theater will be
discussed, with the center of debate always being between the goals of advertisers and the desires
16

André Guadreault, “The Culture Broth and the Froth of Cultures of So-Called Early Cinema,” A Companion to
Early Cinema, ed. André Guadreault, Nicolas Dulac, and Santiago Hidalgo (Malden, MA, and Oxford: John Wiley
& Sons, 2012), 16. Gaudreault has spent a number of years rethinking the silent cinema from this perspective. See
the following examples available in English: Gaudreault, Film and Attraction: From Kinematography to Cinema,
tran. Timothy Barnard (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2011); and Gaudreault and Philippe Marion, “A
Medium is Always Born Twice…,” trans. Timothy Barnard, Wendy Schubring, and Frank Le Gac, Early Popular
Visual Culture 3.1 (May 2005): 3-15.
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of filmmakers, exhibitors, and audiences. Chapters will be structured not around copy style, or
ideological opinions, but around tactics for invading the theatrical space – lantern slides,
commercial trailers, and offscreen technologies. As this is a study of the early adoption of a
medium, the multiplicity of available tactics, and the way those tactics were distinguished, are
the most important subjects.17
In basic terms, cinema advertising tactics fragment along three important axes: the
directness of address (camouflaged via integration with entertainment, or overt standalone
messages), formal properties (moving or still imagery), and physical position (onscreen or
offscreen). The first axis – directness – is a distinction that frames the entire selection of topic
for this study. Via direct advertising slides, trailers, or offscreen imagery, the viewer is
introduced unambiguously to the availability of a product (up to and including a mention of the
price and a merchant’s address). Indirect advertising tactics, like product placement and
sponsorship, link a product to a film without overtly calling attention to product qualities or
price. In the American silent cinema, direct and indirect advertising were distinct practices,
which were offered by different advertising companies, and financially benefitted different
sectors of the film industry. Direct cinema advertisements were brief and independent messages,
the theater ‘space’ was openly purchased from exhibitors, and the producers were typically small
companies dedicated exclusively to one tactic. Indirect advertising was often circulated
surreptitiously (only the film producer, not the exhibitor, was paid), and the producers were often
mainstream American studios like Universal. Thus, the two represent distinct projects. As

17

Similar analyses of what Rick Altman has termed the “chaotic diversity” of early developmental periods can be
found in numerous previous studies. For two film related examples, see: Rick Altman, Silent Film Sound (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 23; Tom Kemper, Hidden Talent: The Emergence of Hollywood Agents
(Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2010).
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indirect tactics have received the lion’s share of previous scholarly attention,18 I have opted to
devote my energies to the lesser known direct advertising methods.19
The remaining two axes – formal properties and physical position – help to fragment
direct advertising discussions still further. The dominant area of debate in direct cinema
advertising in the silent era was regarding formal properties. It is important to remember that the
transitional era cinema remained, for a time, a mixed media venue. During the 1910s, though
motion picture theaters were defined by the centrality of film to their offerings, still images
through lantern slides, live musical performances, and even brief stage shows remained a part of
programs. As such, a significant amount of time and ink was expended in cinema advertising
debates on the topic of still imagery, and whether the use of stills was an aid or a hindrance to
advertising effectiveness. (For example: Was a still image a welcome ‘rest’ from motion picture
eye-strain, or was it a boring disruption of the flow?) Slides were also cheaper to produce and
circulate than films, adding an element of practical financial concern to an otherwise complex
biological and psychological debate.
Physical position was a less common, but no less compelling, topic which fragmented
debate on cinema advertising in the United States. For a minority of cinema advertising
proponents, it was not the lack of motion but the usurpation of the screen which caused the most
trouble for cinema ads. For these ad men, the walls, chairs, and air were all seen as viable
location alternatives for advertising content, as long as such advertisements did not obstruct the
screen or otherwise interfere with its viewing. Such advertising would occur to the side of the
18

See, for starters, the following works. Charles R. Acland and Haidee Wasson, eds., Useful Cinema (Durham:
Duke University Press, 2011). Lee Grieveson, “The Work of Film in the Age of Fordist Mechanization,” Cinema
Journal 51.3 (Spring 2012): 25-51. Other examples will be referenced over the course of this introduction.
19
The issue of ‘hard sell’ and ‘soft sell,’ on the other hand, does come up. Through the use of humor and animation,
trailers were decidedly more ‘soft sell’ than slides. Though ad content is not a primary topic of this study, this
distinction between ‘dry’ slides and ‘fun’ trailers became part of the rhetoric that differentiated the two tactics, and
shall be explored in chapters three and four.

9
entertainment, as marginalia to a simultaneously available focal point. In the debate over
physical position, theories of permanent visibility (as opposed to the ‘fleeting’ nature of an
onscreen ad) and the importance of viewer choice (could the viewer ‘opt out’ of reading the
advertisement) came to the fore. Emerging from the tradition of printed handbills and theater
curtains, the chair-back, wall, or waste receptacle sign were proposed as alternative advertising
forms for the cinema space.20 As such, the distinction between temporal and spatial advertising
became one of the central and most influential aspects of silent cinema advertising debates.
Concerns over the consequences of temporal advertising (primarily, the possibility of ‘ill will’
created by audience compulsion) grew to dominate the discussion of cinema advertising, and
were formative concerns for early radio (see chapter six).21
Identifying these fault lines is important as they drove both competition and innovation in
all areas. While commercial trailers were designed to compete with lantern slides, on the
grounds that stationary slides were undesirable, the inventors of ‘motion slides,’ using liquidchambers and moving parts, used the same logic to try to improve their wares. The importance
of evading a fleeting impression drove many slide and trailer makers to suggest offscreen parallel
advertising (like a simultaneous printed ad in the theaters handbill). As such, identifying the

20

Non-cinematic precursors also informed this debate. Probably most important was the then comparatively recent
shift of magazine advertising out of a bookend position (where all advertisements were restricted to their own pages
at the beginning and end of each issue) and into the regular pages. See: Hugo Münsterberg, “Social Sins in
Advertising,” Psychology and Social Sanity (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page, and Co., 1914), 229-249.
21
Perceptive readers may note a similarity between the spatial arrangements of the theater and the spatial
arrangements of a screen. As product placement has become more complex, similar issues have been discussed;
how ‘central’ should an advertisement be? Amanda Lotz identifies a product placement split which she terms
‘organic’ (non-obtrusive product placement which doesn’t call too much attention to itself – like a logo appearing in
the background) versus ‘inorganic’ (very forced and obvious placement – like a close-up of a car logo, or the
inclusion of the product name in the dialogue). (Amanda Lotz, The Television Will Be Revolutionized (New York
and London: New York University Press, 2007], 168; see also Jean-Marc Lehu, Branded Entertainment: Product
Placement & Brand Strategy in the Entertainment Business [London and Philadelphia: Kogan Page, 2007], 114115.) The increasing visual and verbal centrality of inorganic product placement is similar to the usurpation of the
screen that was criticized by offscreen advertising proponents in the silent era. Despite the parallel, Lotz’ terms do
not really fit with the offscreen / onscreen split. As such, they have not been adopted here.

10
conceptual lines is not simply an exercise of differentiation, but also an introduction to many of
the debates to come.
Studying transitional era American cinema advertising by fragmenting out tactics and the
thinking underlying them allows us to see not only the importance of cinema advertising to the
development of the classical Hollywood exhibition paradigm, but also the complicated debates at
the time over how best to define the audience. Perspectives on the formal properties and
positioning of cinema advertising, including the belief that advertising had no place in the
cinema, were tied to perspectives on audiences. Were audiences grateful for services? Annoyed
by interruption? Accepting of humorous or pleasant advertising messages? Disdainful of all
things commercial? By separating the study into tactics for direct advertising, we can see clearly
the ways in which a single topic – in this case, cinema advertising – produces a mass of
conflicting interpretations which are then smoothed into a single, mainstream institutional
definition of the medium. Such a study is of added relevance to current scholarship due to the
parallels with current digital culture. The mass rethinking of advertising in the wake of the
digital transition has given new life to these audience debates which occurred in the silent
cinema as the now virtual ‘venue’ of digital media can contain marginalia as well as ‘spots’ and
‘placement.’

Technological ‘Failure’ and the Study of History
In the wake of the postmodernist critique of historical practice in the 1970s – in which
historical writing was criticized, among other things, for hiding interpretive claims in formal
structures and erroneous assertions of ‘objectivity’22 – it is helpful to define and justify, at the

22

Though the movement was part of the larger wave of postmodern critique, the locus of historical postmodernism
is the work of Hayden White, whose 1970s critiques led to the scholarly equivalent of open warfare in the 1980s and
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outset, one’s particular historiographic approach. History as a discipline has its operating
theories as well. (Indeed, it is in deference to this critique that history is an interpretive act,
structured by various interpretive preconceptions, that my writing is at times worded in the first
person [“I argue…”] rather than in an omniscient third person.)
In brief and explicit terms, my perspective is that dead ends, failures, abandoned ideas,
and stagnant theories are vital to the telling of history, as successful and immediate adoption of a
concept is not a pre-requisite for historical influence. Indeed, as Kenneth Lipartito argues,
[f]ailed technologies, far from being dead ends or even mere cautionary tales, may
persist well beyond their material life. They may reinforce rather than undermine
technological paths, even when those paths are questionable or undesirable. […]
Failure…stem[s] not from some functional flaw in the product or from a
traditional notion of consumer demand, but rather from a contingent sequence of
actions that reflec[t] the influence of expectations, assumptions, uncertainty,
politics, and self-reinforcing decisions.23
In short, the existence of an idea matters, regardless of its breadth of adoption, as it is imbricated
in a way of thinking and a larger process of social development. This is, to my mind, the
primary reason why the main line of development in any given field is always susceptible to
jarring paradigm shifts or unexpected recurrences of ideas that seemed to have died long ago.
Progress, if indeed we can call it that, is not always (perhaps even rarely) rational. To treat the
less successful elements of history as ipso facto unimportant is to commit the error of thinking
that the present has never lost or temporarily mislaid ideas from the past. The telling of history
must not abandon counter-histories, cyclical repetitions, and coincidence in favor of causal logic.
Nor, of course, should the inverse be true. We must be capable of telling both the ‘master
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narrative’ and the marginal history simultaneously. One of the ways in which we can do this is
to find those moments – those seemingly minor, barely-influential ideas – which prefigure later
turns in the ‘master narrative.’
The historical turn towards studying failures is comparatively recent. 24 Scott A. Sandage
asserts in his 2005 book Born Losers that, from the early 1800s to the late 1900s, American
culture at large – and, by extension, the historians and other scholars who studied it –commonly
“fixed blame [for failure] squarely on individual faults, not extenuating circumstances.”25 The
deterministic assertion that failure was somehow predictable due to technological or personal
fault became axiomatic. The “‘reverse Whig’ histories” described by Lipartito, in which
technologies that failed in the market become “cautionary tales of error or hubris,”26 are thus a
longstanding tradition in American (mis)interpretation. Sandage stresses that prominent business
historian Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., as recently as 1975, still confidently asserted “that studying
failure in and of itself would not be a useful enterprise.”27 In the latter half of the 1980s, scholars
began to attack such deterministic thinking and rethink the importance of the study of failures to
culture, both as prerequisites to later successes and as important markers of the contingent nature

24

I use the term ‘failure’ here as scholarly studies of the importance of ‘non-successes’ typically use the term, in
deference to their case studies (most commonly, technologies abandoned after a cool market reception). However,
as Graeme Gooday has pointed out, the definition of ‘success’ is hazy – even when one restricts the discussion
solely to economics; the diesel engine may not have dominated the market, but it was still successful. Sales figures
and their duration therefore remain open questions. As cinema advertising is a particularly complicated case, I will,
over the remainder of this study, use the more open term ‘marginalized’ rather than ‘failed.’ Cinema advertising
businesses may have failed, but the techniques and technologies rarely died with them. In most cases, they were
simply pushed out of the mainstream. As such, the late 1970s cinema advertising renaissance was merely an
expansion of long, low-level usage. ‘Failure’ of silent cinema advertising is, thus, solely a measure of scale, not a
complete disappearance. Graeme Gooday, “Re-Writing the ‘Book of Blots’: Critical Reflections on Histories of
Technological ‘Failure’,” History and Technology 14 (1998): 269.
25
Sandage, Scott A., Born Losers: A History of Failure in America (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard
University Press, 2005), 17.
26
Kenneth Lipartito, “Picturephone and the Information Age: The Social Meaning of Failure,” Technology and
Culture 44.1 (January 2003): 53.
27
Sandage, Scott A., Born Losers: A History of Failure in America (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard
University Press, 2005), 8-9.

13
of success – that any ‘success’ emerges from a field of related marginal ideas.28 The study of
failed, abandoned, and unexpectedly recurrent ideas has thus already added significantly to our
understanding of the development of technology, discouraging deterministic descriptions of the
impact of technological invention on history (asserting that success or failure of an idea, and its
impact on culture, is inevitable due to traits of the invention), and encouraging a focus on the
contextual elements driving both the invention and adoption of a technology. However, as
Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman assert,
[a]t too high a level of generality, the knowledge of social shaping is vacuous,
except as a polemical counterpoint to simplistic technological determinism. If the
idea of the social shaping of technology has intellectual or political merit, this lies
in the details: in the particular ways technology is socially shaped.29
Important to the history of failure, then, is understanding the way that the act of invention is
integrated into longer histories of ideas, from the overdetermination of the act of invention, to the
polysemy (or “interpretive flexibility”) of a technology once it has been released into culture.
The field of technological history provides numerous examples of the importance of
failed technologies to longer histories of ideas. An exceptional example is the research into the
failure of Picturephone by Kenneth Lipartito, in which he links the concept to longer standing
notions of visuality and ‘distance learning’ – going so far as to assert that the Picturephone,
given different circumstances, could have filled the same cultural niche that the internet now
occupies.30 Randall Patnode argues that technologies can fail (and succeed) due to institutional
inertia in competing areas, as was the case with ‘wired wireless’ transmission, which both AT&T
28
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and RCA failed to push as an alternative to commercial radio in the 1920s.31 Steven Boyer
connects Nintendo’s Virtual Boy videogame system to the discourse of virtual reality, asserting
that niche appreciation connects technologies to wider cultural concerns even in the wake of a
mainstream failure of a product to sell.32 Paul Atkinson asserts that even ‘non-products’ like the
Kitchen Computer (a piece of technology designed for reasons other than sales) can connect to
broader ideas; in Atkinson’s words, the aesthetics of the Kitchen Computer were significant for
design history, regardless of the circulation of the technology, as “it was purely the idea of the
product that was being consumed.”33 Patrick McCray makes a similar argument for the
influence of one discarded concept on future scientific developments, in his study of the
abandonment of the National New Technology Telescope.34 As mentioned above, cinema
studies has its own examples of this historical rethinking; studies of the persistence of
experimentation with color, sound, and widescreen ground particular failed efforts in longer lines
of conceptual development.35 Such studies, to varying degrees, stress the complex array of
influences on the development of any given device, putting the importance on the life of an idea
rather than an invention.36
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Recent work in media history has been more interested in the second approach to failure:
studying the ‘broth’ of alternative uses from which the successful mature form of a medium
emerges. Rick Altman has proposed a model of research which he calls ‘crisis historiography,’
in which one studies the ‘identity crisis’ of new technologies caught between competing cultural
ideologies before finally settling into their stable form.37 André Gaudreault and Philippe Marion
call this moment the “incubation period” between a medium’s “integrating birth” (its moment of
invention when it is seen as a continuation of old forms) and its “distinguishing birth” (when it
becomes fully institutionalized as a unique medium).38 Carolyn Marvin, using a spatial
metaphor that I literalize in studying exhibition structures, forwards a notion that new mediums
are like undiscovered country, slowly being ‘mapped’ by minds slanted by cultural
preconceptions.39 Lisa Gitelman calls this phase the development of ‘protocols,’ in which one
particular usage of a technology becomes ‘common sense’ as all other possible uses are publicly
forgotten.40 For media, the state of newness requires the existence of a multiplicity of
interpretations and competing uses, many of which must, by the fact of later institutionalization,
be eventually marginalized.41
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It is my contention that the study of cinema advertising – a concept which not only had
the long gestation period of widescreen cinema, but also the flurry of early conflicting
interpretations of an ‘identity crisis’ – can helpfully join these two approaches to ‘failure.’ By
studying the early adopters, foundational concepts, and the everyday men and women of
American history bound up in the ‘identity crisis’ of early cinema advertising (and early cinema
itself), in the wake of a later renaissance of the substantially similar techniques in substantially
similar venues, we can link the marginalized ideas of one generation to a reoccurrence.42 In the
American cinema, as it turns out, advertising techniques behave like weeds; they grow in hidden
places and occasionally overrun the garden, and a long line of cinema ‘guardians’ have
continually tried to pull them out. What follows is a first step: a study of the ‘identity crisis’ of
cinema advertising, analyzing the large-scale insertion and removal of consumer goods
advertising in American silent movie theaters, decades before the contemporary renaissance.
Experimentation with direct advertising in the American silent cinema was a social event, and its
fate was determined by expectations, preconceptions, and struggles to define the medium. An
emerging rhetoric of cultural hierarchy (with cinema as a highbrow medium), along with rapidly
codifying preconceptions about the incompatibility of direct advertising with both pleasure and
ticket prices, were important social determinants for the initial marginalization of cinema
advertising.

Literature Review: Media Studies
This study is placed at the intersection of two major fields of study – histories of film and
histories of advertising – each of which is large enough to require its own sub-heading here. In
42
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this section, I will deal exclusively with media studies. Four specific sub-fields in media studies
have bearing on this research: aesthetics (specifically animation), reception studies, studies of
silent film exhibition, and media industries studies (specifically silent film). Combining these
four branches of study allows us to restore the marginal practice of direct consumer goods
advertising in the American silent cinema to a place of formative importance for film history.
For formal aesthetics, direct cinema advertising techniques compel us to rethink the received
wisdom about the origins of animation, which was a practice tightly connected with commercial
trailers in the mid-1910s. For reception studies, this research can help to re-insert cinema
advertising into the discussion as an interpretive frame for the cinema experience, both then and
now. For histories of transitional era exhibition, early American advertising experiments provide
an important element of marketing context to the development of a middle-class cinema culture,
as the rebranding of cinema as highbrow occurred with overt reference to the supposed lowbrow
qualities of advertising funded entertainment. For studies of media industries, transitional era
cinema advertising research provides a parallel with radio, television, and internet industrial
studies, describing the dalliance with consumer goods advertising which resulted in the cinema
becoming the only mass medium to predominantly reject direct advertising. Each of these four
topics shall be reviewed in turn in this section.
Aesthetic concerns dominate early work in scholarly cinema studies. Vachel Lindsay
published the first aesthetic analysis of film, The Art of the Moving Picture, in 1915, in which he
laid out an early taxonomy of ‘genres’ he labeled films of ‘Action,’ ‘Intimacy,’ and ‘Splendor.’43
As cinema studies emerged as a distinct field in American universities at mid-century, aesthetics
dominated the discourse, with the concept of ‘auteurism’ (the study of cinema as a work of a
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particular author – usually the director) dominating the discourse.44 American silent era auteurs
like D.W. Griffith and Charlie Chaplin,45 and genres like the Western and the adventure serial,46
have received significant scholarly attention, ranging from purely formal analyses to broad
biographically and culturally informed studies, as pure formalism has become less dominant in
the field. Although much of the study to follow is not oriented towards the screen or the creators
of the advertising content, one highly pertinent sub-field of aesthetic research is relevant: studies
of animation. While the field is understandably oriented around major figures and studios from
the golden age of cinema – like Walt Disney and Warner Bros.47 – a few scholars have
researched the early history of film animation. Donald Crafton’s Before Mickey is the
touchstone for silent era animation, in which he studies the makers and styles of early
entertainment animation, taking particular interesting in the slow and difficult evolution of the
form as techniques were invented to streamline and cheapen the process.48 Giannalberto
Bendazzi takes a longer view, studying a hundred years of animation history, while helpfully
providing a global context for developments – providing brief overviews of unstudied national
animation cinemas like Sweden (where the animation “grew in the field of advertising”).49 The
very early silent film work of Walt Disney has, of course, also received significant attention as a
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developmental period for his work, including (often brief) discussions of his introduction to
animation at the advertising oriented Kansas City Slide Company.50 These scholars have already
given us a suitably nuanced conception of the interplay between art, technology, and business
acumen in early American animation.
However, the importance of cinema advertising history to animation has remained
predominantly off the radar. The references to advertising cartoons in the works of both Crafton
and Bendazzi are slim, and the early work of Disney is studied only as a precursor to his later
fame, not as part of a broader culture of commercial animation. This study of direct cinema
advertising, particularly the early years of consumer-goods trailers, and their relationship to the
even older concept of hand-drawn lantern slides, provides a shadow history of the origins of
animation – a history in which advertising dollars were equally responsible for technological
innovation. Animated trailers were circulated regularly in American cinema theaters as early as
the work of the entertainment pioneers. This history is thus very important to a complete
understanding of the development of animation from a cinema novelty to an institution.51
Research into reception is as established as aesthetic studies of cinema, although early
work was conducted from a social scientific angle, rather than the literary inflection of scholars
of the cinema as an aesthetic form. Scholars have been interested in ways in which cinema
transmits meaning to viewers, and the elements which frame and delimit interpretation, since
Hugo Münsterberg published The Photoplay: A Psychological Study in 1916. In this work,
Münsterberg codified the early film theory of “psychical infection,” in which the communication
50
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of information via motion pictures was deemed too rapid to allow for critical thinking, thus
effectively ‘implanting’ information into the viewer’s mind.52 After significant revision to this
‘passive audience’ thesis over decades of social scientific research,53 the current theory of ‘active
audiences’ and interpretive flexibility emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. Post-Structuralists like
Julia Kristeva and Roland Barthes introduced the concept of ‘intertextuality,’ in which a text, for
both the writer and the reader, must always be filtered through connotations both social and
personal.54 Meaning is thus not in the books, but created through the interaction of a mind and a
text. Through Cultural Studies theorists, this concept has taken on the status of theory of
interpretation. Stuart Hall proposed the possibility of ‘negotiated’ and ‘oppositional’
interpretations of messages in his 1973 argument “Encoding and Decoding in the Television
Discourse” – an essay which was a driving force for the explosion of Cultural Studies
scholarship in the years that followed.55 Since the turn to ‘active audience’ thinking, some
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scholars have begun to study elements of the cinema experience which, while they do not
determine, can at least delimit interpretive freedom. A foundational text in this line was
Lawrence W. Levine’s Highbrow/Lowbrow, in which he asserted that the distinction between
high-class and popular American culture emerged over the course of the 19th century, resulting in
the ”sacralization” of high culture as inherently valuable and deserving of reverence and respect.
This cultural hierarchy became a fundamental interpretive frame in consumption of cultural
works.56 Silent era studies have also pursued this notion productively. Various scholars have
studied the American film industry’s quest for respectability in the mid-1910s, which had the
ultimate goal of rebranding the cinema experience as a highbrow entertainment.57 As this
attempt at rebranding the experience of cinema became more and more successful, it acted as a
frame on interpretation, skewing the viewer’s reading towards artistic appreciation. Kathryn
Fuller-Seeley has studied the development of storefront theater advertising during the early silent
era, asserting that the content of film posters helped to train audiences how to view the content
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on the screen.58 Richard Abel has asserted that the production of Westerns, for example, was
part of a concerted effort to train viewers to notice, and appreciate, that American films were
American made and thus attuned to American beliefs.59 Research into the theory of the
‘balanced program’ – in which more sedate, intellectual and ‘educational’ films were used to
avoid “continual stimulation from exciting dramas,” and thus (in theory) gave the program a
psychologically comfortable flow of tones – has even provided some knowledge of how silent
era American film practitioners themselves conceived of factors which influenced viewer
reception.60 As such, scholars have provided a significant working knowledge of the contextual
elements of interpretation in American silent theaters.
We can add to this work on silent era context through a study of cinema advertising. A
glaring absence in research into American silent era interpretation and framing is the structuring
presence (and equally structuring absence) of direct consumer-goods advertising within the
cinema space. In the transitional era, a large number of cinema fans and practitioners accepted
without question the notion that the presence of advertising in the cinema theater would
influence the viewer’s interpretation of the films and the experience. Generally this sense of the
intertextual impact of advertising was linked overtly to a Levine-esque cultural hierarchy, in
which advertising was described as ‘degrading’ to the cinema experience. The marginalization
of advertising is a moment in which the mainstream film industry asserted that advertising
58
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content, specifically, would not be allowed to delimit the viewer’s interpretive independence.
Commerce was to remain outside of the experience; the cinema was a place to escape from
exhortations to consume.
Tightly connected to research into the vagaries of audience reception and interpretive
framing, is research into exhibition – particularly the variations in silent cinema exhibition
practices. Early scholarship on the American silent cinema was predominantly concerned with
national norms of exhibition. As such, the turn to the feature film model of exhibition, the
formation of large chains of theaters, the construction of palatial theaters, and the vertical
integration of the industry (in which the major studios took over the chains) were all studied as
elements in the creation of the ‘classical Hollywood cinema’ model – the homogenization of
American cinema culture.61 Recent scholarship into the silent era has begun to stress the
vagaries of this transition, pointing to the prevalence of old and alternative exhibition practices
alongside the mainstream palatial model. The particularities of segregation have allowed for
significant research into the fragmentation of American silent era exhibition. Mary Carbine,
Gregory A. Waller, and Jacqueline Najuma Stewart have all studied the ways in which
segregated and exclusively black theaters provided unique experiences for the audiences within
them.62 Ben Singer has shown that the transition from the ‘variety program’ of shorts to the
‘feature program’ took place over a number of years, indicating that, between 1914 and 1918,
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both ‘feature program’ and ‘variety program’ houses were in operation simultaneously.63
Kathryn H. Fuller-Seeley has differentiated between rural and urban exhibition models over the
course of the 1910s, arguing that nickelodeon-style exhibition continued in rural areas until the
studios made a concerted effort to link palatial exhibition with ‘quality’ cinema. In this same
work, Fuller-Seeley also points to the importance of regional variations (like the South’s
pioneering use of air-conditioning) and movements for non-theatrical screenings (like the
censored and/or ‘educational’ church and school shows) to the exhibition culture(s) of the
1910s.64 Richard deCordova’s earlier research into children’s matinees provides further
information on the proliferation of censored shows.65 With the recent turn to regional and local
studies of American cinema, significant research into ‘educational’ film exhibitions in nontheatrical spaces has also been done.66 We now have a sense that the transitional era was one of
various interlocking exhibition cultures, in which a number of key determining factors –
including race, censorship, region, etc. – are important to understanding any individual
exhibition site.
My research adds another element to our knowledge of the ways in which exhibition
practices in the American silent cinema were fragmented. Much like Fuller-Seeley’s notion that
rural cinema practices were increasingly derided as culturally inferior to the urban palatial
cinemas, the theaters which chose to integrate consumer goods advertising into the experience –
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whether it be through slides, trailers, or offscreen technologies – came under increasing attack as
well. As it became more and more common to assert that direct advertising within the cinema
space was not in keeping with the ‘dignity’ of motion picture exhibition, both the integration and
rejection of advertising became a point of distinction for American silent theaters of the 1910s.
Those theaters which rejected cinema advertising often publicized their decision boisterously.
Thus, whether or not a given theater included advertising was an important distinguishing
element.
Comparatively recently, scholarly studies of production and exhibition cultures have
coalesced into broader studies of the industrial structure of media. In general, media industries
scholarship focuses on production cultures and the elements which impact the creation of media
forms and content.67 For example, Michael Curtin has argued for the importance of regional
specificity to production cultures in, for example, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Hong Kong.68 A
common topic of study in media industries research is the importance of advertising dollars to
production. Philip M. Napoli, Robert McChesney, and the team of David Croteau and William
Hoynes, have variously studied the ways in which advertising becomes entwined with media like
radio and television. The ‘dual market model’ of business, in which content is sold to viewers in
order to sell viewer numbers to advertisers, can skew production towards the (presumed) tastes
of popular target audiences.69 Although media industries studies are not exclusively focused on
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contemporary events, historical research is less common. In many ways, the first three volumes
of Scribner’s “History of the American Cinema” series remain the best reference texts for the
American silent cinema as an industry, as their wide ranging contents provide easy access to
broad knowledge of the American film business.70 While most of the previously cited work in
silent cinema deal, partially, with culture and aesthetics as industrially determined, book length
research explicitly focused on the industrial structure of the silent cinema remains rare. Tino
Balio studied the development of the American cinema from a historical angle in 1976, stressing
the importance of transitional era events like the developing hierarchy of theaters, and the
competing groups of the Motion Picture Patents Company and the Independent film producers.71
Janet Staiger’s portion of the 1985 study The Classical Hollywood Cinema extended our
understanding of the evolution of the American industry through a discussion of the shifting
production models common to studio filmmaking, and how the alterations in the structures of
power impacted production.72 Staiger’s later research into the adaptation of advertising practices
for film marketing added further detail to our understanding of the growth of American film as a
cultural industry.73 The institutionalization and competitive conditions of transitional era cinema
are thus relatively well understood, even if the information is dispersed.
A study of cinema advertising in the 1910s adds helpfully to the discussion, in that it
brings one particular conversation from media industries scholarship – advertising and its impact
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on industry structure and content production – into an arena where it has been largely left aside.
As a rapidly marginalized practice in the American cinema, research into early cinema
advertising has remained limited – likely under the assumption that cinema advertising failed to
gain significant traction in this medium, and that it thus had no significant impact. However, it is
my contention that, since the development of advertising as an industry in late 19th century
America, all American mass media have negotiated their own relationship to the dual-market
model. There is no medium that is outside of the advertising question in a market economy
where media operate as private, for-profit businesses. For a significant stretch of time, the
cinema was a prominent example not of the absence of advertising, but of a large-scale rejection
of it. As such, debates over cinema advertising add greatly to our understanding of the early
institutionalization of the medium in this country. As exhibition culture was still seeking its
stable form, practices of financing were in flux; it was not entirely clear that ticketing and
concessions would be the predominant means of funding the cinema experience, as exhibitors
attempted many means to underwrite cinema expenses. The marginalization of direct advertising
was, thus, as important as the acceptance of advertising would have been; it was a conscious
response to a question which demanded an answer.

Literature Review: Advertising History
While this study of cinema advertising adds an easily identifiable component to extant
transitional era cinema scholarship, what it offers to advertising scholarship is both more subtle
and more modest. In the early decades of the 20th century, cinema advertising in the United
States was a marginal practice dominated by upstarts and charlatans. However, as we have
learned from scholarship on failure, the historical importance of a venture is measured not by its

28
institutional or financial success, but the way it connects to ideas. In short, this dissertation helps
to smooth the historical progression from printed messages – be they distributed through
periodicals, billboards, or printed lithographs and novelties – to the ‘moving media’ of radio and
television. Although radio itself had a long transition from agency indifference to agency
domination, radio research tells only a part of the story. Experimentation and disillusionment
with moving media occurred in the American cinemas of the 1910s. Arising at a moment when
the American advertising industry was in significant flux, this history of American cinema
advertising adds helpfully to our understanding of the redefinition of advertising in American
culture over the 1910s, and the ways in which this decade set the terms for the new debates of
1920s. Three topics of study in previous advertising scholarship are thus central to this work:
institutionalization of the advertising industry as an adjunct to industrial manufacturing, theories
of audience hostility and how to overcome it, and theories of medium form and advertising
placement.
Modern scholarly studies of the institutionalization of American advertising begin with
the pioneering work of Daniel Pope and Quentin J. Schultze. Pope, in his 1983 study, The
Making of Modern Advertising, persuasively argued that the rise of modern advertising agencies
was directly tied to the rise of large industrial manufacturing. Pope’s work reveals two important
elements underlying the institutionalization of the ‘full-service agency,’ which provided copy
writing, market research, and placement services: the need of large-scale manufacturers to create,
rather than follow, demand; and the financial benefits of having middle men create, coordinate,
and negotiate vast campaigns.74 Quentin J. Schultze, whose research was roughly
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contemporaneous with Pope, studied the latter stages of institutionalization, when agencies
attempted to gain ‘professional’ status. Schultze argues that the industry encouraged the growth
of advertising as a part of college curriculums, intending to improve the sense that advertising
was a legitimate profession, complete with its own high-level skills and training.75 In a study of
the trade journal Judicious Advertising, Schultze also revealed that, by the first half of the 1910s,
the opinion that advertisers held of advertising was clearly on the rise, indicating that the public
relations campaign was having positive impact on the agent / client relationship.76 Roland
Marchand helped to clarify the master-narrative of American advertising development through
an analysis of the conflicting theories of advertising active in the early 20th century. Marchand
differentiated between the thinking of what he termed the ‘real pros,’ who saw the value of
advertising solely in financial terms, and the ‘uplifters,’ who believe that advertising should
serve the needs of education, public service, and cultural uplift. In short, as advertising
institutionalized, an internal schism developed around whether or not advertising should aim for
a highbrow aesthetic.77 Cynthia B. Meyers’ recent research into early radio has shown the
persistence of this particular conflict, as ‘real pro’ and ‘uplift’ advertisers had different notions of
the value of the medium.78 Pamela Walker Laird added the element of medium specificity to the
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complexities of advertising’s institutionalization with her 1998 book Advertising Progress.
Laird asserted that periodical-oriented agencies became the central figures in American
advertising by engaging in direct competition with billposters and job printers. By directly
attacking the use of other forms, while simultaneously engaging in a massive public relations
campaign describing periodical advertising as trustworthy, moral, and helpful, agencies
consolidated power not simply through the appeals Pope identified, but through a competitive
campaign to boost the perceived merits of their offerings.79 In her 2004 book Buyways,
Catherine Gudis studied the standardization of practices in the billboard industry specifically,
providing clear evidence of the distinct challenges each branch of the advertising industry faced
in becoming an accepted part of the market matrix. For example, a central crisis for early
billposting was the likelihood that any given advertisement would be covered or torn down
within minutes of being posted; it was not until 1909 that the national Association required
billboard companies to contract only for “listed and protected showings.”80 In sum, industrial
studies of the American advertising industry provide a sense of an industry simultaneously
institutionalizing and remaining deeply divided by both medium selection and theories of
persuasion.
Closely connected to the professionalization and institutionalization of particular
branches of the advertising industry, is the public standing of advertising with its audience. It
was not solely advertisers who had to be convinced that advertising men were useful. In the
political atmosphere of muckraking literature and Progressive political action, the general public
– which tended to see advertising in relation to patent medicine or P.T. Barnum’s circus hokum –
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was increasingly hostile. Advertising as an encouragement to consume has been a part of
sociological criticism of American culture since at least 1899, when Thorstein Veblen described
the acquisition of particular goods by the rich as ‘conspicuous consumption.’81 A number of
contemporary scholars have approached the public acceptance of advertising as part of the
ideological growth of a consumer culture, often analyzing how copy trends dovetailed with urban
modernity: such as T.J. Jackson Lears’ notion that the tone was ‘therapeutic’ and designed to
meet the emotional needs of modern, urban life.82 More important to this study than large-scale
shifts in cultural ideology are the various ways in which advertising men consciously attempted
to defuse or pre-empt public hostility. The ‘Truth in Advertising’ movement represented
industry concerns about audience hostility writ large and acted, as Pamela Walker Laird has
asserted, as a public-relations campaign to “advertise advertising.”83 Research into industrial
practices also provides numerous examples of smaller, more specific efforts to give particular
types of advertising positive connotations. Often these efforts were attempts to associate
advertising with ‘public service.’ Richard Ohmann’s research into the emergence of mass
magazines, which were sold below cost and derived a profit through advertising, has shown that
audience hostility can be circumvented through direct reference to the audience’s pocketbooks.
Though the magazines were not free, the reduction in subscription cost, combined with a
simultaneous increase in quality, was enough to make the advertising appear to be providing a
81
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literally valuable service.84 Laird has asserted that the late 19th century explosion of lithography
as an advertising medium was largely due to the vast circulation that could be attained through
distributing artwork to merchants and consumers for free, “[i]n a culture not yet saturated with
manufactured images.” Although, as Laird says, there are no records for advertising work at this
date, the democratization of art images through advertising lithography has the appearance of
intent, not accident; courting a culture of image ownership was the lithograph equivalent of
boosting circulation.85 More obvious are the actions of the billboard industry, where public
hostility towards ‘defamation of the landscape’ was a persistent problem. Throughout the 1910s,
as Catherine Gudis asserts, billboard companies began filling unsold billboard space with
pleasurable content (such as nativity scenes for the Christmas season), and advertisers began
weaving elements of practical use value – such as thermometers, clocks, and tourist information
– into their advertisement.86 Studies of radio and television again provide evidence of the
continuation of such thinking. Alexander Russo discusses the “Bulova Time Signal” of
American radio – a regular announcement of the current time, overtly sponsored by Bulova
watches.87 In short, the use of advertisements themselves, ad space, or public rhetoric to
encourage a sense that advertising provided a public service was a widespread tactic for defusing
audience hostility towards advertising.
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This dissertation can add helpfully to this literature on the rise in the standing of
advertising among both clients and the public, as the experience of silent era American cinema
advertisers provides a significant example of the extreme difficulties faced in earning the
approval of these groups. For cinema advertisers, precedents in viewer appeasement were
problematic at best. Theaters already featured very low pricing; as such, cinema advertisers
could not claim a demonstrable impact on prices without subsidizing the experience completely
through the creation of free-theaters. Charitable or public service use of space was equally
problematic for two reasons. First, demand for space dramatically exceeded supply; thus, in this
environment, utilizing limited space for public service displays was unlikely. Second, unlike
billboards, which were the possessions of the billboard companies, theaters were independent
entities; as such, even when public service imagery – like Liberty Loan advertising – was
integrated, it was the exhibitors, not the cinema advertisers, which received the praise. The only
means concocted at the time to concretely link cinema advertising to public service were
sponsored time-pieces, produced both as onscreen slides and fully-functioning offscreen wall
installations. When the mainstream film industry began overtly deriding advertising as a piece
of its own public relations campaign – asserting that advertising was explicitly degrading to
highbrow cinema – cinema advertisers effectively lost the battle, and were pushed into “hole in
the wall type” of theaters for decades. In short, the thorniness of entrenched cultural hostility
towards advertising becomes much more apparent when one studies a branch of the industry
which failed to effectively combat it. In the absence of a sense of significant public service, and
with no public support from the film industry, cinema advertising was left out of the general
trend towards greater respect for advertising. As such, this cinema oriented study of advertising
adds some important context to the early 20th century public relations efforts by the advertising
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industry. The parallel efforts of the film industry and the advertising industry to climb the
cultural hierarchy became, in the limited arena of cinema advertising, conflicting goals. Public
hostility towards cinema advertising did not simply remain active; it was intentionally increased
by the film industry. Though the advertising industry in general improved its standing in this
era, the mainstream cultural sense that cinema advertising was conducted by parasites and
charlatans, by and large, remained.
Connected to the issues of client and audience appeals, is the ever expanding literature on
the relationship between media, advertising form, and viewer acceptance. Scholarly interest in
the relationship between form and response dates at least to 1914, when Hugo Münsterberg
published an aggressive critique of magazine advertising; asserting that it should always be
restricted to a ‘bookend’ position before and after the traditional content, Münsterberg argued
that interleaving advertising with content produced “a sermon of bewilderment and scramble,”
and had a devastating impact on a reader’s psychological well-being.88 Recent scholarly studies
have frequently focused on the thorny problems of spatial and temporal sequencing in electronic
media. Cynthia B. Meyers has shown that a subset of advertising men at the J. Walter Thompson
Company were indifferent to radio in the 1920s because they doubted that indirect, good will
advertising was effective enough to justify the cost of program production. In this case, a
doubtful audience response was cause to question the sponsorship model.89 Alexander Russo
asserts that the growth of ‘spot’ advertising in daytime radio was directly connected to the
shifting sense of the prevalence of inattention; if daytime listeners were not suitably focused on
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the programs, then the risk of alienating viewers through hard-sell spot advertising was
considered to be a better than the risk of more subtle soft-sell advertising being missed.90 In the
wake of the digital transition in media, such concerns have taken on a sense of urgency. As
Amanda Lotz has said, digital technologies and ‘spot’ skipping through DVR has shaken
television advertising out of “fifty years of complacency,” as placement, sponsorship, and new
spatial tactics (like the corner ‘bug’) now appear better suited to contemporary television
viewing patterns than the traditional 30-second spot.91 As the newest and therefore least settled
medium, research into internet advertising formats has received perhaps the most attention. See,
for example, the avalanche of research into ‘banner blindness’ – the fear that a magazine-esque
direct advertisement in the margins of a website will be ignored – includes research not only on
the applicability of the form, but even screen positioning.92 Through these studies it is clear that,
in ‘transitional eras’ for any medium, advertising methods are subject to wholesale rethinking.
This dissertation adds to the existing literature by providing a thick description of the
variety of tactics proposed in the era of cinema advertising’s advent. A broad array of possible
90

Alexander Russo, Points on the Dial: Golden Age Radio Beyond the Networks (Durham: Duke University Press,
2010), 121. Studies of the transition to television point to both cultural and financial determinants for a change in
broadcast practices. Public concerns about the debasement of radio by advertisers led the networks to liberate
program creation from ad agencies; at the same time, spiraling costs of production led agencies to the conclusion
that it would not be cost effective even to continue program-production practices on radio, much less on television.
Cynthia B. Meyers, “From Sponsorship to Spots: Advertising and the Development of Electronic Media,” Media
Industries: History, Theory, Method, eds. Jennifer Holt and Alisa Perren (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 72;
and Cynthia B. Meyers, A Word From Our Sponsor: Admen, Advertising, and the Golden Age of Radio, manuscript,
296, 306. See also: William Boddy, Fifties Television: The Industry and Its Critics (Urbana and Chicago:
University of Illinois Press, 1993), 158; and Michele Hilmes, Hollywood and Broadcasting: From Radio to Cable
(Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1990), 140-141; and Lawrence R. Samuel, Brought to You By:
Post-War Television Advertising and the American Dream (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2001), 120.
91
Amanda D. Lotz, The Television Will Be Revolutionized (New York and London: New York University Press,
2007), 153.
92
In 2007, an international team of researches argued that placement on the left-side of the screen makes it more
likely that users will read an online advertisement. Gangseog Ryu, Elison Ai Ching Lim, Lynn Thor Ling Tan, and
Young Jee Han, “Preattentive Processing of Banner Advertisements: The Role of Modality, Location, and
Interference,” Electronic Commerce Research and Applications 6.1 (Spring 2007): 6-18. See also: Jan Panero
Benway and David M. Lane, “Banner Blindness: Web Searchers Often Miss ‘Obvious’ Links,” Internetworking 1.3
(December 1998); Guillaume Hervet, Katherine Guérard, Sébastien Tremblay, and Mohamed Saber Chtourou, “Is
Banner Blindness Genuine?: Eye Tracking Internet Text Advertising,” Applied Cognitive Psychology 25.5
(September/October 2011): 708-716.

36
advertising methods arose for cinema use. Some methods treated the cinema like a projected
magazine, inserting direct advertising as pauses in the flow. Other methods treated the cinema
like a single entertainment, inserting indirect advertising – through product placement and
sponsorship – into the flow of otherwise entertainment oriented films. Some cinema advertising
proponents even treated the cinema walls like the outside environs, proposing to erect lighted
billboards around the periphery of the cinema screen, as though the moving pictures were like
passing scenery outside a train window. The indeterminate position of cinema as an advertising
medium – with both temporal and spatial locations for advertising – produced an array of
conflicting, but equally plausible, interpretations of cinema spectatorship. This study of the
thinking of the silent cinema era provides a clear precursor to later debates about electronic
media. Temporal rather than spatial advertising grew to dominate the thinking of the time, but
national circulation was a persistent problem. As such, experience and frustration with rigid
temporal restrictions – what the J. Walter Thompson Company criticized as broadcasting’s
‘fleeting’ nature – began with the silent cinema.

Literature Review: Silent Era Cinema Advertising
A small, but growing body of research has already begun to fill this gap and connect the
early 20th century American cinema and advertising industries. The early days of in-cinema
advertising are not entirely undiscovered country. Beginning in star studies, with research into
testimonials and the ‘halo effect’ of stardom,93 scholars have expanded research into American
silent era product advertising to include multiple forms of in-cinema advertising. Two particular
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forms have received the bulk of attention: product/brand placement (and the related practice of
sponsorship), and industrial/educational films.
As the only book length study focusing exclusively on cinematic permutations of
advertising, Kerry Segrave’s book, Product Placement in Hollywood Films: A History, is the
widest ranging take, as yet, on the topic. Covering just over 100 years of cinema advertising –
focusing, as the title would suggest, on product placement – Segrave’s book provides a good
starting point for future studies. Despite devoting only sixteen pages to the thirty years of silent
cinema, Segrave manages to cover many of the high point, including both tactics (lantern slides,
trailers, industrial films, product placement) and theories (such as the rising faith that ‘trade
follows the film,’ and the notion that placement was an abuse of the exhibitor – which
culminated in an official ban on paid product placement, by Will Hays, in 1922).94 Indeed, this
split between swelling advertiser interest and equally increasing exhibitor reticence was the
central reason for the proliferation of tactics in the era, as advertisers tried many different
approaches in an effort to find a workable model. Despite the value of Segrave’s work, however,
the analysis can be expanded significantly.95
Jean-Marc Lehu, and the team of Jay Newell, Charles T. Salmon, and Susan Chang have
both provided valuable expansions to the analysis of the growth of product placement in the
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silent era. Lehu, with a practitioner’s interest in placement (resulting in both an extremely brief
analysis of the history and an unfortunate lack of concrete examples), asserts that filmic product
placement had important precursors in 19th century stage theater, citing (but not dating) a Sarah
Bernhardt performance. Lehu thus helps to link cinema advertising to longer traditions in
American advertising practice.96 Newell, Salmon, and Chang have more helpfully added
significant nuance to our knowledge of the permutations of transitional era placement, arguing
that its development was largely a means of subsidizing early film production, as ‘tie-ups’ could
provide props and result in the circulation of film stills (which would help market the film), both
with no direct cost to the studio. The watershed moment was the Edison Company’s passenger
rail placement, which occurred repeatedly (52 films) in the first decade of cinema, in exchange
for which the company received free transportation for its camera crews. Newell, Salmon, and
Chang likewise connect the struggles of product placement to exhibition culture, indicating that
placement was “controversial almost from the start,” and that “negative reactions…from theater
owners, foreign distributors, and motion picture critics…dr[o]ve [it] underground.”97
Knowledge of this reluctance provides two important elements for a study of cinema advertising:
first, stagnation of the cinema advertising industry likely resulted primarily from exhibitor, not
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production company, pressure; second, opposition to product placement gave impetus to the
experimentation with the direct advertising tactics to be discussed in this study – tactics which
included payment to exhibitors for their screen time. As such, the history of early product
placement is foundational for a study of direct advertising, in which the exhibitors – so
concerned about studios profiting from their screens without sharing the revenue – were paid
directly for the use of the screen.
Though product placement remains one of the most important elements of cinema
advertising practice, in the past few years the lion’s share of attention has been given to a
common, but until recently understudied, alternative in silent cinemas: industrial films
(educational films produced specifically for advertising value). Drawing attention initially via
the pioneering work of both collector Rick Prelinger and NYU’s Orphan Films Symposium, the
industrial film has emerged as one of the focal points in scholarly studies of non-theatrical and
local film practice. Studies of industrial films have helpfully stressed the importance of context,
rather than aesthetics, to the study of advertising oriented films.98 This research is helping to
pave the way for future work by theorizing methodology. For example, in the edited collection
Films That Work, multiple interpretive schema are proposed which are helpful for the broader
study of cinema advertising: most notably Thomas Elsaesser’s tripartite focus on the
‘commissioning/funding,’ ‘purpose,’ and ‘addressee’ of such films (or, what he terms the
98
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Auftraggebur, Anlass, and Addressat – the “three A’s”), and Vinzenz Hediger and Patrick
Vondereau’s “three R’s” (the corporate values of recording, rhetoric, and rationalization).99
Beyond methodology, research into industrial and sponsorsed films has provided
indications of their importance to cinema aesthetics and exhibition. In the realm of aesthetics,
Stephen Bottomore has asserted that the development of mainstream documentary cannot be
understand without a knowledge of such advertising inflected precursors as “travelogues,
industrials and educational films,” and their use in the building of balanced programs throughout
the 1910s.100 Lee Grieveson similarly encourages us to see Ford films as central to the growth of
an American filmic address promoting both industrialization and consumption as redeeming
values.101 From an exhibition standpoint, Joseph Corn has connected the industrial advertising
style to the notion that cinema audiences are active and irritable, and in need of courting. For
Corn, successful theatrical circulation of advertising films was only attainable when advertisers
learned to use indirect methods, stressing educational content rather than “bludgeon[ing]
viewers” with a direct sales exhortation.102
In short, the various studies of the growth of product placement and industrial films –
though their number remains limited – provide a number of valuable foundational concepts.
These studies stress the importance of audience irritation to the stagnation of in-cinema
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advertising practice, indicate that a history of exhibitor hostility towards advertising may play an
important role, and encourage a focus on contextual issues (including not only what advertisers
hoped to gain from a given film, but what exhibitors and audiences might have hoped to gain
from viewing or refusing to view such films). Despite these previous studies, however, the
bigger picture remains under-researched. What relationships drove the proliferation of product
advertising tactics in the silent era? Was there a pattern of development, or were all tactics
experimented with simultaneously? And what elements of American cinema history led to the
failure and marginalization of certain models and the partial acceptance of others?103 The
following study is an effort to answer these question, as the three little studied direct advertising
tactics (lantern slides, consumer goods trailers, and offscreen advertising techniques),104 when
analyzed in parallel, add significantly to our understanding of the ebbs and flows of cinema
advertising theory and practice during its formative years between 1908 and 1922.

Scaffolds and Structure
This project is a model of the type of research now possible with internet based archiving.
While terrestrial holdings provided important content – including Duke University’s complete
run of Printers’ Ink during this date range – this research was simplified significantly by Google
and by the Internet Archive. The scanned materials from the Media History Digital Library
103
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provided an invaluable repository of motion picture industry trade papers like Moving Picture
World and Motography, in a searchable format so that minor references to particular terms like
‘trailer’ and ‘slide’ would not be missed. ProQuest provided the same value for searching old
issues of Billboard. Google’s ‘Book Search’ likewise provided significant searchable access to
advertising trades like Printers’ Ink and Advertising & Selling, which pinpointed a number of
articles and display advertisements which made only casual reference to cinema advertising,
while their ‘Patent Search’ allowed me to easily find motion picture theater related patents which
would otherwise have remained in the dustbin of history. Online newspaper holdings at
ProQuest, though not frequently used here, added the occasional nuance. Without full-textsearchable online archives, this dissertation would have required unwieldy research time and
would likely have been abandoned as an unworkable concept.
This wealth of digitized trade materials – ranging from theoretical articles, to diatribes of
condemnation, to self-advertising from cinema oriented ad men – is unfortunately balanced by a
corresponding absence: there are virtually no internal business materials to draw from. Only the
Alexander Film Company material held in Colorado Springs, the collection of Kansas City Slide
Company catalogs in Kansas City, and the (extremely small) collection of Publicity Clock
Company trade materials held by Duke University provided significant information. Large and
promising archival holdings of advertising papers, like the J. Walter Thompson archive at Duke
University, turned out to contain very little of use, as mainstream advertising agencies were, by
their own description, apathetic about cinema at this early date.105
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As an industrial history, therefore, the primary documentation is imperfect, as no income
figures or internal strategy discussions can be cited. The material was simply never archived,
except for the few pieces of pre-1930s material in the Alexander Industries holdings. It would
take a heroic effort to even determine incorporation and dissolution dates for the nearly 200
businesses mentioned in these pages. As such, much of the argument to come is inferred from
the swelling and receding quantities of trade-press advertising, persuasive claims made in the
copy of these advertisements, and more nuanced discussions from trade articles. This is an
approach fraught with unsolvable problems. How much of self-advertising copy was false, or at
least inflated rhetoric? Does a decrease of self-advertising mean that a business was at risk of
failure (lack of advertising budget) or that it was flourishing (operating at peak capacity would
leave no value to further advertising)? How much of the difference in rhetoric is attributable to
changes over time and how much is simply regional or personal variance in opinion?
Even more problematically, the internal politics of industries and trade presses could
have dramatically impact what was discussed. The trade presses, in deference to their own
circulation numbers, had reason to minimize discussion of issues deemed both sensitive and trite
by the mainstream of their industry. It is plausible, then, that the contours of the discourse are
skewed by prominent journals pushing particular agendas about cinema advertising. The Moving
Picture World, for example, seems to have devoted less time to the topic of cinema advertising
than it might – publishing regular columns from Epes Winthrop Sargent and F.H. Richardson
(both of whom opposed the commercialization of cinema) but featuring a dearth of articles in
which cinema advertising men were allowed to speak directly. Even more compelling is the case
of Nickelodeon (which became Motography in 1911) which published articles by industrial film

industry could prove broad class based appeal, and exhibitors began to band together and offer guaranteed
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producer Watterson R. Rothacker roughly twice per month for more than two years (from 14
January 1911 to 5 April 1913), after which point discussion of the topic occurred significantly
less frequently. The reason for the reduction of focus on cinema advertising is unclear, but the
moment of the change is suspiciously near to the historic nadir of slide advertising. The trades
thus fail to provide a reliably impartial record of cinema advertising in either their articles or
display ads.
Without the ability to see internal correspondence from a suitably large number of
companies, there is little opportunity to study the undercurrents and unspoken covenants driving
the public face of the debate. Nor do we have the ability to study the internal contradictions and
conflicts that occur within any industry. As David Hesmondhalgh has said, the media industries
are “complex, ambivalent, and contested,” as various opinions exists between companies and
even within an individual company.106 Unfortunately, the extant evidence emerges almost
entirely from sources which were speaking to particular public audiences. The individual,
unvarnished voices are largely missing. As such, this study will, by necessity, lay perhaps undue
stress on the sales rhetoric of the companies themselves, and the opinions of trade presses which
may have had hidden agendas and editorial policies.
The study will proceed in five further chapters, the last of which acts as both a standalone
argument and a conclusion. Chapter two sets the tone for the dissertation as a whole, providing a
broader introduction to a central concept in the American advertising industry’s media
proliferation: the notion of the ‘receptive mood.’107 The belief in an inherently receptive
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spectator of electric media arose in response to two key elements of early twentieth century
American discourse: the rise of medium specific psychology; and the notion that image based –
and specifically cinematic – communication resulted in a ‘passive audience.’ The captive
audience of the motion picture theater was often described as captivated by what they witnessed.
Although cinematic advertising faltered, the myth of the ‘irresistible medium’ persisted. The
dream of a captive and receptive audience continues to define the ad industry’s hopes for any
new medium, as abandoned and marginalized cinema techniques re-emerge across the media
landscape. The rise of this logic is a key legacy of silent cinema advertising. Understanding the
rise and use of this rhetoric not only renders silent cinema advertising debates comprehensible,
but adds important foundational knowledge to our understanding of the ways in which the
American advertising industry has interacted with new media.
The remaining three body chapters predominantly function as two overlapping pairs. The
first (chapters three and four) shows the rise and fall of the ‘commercial break’ model in motion
picture theaters, and the methods that arose from this model. Chapter three, “The Front Cover
Medium,” details the history of the so-called ‘magic lantern’ advertising slide, which opened up
a space for in-cinema advertising by staking claim to the gaps which necessarily existed between
films prior to the advent of the multiple-projector model of exhibition. In the early days of
experimentation with this form, many nickelodeon theaters operated much like contemporary
television stations, with an advertising ‘break’ at regular intervals during the entertainment –
here, at the end of each roughly fifteen-minute reel. As screening spaces improved – by adding
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an additional projector or increasing the comfort and opulence of the space – and audiences grew
weary of the imposition, slide advertising lost ground. However, slides set the standards; all
other direct advertising techniques concocted in the silent era would be based in lessons learned
from the fading of advertising slides.
Chapter four, “Screen Sugar Pills,” discusses the upgrading of the ‘slide’ into the
commercial film ‘trailer’ – a roughly one-minute advertisement designed to be appended to the
ends of film reels – and the permanent abandonment of the regular commercial pause. As the
slide faltered around 1913, the trailer form was developed to partially replace them. The shift to
a multiple projector system could have allowed trailers to completely replace slides, as they
would have been spliced into the program in the same places, artificially maintaining the gap
between reels without forcing a pause in the projection of motion pictures. However, exhibitor
reluctance, combined with the trailer producers’ need to regularize income resulted in the
development of a less obtrusive model. Theaters sold a certain number of minutes of their
program duration to trailer producers, and the trailer advertisements, initially conceived for
piecemeal circulation, began to be screened in series of five to ten as a ‘chaser,’ indicating that
the program had reached its end and was about to restart.108 Over the course of this process,
what is recognizable as the commercial advertising ‘spot’ was developed, but almost
immediately moved into a limited ‘bookend’ position in a small subset of American film
theaters.
Chapter five, “Profit Margins,” provides a discussion of an alternate ‘corrective’ to the
faults of slide advertising: offscreen advertising technologies patented in the 1910s and 1920s.
Although they were only rarely integrated into cinema spaces – and remain little used in the
108
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contemporary resurgence of cinema advertising – lighted clocks, lighted signs, wall units,
branded trash bins, and other elements of cinema advertising at the periphery of the screen, were
created to stress the interactivity of the theatrical space. Designed as alternative sites of visual
stimulation, offscreen advertising was not only a conciliatory gesture in response to audience
desires not to have advertising forced upon their attention, but also a means to provide potential
secondary entertainments. When paired with the analysis of slides in chapter three, the history of
peripheral advertising technologies provides evidence of an alternative argument arising in the
realm of moving advertising, in which ad content was nearly literalized as billboards at the edge
of a viewer’s celluloid based ‘travels.’
Chapter six, “The Cinema Wants to Be Free,” wraps up the study with a discussion of the
various attempts to use direct advertising tactics to create a free, fully advertiser-funded cinema.
Ranging from simple coupon models, to television-like collections of shorts interspersed with
long commercial breaks, a minority of film advertising proponents encouraged the
marginalization of the ticket price, rather than the marginalization of advertising, as a way to
solve the persistent problem of spectator irritation. Had either of these models become the
common method of cinema spectatorship, film culture would have developed in a way parallel
with television and internet content distribution, with ‘free’ content underwritten by the intrusion
of direct advertising messages. The presupposition that advertising and ticketing are
incompatible remains at the core of critiques about cinema advertising, and the case study in this
chapter proves that the concern (and that the correlated support for advertising supported freemedia) is decades old. On the heels of the discussion of free theaters, chapter six returns to the
issues which have opened the dissertation, describing the multiform reasons for the partial
abandonment of the cinema as an advertising medium. A coda on the contemporary rebirth of

48
cinema advertising will add clarity to the analysis, analyzing the important distinctions between
silent era and 21st century cinema advertising which help to explain why the previously
unsuccessful experiments are unexpectedly prosperous nearly a century later.
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CHAPTER 2. “A NOVEL AND IRRESISTIBLE MAGNETISM”: ADVERTISING LOOKS
AT CINEMA, 1908-1921
[M]oving Pictures…ha[ve] a novel and irresistible magnetism
which demands and receives an undivided attention.
- Watterson Rothacker (June 1911)1
In 1925, prominent cinema exhibitor Samuel ‘Roxy’ Rothapfel co-authored a book called
Broadcasting: Its New Day. In this book, Rothapfel declared that the newly developing medium
of radio, with which he had experimented, could not use direct advertising funds to become selfsustaining on the grounds that “if you try to sell…some brand of shoes or anything else over the
radio [then] you’ll have no radio audience” regardless of the non-advertising component of the
programming.2 While the quote makes sense as part of radio history, as the form was just then
developing and Rothapfel was an early adopter, the identity of the speaker stands out. Rothapfel
was, above all, a film exhibitor. To assume that his impression of direct advertising on the radio
came solely from two years of radio experimentation would be ludicrous.3 Rothapfel’s opinion
was formed over the course of more than a decade in the cinema.4 The myth of the vanishing
audience, asserted so confidently at this early date – and disproven with gusto by the decades of
direct advertising on American radio and television – became widely held during the 1910s
through debates about the plausibility of advertising in the cinema. It was the standard rhetoric
1
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of men who opposed advertising in cinemas, and the certitude with which Rothapfel made the
claim cannot be understood without reference to the years of debate from which it emerged. The
American cinema – for Rothapfel and others – set the terms of debate for early radio advertising
theory.
In this opening argument, I wish to give prominence to a particular element of the
American cinema advertising debate of the 1910s – the part which was most relevant to
Rothapfel’s 1925 radio claim, and which continues to inform advertising theory to new media to
this day: the dialectic of the ‘captive audience’ and the ‘receptive mood.’ The belief in an
inherently receptive spectator arose in response to two key elements of early discourse: the rise
of medium specific psychology; and the notion that image based – and specifically cinematic –
communication resulted in a ‘passive audience.’ The captive audience of the motion picture
theater was often described as captivated by what they witnessed. As cinematic advertising
faltered, American advertising culture normalized the assumption that pausing a public pay-perview entertainment in order to integrate advertising was tantamount to abuse of the spectator.
Advertising was, eventually, only minimally integrated into American cinema, due to the
assumption that the audience would always resist the otherwise promising techniques devised for
it. Product placement, pre-feature stills, and trailers – even in 21st century America cinema
advertising – are heavily delimited in deference to the likelihood of audience frustration.5 There
is a tacit understanding between audiences and exhibitors that consumer-goods advertising
should predominantly occur before the house lights are dimmed, with coming-attractions
predominating once the house is darkened.6 Indeed, much direct advertising is screened during

5

Deron Overpeck, “Subversion, Desperation and Captivity: Pre-Film Advertising in American Film Exhibition
Since 1977,” Film History 22.2 (2010): 225.
6
Joanna Phillips and Stephanie M. Noble, “Simply Captivating: Understanding Consumers’ Attitudes Toward the
Cinema as an Advertising Medium,” Journal of Advertising 36.1 (Spring 2007): 85.

51
the intermission between showings of the feature, when theaters are devoid of all but a handful
of spectators. This placement is the legacy of more than 100 years of compromise between
cinema audiences and cinema advertisers.

Medium Specific Psychology and the ‘Passive’ Cinema Spectator
In the 1910s, as the number of viable advertising mediums began to proliferate beyond
the simple binary of print publications and posters, it became common in the American trade
press to argue for the adoption of a specific medium through appeals to the psychology of its
consumption. In 1902 the magazine Cosmopolitan claimed that the power of popular magazines
for advertising rested in their status as “peculiarly the companion of leisure hours, when the mind
is free to accept new impressions.”7 Over the course of the early decades of the twentieth
century, the psychology of a medium’s ‘readers’ became a common rhetorical trope. Shredded
Wheat publicity director Truman A DeWeese offered an even more personal rationale in 1915,
when he proclaimed that “[t]he newspaper stands first as an advertising medium because it is
peculiarly a home institution and sustains an intimate relation to the family circle.”8 By 1920,
outdoor advertisers claimed that it was not the home that created a positive psychological state
for advertising, but nature which “puts people in a friendly, cheerful, optimistic frame of mind”
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and leaves them “most open to suggestion.”9 Strauss Theatre Programs asserted that the live
theater was the best venue for advertising as it was the site of the “Emulative Attitude of
Mind.”10 As the advertising industry expanded, and medium options grew, such theorizing was
commonly seen as a viable means to attract advertisers to a given medium.
The rise of this rhetoric of receptivity coincides with the growth of a theory of image
power which culminated in mid-1910s debates about cinema censorship. The psychological
interpretation of film by Hugo Münsterberg, the ‘impressionability’ theory of the film reform
community, and the legalese of the Mutual Decision all display an obsession with the ability of
motion pictures to ‘infect’ the viewer. In short, a swelling sense of the cinema audience as the
passive recipient of an ‘injection’ of pictorial information is clear in this era.11
Lee Grieveson, in discussing early academic study of film in the United States, asserts
that Hugo Münsterberg’s 1916 book The Photoplay was the first academic endorsement of the
growing public sense that cinema was akin to hypnosis. Prior to Münsterberg’s work, numerous
film reformers published arguments expounding a similar thesis. In 1909, for example, Jane
Addams, organizer of the well-known Chicago reform community at Hull House, described film
as a “mimic stage” which, specifically in crime films, had a pernicious influence on children.12
In 1911, Reverend H.A. Jump asserted that “movies operated through ‘psychic suggestion,’ to
9
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put ideas in the viewer’s head without his knowing it.”13 Belief in ‘impressionability’ –
specifically in women, immigrants, and children – and the cinema as capable of ‘implanting’
ideas in unsuspecting viewers, steadily increased over the course of the 1910s. As Richard
Butsch argues, the cinema represented the first instance in which “reformers concentrated their
attention on the effect of the show rather than on the behavior in the audience as a primary
concern.”14 Münsterberg’s book helped to institutionalize the critique as a cinema-specific
concern, asserting that film spectatorship produced a mental state where ideas are “forced upon
us,” and that the cinema environment produced the possibility of “psychic infection.” As Lee
Grieveson has asserted, “the power of movies over subject-spectators hovers at the margins of
[Münsterberg’s] account.”15
What Münsterberg did for academia, the Mutual Decision (1915) did for law. With this
decision, the American judicial system – while famously declaring cinema to be “a business pure
and simple” – effectively codified ‘psychic infection’ theory as a legal concept. As Samantha
Barbas asserts, the court rejection of film as protected speech act was, at its base, an extension of
the notion that images were more manipulative than words and were prone to trump reason. The
case, centering on newsreels as an argument against prior restraint, was an attempt to legally
assert that film was as good, if not a better disseminator of news than print. The argument ran
aground on the widespread faith that images held spellbinding powers. In the words of the court,
motion pictures had a power for evil “the greater for their attractiveness and manner of
exhibition.” Clarifying this interpretation, the court declared that “those who witness the
[movies] are taken out of bondage to the letter and the spoken word.” Barbas is correct to assert
13
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that this shadowy wording represented the court’s agreement with the notion that the viewing of
motion pictures was, in essence, “a passive, noncognitive act.” 16 As such, legal rhetoric
paralleled the popular conceit that the cinema was a venue in which mental sponges soaked up
ideas from the screen.
Of course, a reform community is a largely optimistic one; negative rhetoric is marshaled
in support of a presumable positive alternative model.17 While it is undoubtedly true that
descriptions of film “play[ing] on the keyboard of our mind[s]”18 have an implication of terror,
the sentiments were actually expressed ambivalently. Münsterberg’s book was ultimately a
defense of the film as art: a medium, unlike any other, in which reality was resequenced to match
mental activity (where a close-up was the equivalent of directed attention, and a flashback was
visualization of a memory link, for example). Likewise, the Mutual Decision was not designed
to destroy cinema, but to allow for oversight from censors to make sure that the presentation of
information was handled agreeably. Notions of an ‘injection’ of information were, even then,
not a reason to abandon or destroy the cinema. Opponents simply saw the possibility of damage
as evidence of the need for oversight.
Underlying all of this concern with media infection, therefore, was the reformer’s hopeful
sense of cultural ‘uplift’ – the assumption that socially impactful media could be harnessed for
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good, to ‘infect’ the viewer positively. Influence was only pernicious if it was allowed to be.
The world of film reform, arising in parallel to this ‘psychic infection’ theory in the 1910s, was
the optimistic outgrowth of ‘passive spectator’ ideology.19 The National Board of Review,
Better Films Committees, and ‘uplift’ groups nationwide waged a massive campaign for the
improvement of film, designed more to elevate the masses than it was to limit the release of
pernicious films. Louise Connolly, speaker on behalf of the Better Films Committee, described
film as “a great new avenue for…God to pour Himself out into the genius of man for the uplift of
the joy of men,” and argued strongly that the film reform community should act as “guardian
angels for the motion pictures” by encouraging the production of moral films.20 The rise of
Saturday morning, age-segregating children’s matinees, and the boom in non-theatrical
educational screenings were both tied directly to this ‘uplift’ corollary to fears of cinema
infection.21 Despite the legal standing of film censorship, the drift of public sentiment, in the
upper and upper-middle class reform community, was towards reformation rather than
restriction.22
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As such, as the cinema was transitioning into the classical Hollywood form, it became
increasingly common for parties interested in but external to the film industry to feel that film’s
defining feature was an ability to bypass rational thought, and that cinema therefore had
unprecedented possibilities for both social damage and social control. Although it is impossible
to know just how widespread the faith became in American culture, we can safely emphasize
that, over the course of the 1910s, it became increasingly common to assert that film needed a
guiding hand to keep it educative rather than retrograde.23 Although this definition of the
audience – to use Philip Napoli’s advertising-oriented term, this ‘predicted audience’24 – was
massively out of sync with the observed audiences of the time (a distinction which will become
important below), reformers turned to it time and time again as a shorthand description for
cinema psychology.

The Captive Audience and Receptive Mood
From the earliest days, the discussion of the cinema by the advertising community
contained numerous references to this growing popular theory of image power. The words of
professional advertising man Don Herold, in 1915, provide a well written summary of early
thinking:
An advertising man ought to spend a nickel now and then and go to a picture
show and sit among his parishioners. He should not only sit among them, but
Review’s successes and failures. See my unpublished Masters Thesis, “A Tempest in a Tub” (Emory University,
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23
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should think about them. And he will find it hard to think about anything except
the picture on the screen. That fact alone should make him think harder than ever
when he gets away from the grip of the picture story. Why does a picture compel
him to concentrate?25
Among the many interesting turns of phrase in Herold’s article (not the least of which is the
slippage between consumers and ‘parishioners’ here), is the telling insinuation that motion
pictures on a screen would force a virtual cessation of all other thinking. For Don Herold, image
power was an element of communicative simplification: “Good copy makes men think in
pictures[; g]ood pictures make thinking easy.”26
Among cinema advertisers, Herold was clearly not alone. The power of visual
communication was repeatedly used to assert the supremacy of motion pictures for the purposes
of advertising. The International Harvester Company used image-power as a primary argument
for their film work as early as 1911, declaring that “the things we see have a habit of staying with
us more clearly than the things we hear.”27 By 1913, the superiority of images to words had been
commonly reduced, in cinema advertising circles, to the maxim that “[e]ighty-five per cent of all
impressions upon which we act are received through the eye.”28 Hierarchical notions of imagery
developed quickly as an elaboration of image-power. As cinema advertisers clearly wanted
others to see film as the advertising medium par excellence, the addition of motion to images
was commonly asserted as a means to increase the potency of image-based communication.
Advertising theorist Ernest A. Dench asserted that film could allow advertisers to evade the need
25
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“to compel the spectator to imagine things,” implying – as Münsterberg suggested the same year
– that the motion and editing of cinema would made it possible for advertisers to construct an
advertisement that would do the thinking for the spectator.29 Harry Levey, head of Universal’s
Industrial (read: advertising film) Department, argued that “the eye is quicker than the mind,”30
clearly connecting the needs of advertisers to film’s supposed ability to bypass reason. A wave
of other cinema advertising articles likewise described cinema advertising as a form of ‘mental
photography’ for sales messages,31 as though moving images could circumvent critical thinking
regardless of content and chemically develop advertising directly within the brain.
An outgrowth of this conception of the cinema as a copying machine (imprinting
advertising information on the brain) was the cinema advertising community’s obsession with
the notion of the captive audience – an idea which has since developed into not only a common
idiom, but the impetus for a legal expansion of First Amendment rights.32 Examples of the
captive audience as a marketable trait of cinema audiences appeared as early as 1910, and
continued to appear in articles at least as late as 1921. The assertions ranged from the simple
notion of the audience being unable to leave (without forfeiting their ticket price), to the complex
assumption that viewers would stare at moving images in much the same way that moths
approach flame. The trade presses of the 1910s were inundated with countless examples, many
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of which reduced the entire issue to the euphemism that film was “a 100% medium.”33 For
example, the Neosho Slide Company asserted that slides had “[n]o waste circulation” because
“Ad Slides Compel Attention.”34 Even industrial film producer Watterson Rothacker, a
proponent of indirect advertising methods, promoted his product with the claim that “moving
pictures…ha[ve] a novel and irresistible magnetism which demands and receives an undivided
attention.”35 In cinema advertising rhetoric, then, the very act of sitting in a motion picture
theater provided the advertisement with a direct conduit to the brain. The rhetorical implication
was that a spectator would have had to possess an almost inconceivable force of will to resist
cinema advertising.
In most cases, an assertion of audience captivity was followed immediately by a claim
that the audience was in a ‘receptive mood.’ Expanding on mass magazine trade rhetoric which
connected “pleasant, leisure hours” to a receptive state of mind, cinema advertising proponents
asserted a connection between the medium and a positive mindset.36 Advertising film advocate
Joseph B. Baker asserted as early as 1911 that cinema advertising could deliver content
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“with…ease and certainty” due to the fact that the intensely focused audience was “in the mood
to be entertained.”37 Lantern slide proponent Frank Farrington claimed, in 1913, that no other
advertising could possibly be “received in so favorable a frame of mind” as that seen in a motion
picture theater.38 By 1921, ad man Francis T. Kimball went so far as to describe the cinema
patron’s mood as “absorbent.”39 For cinema advertising thinkers, then, entertainment and
audience passivity were coalescing into a perfect storm; cinema spectators were effectively
described as jovial sponges.

The ‘Combative Spirit’ and Film’s Stagnation as an Ad Medium
Despite the common use of ‘passive spectator’ theory, across both advertising and reform
culture, a large contingent of film industry workers and cinema fans were simultaneously
advocating for an alternative description of the audience – that the cinema was a site of ‘active
audiences’ whose attention needed to be both respected and courted. While reformers and
advertisers often took a prescriptive approach to cinema audiences, trying to fit them into
particular conceptions of an ideal society (be it a moral society or a consuming one), film culture
saw the audience as endlessly differentiated and in need of proper courting in order to maximize
profit. Studios and exhibitors therefore tried to cater to spectator tastes in hopes that they would
define themselves. Indeed, it is this dialectic between the reformist’s description of an absorbent
spectator, and the film industry’s fear of a bored one which kept advertising from being more
broadly integrated and caused the cinema to remain a perpetually third class advertising medium.
Fears of a backlash against compulsory viewing have effectively the same date range as
their ‘receptive’ counterparts, as examples have turned up from 1909 to 1921. If assertions of
37
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audience receptivity were tied to the over-optimistic assumption that a mind attuned to pleasure
would not rebel against an advertising message, notions of distaste were tied to the equally
problematic assumption that advertising could not occur in a venue for which one had to pay a
ticket price.40 Presuming that advertising would generally occur on the screen, exhibitors, film
fans, and their rhetorical allies asserted that the viewer would rebel against an advertisement due
to the fact that a pause in the entertainment for advertising was a hijacking of the paying patron’s
time. Such a compulsory pause could result in audience irritation at best, and could escalate to
“hisses,” antipathy, and even a complete abandonment of the offending theater at worst.41
Francis Holley of the Bureau of Commercial Economics – which specialized in the nontheatrical circulation of advertising films – went so far as to claim that such aroused not a
receptive mood but a “combative spirit.”42 Perhaps the most compelling comment along this line
came from actor Edward Earle who declared that advertising on the screen was generally
unacceptable in the United States because “[n]othing is more distasteful to Americans than
compulsory methods.”43
More importantly, such arguments often became an implicit critique of the notion of
passive audiences, as boredom and irritation were traits of ‘active’ rather than ‘passive’ minds.
40
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Contrary to the nearly unavoidable attention posited by Don Herold, exhibition oriented
descriptions of the audience considered avoidance of advertising to be so mundane as to border
on childish petulance. Businessman and film fan George M. Rittelmeyer recounted stories of
audiences “passing the time away the best they could” during advertisements with chit chat.44
An unsigned 1921 article in Moving Picture Age declared that when an advertisement is “in front
of [the viewer]…he has to look at it or close his eyes.”45 The willful rendering of oneself
temporarily blind may be relatively petty behavior, but for these writers it was a legitimate
concern. Designers of offscreen advertising technologies, like lighted signs and advertising
clocks (see chapter five), expanded this ‘active audience’ rhetoric into an advertising theory of
their own, proposing that the wandering eye of the spectator, while a problem for slide and film
advertising, could be positively courted if offscreen tactics were used.46 The creation of
alternative viewing objects – even if they were advertising oriented – was offered on the grounds
that it would increase the spectators’ ability to freely choose what to see.
Among these latter advocates of the active, discriminating spectator, we read not just the
typical rhetoric of positive differentiation of media – ‘x’ is the supreme advertising medium
because of ‘y’ – but also negative comparison. Roy D. Mock, among many thinkers critical of
the concept of an absorbent spectator, noted that a primary difference between advertising in the
44
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cinema and advertising in all other venues was the concept of choice. In magazines, for
example, the reader could simply turn the page or ignore advertising content; in the cinema, that
choice was not possible, as the focal point of the room was out of the spectator’s control.47
Electronic advertising demanded a new notion of spectatorship – one attuned to the promise and
problems of temporal constraint. Despite the predominantly theoretical thrust of the public
conversation –no academic studies of viewer antipathy to advertising in these early days have yet
resurfaced in the historical record – the assumption that temporal compulsion and ticket price
combined into an unsolvable problem for cinema advertising naturalized over the course of the
decade, through a combination of exhibitor reluctance and trade press discouragement.

The Happy Captive and Twentieth Century Advertising
In these debates over the merits of the cinema as an advertising site – ranging, in their
initial appearance, at least from 1909 to 1921, and engaging minds as diverse as advertisers,
exhibitors, actors, and early cinema theorists in the trade presses – the persistent concern that
culture was wrong to attribute unilateral power to image-based communication kept the
advertising industry from leaping into the motion picture arena with both feet. For every cinema
advertising proponent who argued for a view of the motion picture patron as a smiling cash
machine waiting for input, there were likely a hundred exhibitors, film fans, and advertising
theorists decrying the practice as an intrusion. While neither viewpoint was ultimately entirely
correct – as a small amount of advertising was eventually accepted in nearly every film (via
product placement) and theater (via stills and trailers) in the country – a rhetorical stalemate
between the two positions kept growth in American cinema advertising very slow.
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Forms of electric advertising were designed, tested, and accepted in theaters across the
country, but no tactic was discovered which could satisfy both film industry concerns for viewer
pleasure and advertiser desires to directly address a captive audience. The failure to find a
commonly acceptable approach is apparent in the wide variety of tactics attempted – ranging
from temporal alternation (screen as medium), to product placement (celluloid entertainment as
medium), to lighted offscreen signs (venue as medium), etc. The end result was that the cinema
remained an outsider in the growing advertising industry. Small, start-up advertising businesses
(and dedicated film men) experimented with cinema advertising, while mainstream agencies
were hesitant, and would remain so until the television revolution compelled them to use cinema
advertising as a training ground.48 The perpetual disconnect between captivity and receptivity is
one of the fundamental reasons why cinema advertising was kept in a holding pattern in the
United States.
However, although advertising in cinema theaters has remained limited and inconsistent,
even in the comparatively more permissive decades at the end of the twentieth century, the
debate over cinema’s suitability for advertising furthered the creation of a collection of rhetorical
tropes which would help to shape new media advertising theory over the course of twentieth
century American history. The ‘captive audience,’ ‘receptive mood,’ ‘combative spirit,’ and
‘vanishing audience’ have all, to various degrees, continued to inform thinking about modern
electronic advertising.
Some examples of the perpetuation of ‘receptivity’ theory are obvious in American
advertising history. Radio appeals, for example, were described as the most powerful due to the
idea that the radio voice had the “supple power to move people and mold them, to enlist them
48
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and command them[; f]or people do what they are told.”49 Additionally, advertiser created and
sponsored radio programs were considered to “creat[e] a subconscious obligation [to buy] in the
mind of the listener” on the grounds that the audience would feel indebted for the free
entertainment.50 The power of the voice, and of ‘public service’ (providing freely available
entertainment), are thus asserted to create a receptive mood for broadcast advertising.
Contemporary interactive media receive similar rhetorical treatment. Scholar Paul Skalski has
described video game product placement as “a relatively new way to reach…not just consumers,
but engaged consumers.”51 Internet marketing professional Greg Jarboe has described YouTube
similarly, arguing that it is an excellent advertising venue on the grounds that its users “come
predisposed to ‘lean forward’ rather [than] ‘lean back.’”52 Note that, in interactive media, the
physical posture of the user can become shorthand for receptivity. As advertising men and
women attempt to interest advertisers in new forms, notions of psychological receptivity
continually arise.53
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Captivity, meanwhile, has been a driving theory not just for the adoption of particular
mediums for advertising, but for the intentional integration of advertising outlets into previously
ad-free spaces. In the 1950s, the United States Supreme Court heard a case on the growing issue
of advertising on public buses and streetcars. Enterprising advertising men had provided bus
companies with free radios permanently tuned to a single station – a station for which they sold
advertising. The piping of commercial radio into public spaces has only expanded since this
early iteration, in which “[t]he passengers listen[ed] to what the people at the station want[ed]
them to hear, whether they like[d] it or not.”54 Attempts to turn individuals in public venues into
de facto captive audiences also resulted in the creation of Channel One in 1989, in which, much
like the example of buses, schools were provided with free television equipment in exchange for
the guarantee that the channel’s twelve minute program (which included two minutes of
advertising) would be watched every day by at least 90% of students.55 Both public transit and
classroom advertising continue as legal and profitable advertising venues. Although it has not
yet been put into use, video gaming giant Sony has even patented technology which would turn
electronic game players into ‘captive audiences,’ by providing a simple means for “suspending
playing of the interactive content, displaying an advertisement, and resuming playing of the
interactive content.”56 As there could be significant repercussions to a game experience if the
player was not present when play resumed, the user would effectively be held captive during
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such an advertisement, unable to move away from the screen.57 With the popularity of captivity
as a description of audiences, even the old medium of billboarding, in contemporary theorizing,
has been reconceived as a means to reach captive audiences; as a Warner Bros advertising
executive asserted in 1999, “[t]here’s no way to avoid it if you do a large enough showing.”58
Despite long-standing concerns about captivity being ‘abhorrent’ to American citizens, then, the
advertising industry has continually sought out audiences which were unlikely or unable to
completely avoid an advertising message.59
As such, the rhetorical battle over the cinema screen – at the time, a unique dialectic
between the emerging fields of media effects and audience psychology – has been highly
influential. The cinema bears the most obvious marks of the conflict, as the poles of audience
receptivity and frustration continue to dominate the discourse. However, the concepts at the
heart of the cinema advertising debate – including, most importantly, ‘captivity’ and ‘receptivity’
– have taken on a life of their own as foundational concerns for media selection in the American
advertising industry.
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CHAPTER 3. “THE FRONT COVER MEDIUM”: MAGIC LANTERN SLIDES,
TEMPORALITY, AND ONSCREEN ADVERTISING

Films may come and films may go, but the advertising slide seemingly goes on forever.
- North Tonawanda Evening News (1917)1

As the epigraph opening this chapter would indicate, the commercial magic lantern slide
was a pervasive and long-lived form of theatrical advertising in the United States. Experimented
with or used heavily to ‘get the word out’ for such diverse purposes as local piano tuning,
running for government office, and furthering the awareness of a major brand, magic lantern
advertising slides were a common and influential element of early cinema programs in America.2
Via witty phrasing – entangling the screening duration of a single slide, the extent of a slide
‘break’ in the program, and even the repeated use, for months on end, of a single slide in a single
theater – the above quote humorously derides the multivalent interminability of lantern slides. In
hindsight, a fourth layer of meaning also arises from this statement. The lantern slide as an
advertising form also seems to ‘go on forever.’ Indeed, a high-tech variant of the form persists
to the present day in American theaters; although cheap digital production and distribution is
aiding in the final phasing out of still advertising, Screenvision, the second largest cinema
advertising company in the United States, still offers ‘slides’ – in both 35 mm and digital formats
1
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– as one of their wares.3 Still-imagery, peddling merchants and services, continues as a means to
fill the interim.
When integrated with filmed entertainment – the first medium in which temporal, rather
than spatial, sequencing was of prime importance – the lantern slide was the first widely
successful attempt to reconceive advertising towards a ‘single voice’ model. Prior to the advent
of lantern slide advertising in motion picture theaters, the driving theories of advertising
placement were spatial: nearness to a site of stimulation (interspersed with reading material, or
erected near a beautiful vista) or simple repetition (papering every available surface with
posters). Film – at least, the celluloid portion of it – began the 20th century transition in media
towards temporal structuring. The ethos of advertising changed to a fleeting integration – folded
into narratives, or even pausing the entertainment for commercial messages – rather than an
existence at the margins. To use a contemporary travel metaphor, slides mark the first shift in
placement ideology from the optional billboard to the mandatory stop sign, and caused much
handwringing about the rights of the audience.4 This structuring of sequential media messages
(entertainment, advertisement, entertainment, etc.) – which would become the model for
broadcasting – was introduced with the magic lantern slide.
Though old and seemingly outdated, even at its first appearance in cinema theaters,5 the
form was highly successful and became foundational for advertising development in 20th century
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electronic media for two reasons. First, the cheapness of the form allowed for adoption by local
advertisers, providing a broad and relatively large early-adopter base despite its lack of previous
triumphs.6 This cost-efficiency allowed for persistent use of the formative medium, prior to its
adoption by national advertisers – a necessary element for the rapid development of movie
theater advertising despite persistent early reluctance from exhibitors. Second, and more
importantly, the unavoidable fact of reel-change pauses in nickelodeon theaters opened an
obvious gap in motion picture display – a gap which advertising has attempted not only to fill,
but to maintain as a defining element of ‘moving’ media. The concept of an advertising
‘caesura’ is an intentionally maintained shadow of a technological limitation of early cinema.
The adoption, abuse, and partial abandonment of the form as a part of the silent era film
experience is the structuring incident underlying all other attempts at ‘new media’ advertising
over the course of the 1910s and the following decades. The slide-model’s influence, either as a
success to be emulated or a failed style to be avoided, is apparent in future development ranging
from the cinema’s experimentation with product placement, advertising shorts, trailers, and
offscreen technologies, to broadcasting’s development of sponsor produced programming and
participatory sponsorship via commercial ‘spots.’ A thorough understanding of its advent and
marginalization is crucial to the history of advertising in twentieth-century media.
This chapter will describe the rise, rationale, and specifics of slide advertising in the
atmosphere of expanding national advertising and expanding cinemagoing in the early 1910s,
and will explain its popularity at the time, its longevity as a form, and the perceived flaws in its
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structure which compelled advertisers to experiment with other cinema advertising models. The
chapter will begin with a description of the lantern advertising slide and its place in the silent era
program, revealing a history of the business of slides from its emergence around 1908, through
its boom-period as a reel-change ‘commercial break,’ and concluding with its increasingly
marginal usage following World War I. Following this, a study of the rhetoric both for and
against slides as a cinema advertising medium will show what slide manufacturers, consumer
goods manufacturers, and exhibitors expected to gain – and sometimes lose – by the use of
slides. This rhetorical analysis will include a section on Ernest A. Dench’s nuanced theory of
‘slide psychology,’ a complex take on the tone of the slide pause from a moment – 1916 – just
before the advertising slide permanently lost its prominent position in the program. Dench’s
writings inspire thinking about what might have been, had the regular slide ‘break’ not been
abandoned as an exhibition form. The chapter will culminate with an analysis of two forms of
‘high tech’ slides – motion slides and clock slides – showing how the presence of technological
variants clarifies some of the most commonly perceived flaws of slides as a medium.

What Was a Lantern Slide?
Lantern slides were, generally, still photographs, printed onto a coated plate in order to be
displayed on a large screen, either via an attachment to the motion picture projector, or a
specially designed projecting device (little more than a light-source and a lens). Most commonly
the plates were glass, though a minority of slide manufacturers also used mica, which tended to
fade but was lighter and harder to break, reducing the cost of shipping.7 Non-professionally
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produced advertising messages could also be created via various home-use processes – including
‘scratch slides’ (painting a slide with an opaque coating then scratching in a message), typewriter
slides (a sheet of typewritten text sandwiched between two pieces of glass), adhesive letters
(affixed to plain glass), or even pencil on “draftsman’s tracing cloth” (again, sandwiched
between two pieces of glass for screening).8 The simplicity of these home-made options,
however, rendered them decidedly uncommon for advertising use. Though advertisers
appreciated cost-efficiency, they rarely wanted their names associated with such aesthetically
simplistic forms as home-made slides. Professional advertising slides were almost always
photographic reproductions on glass or mica.
Commercial mass-reproduction of slides was a multi-step process, the first of which was
the making of a usable image. An artist would draw the advertisement at an overlarge size – up
to 16 square inches – and generally in black and white; photographs could also be used9, but
drawn images were far more common in early advertising slides. The industry standard was to
paint an image in white onto black paper, as a design “on a background of solid, impenetrable
black” was considered more pleasing to the eye.10 From a practical standpoint, this ‘white
figure’ style would keep the focus on the copy (rendered as the brightest thing on the screen) and
intended to be ephemeral, cut metal was rarely, if ever, chosen for the purpose. Frank B. Howe, “Commercial
Lantern Slides,” Camera Craft 24.2 (February 1917): 69; “How to Use Ad Slides,” Moving Picture Age May 1921:
19. Metal slides from Omaha’s Never Break Slide Company, and the Kansas City Slide Company: Display Ad,
Moving Picture World 18.9 (29 November 1913): 1006; and “Some Slides for Advertising in the Moving Picture
Show,” p. 82, Box 4, Kansas City Slide Manufacturing Company Records (K0637), State Historical Society of
Missouri Research Center – Kansas City.
8
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would simplify the process of hand-coloring the slides (dye could be generally washed over
particular areas, as the dark background concealed sloppy work).
Commonly these drawn images were generic creations of the slide company’s own copy
writers, designed to advertise classes of, rather than specific, products: for example, the Kansas
City Slide Company’s restaurant slide: “‘Too many cooks spoil the broth.’ That’s why we have
one good one.”11 These ‘stock slides’ were designed to be ordered from catalogs in order to turn
a profit from repeated small sales (no more than a few copies at a time) to merchants across the
country.12 Sometimes ‘stock slides’ were just ‘billboard slides,’ with attractive borders designed
around an empty white space which could be filled with custom copy. Alternatively, the artwork
could be commissioned, or produced from client copy, for a ‘special slide’ – mass produced, in
exactly the number desired by the advertiser, immediately after the drawing was approved.13
In any case, written copy was always brief, as one could never be sure how long a given
projectionist would leave the slide on the screen, and film viewers were presumed to be
“incredibly slow” readers under the best of circumstances.14 Slide advocate Frank Farrington
suggested no more than four words per line, while the Kansas City Slide Company advocated a
ten word maximum for finished slides.15 The bottom quarter of the image was generally left

11

“Some Slides for Advertising in the Moving Picture Show,” p. 77, Box 4, Kansas City Slide Manufacturing
Company Records (K0637), SHSMO-KC.
12
By 1917, Thomas P. Mason asserted that anyone desiring to open a commercial slide business should immediately
begin production on stock slides to match the local business environment. Thomas P. Mason, “Commercial Slide
Making,” Camera Craft 24.8 (August 1917): 315. Mid-19th century advertising lithography featured many direct
parallels with lantern slide advertising. One prominent parallel is the centrality of stock images, sold repeatedly to
various local merchants, to their business models. See: Pamela Walker Laird, Advertising Progress: American
Business and the Rise of Consumer Marketing (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 69.
13
The terminology for these three slides comes from Kansas City Slide Company catalogs, though any given slide
company produced the same products with roughly the same names for the styles.
14
G.R. Lowe, “Slide Advertising for the Retail Druggist,” American Druggist and Pharmaceutical Record April
1914: 44. See also: “Use Slides to Advertise,” Furniture Worker 37.5 (May 1920): 178; and D.H. Harris, “Making
‘Slidevertising’ Pay,” The Advertising Yearbook for 1921-1922, ed. Noble T. Praigg (Garden City, NY: Doubleday,
Page & Company, 1922), 211-212.
15
Frank Farrington, “Advertising in Moving-Picture Shows,” Bulletin of Pharmacy 27.6 (June 1913): 250; Slide
News May 1922, p. 4, Box 4, Folder “KC Slide Co – Flyers ‘Slide News’,” Kansas City Slide Manufacturing

74
blank in order to insert a local dealer’s name, although the positioning of this empty space could
vary depending on the slide producer or the copy design.
Once completed to the above specifications, the image would be placed in front of a
camera (all images were drawn at the same scale so that the camera wouldn’t have to be
refocused), and a negative would be created from the drawing. A specially-made, pedal-operated
printing box was used so that a single operator could rapidly expose a large quantity of slides.16
Once a suitable number were printed, they would be run through developing fluid and washed,
leaving completed black and white slides, at a uniform (American) size of 3 ¼ x 4 inches.17 The
printed glass slides would then be hand colored.18 Finally, a mat (complete with the slide
maker’s name and address) and a second piece of glass were laid on top to protect the image
coating, and the layers were bound together with paper tape.19
Advertising slides – just one of many types of glass slides then being made – were
available for purchase by any size business, and even by proxy. National advertisers could make
bulk orders to be sent to local dealers as ‘helps’ (shorthand for a piece of advertising material
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sent out by the manufacturer to help the dealer move the goods).20 Local merchants could order
one or a few slides solely for their own use. Exhibitors could even order multiple one-off slides
on behalf of a few local advertisers, as a way to both lower total shipping costs for merchants,
and engage in a bit of censorship over what would appear on their screen. Although early slides
were mailed out immediately upon receipt of the order, with instructions for the customer to
hand-write their own dealer information into the blank space at the bottom, by 1913 multiple
companies offered to professionally append dealer information, via a sticker or piece of
celluloid, before the slide went into the mail.21
Completed slides could be projected in any space where a ‘magic lantern’ and screen
were available – generally a motion picture theater, though vaudeville theaters and window
displays were also used. In theaters, the end result was a single massive advertisement projected
on the screen and looming over a seated audience. In the over the top rhetoric of the Neosho
Slide Company, this unavoidable, lighted, massive ad would “stamp [the advertiser’s] name,
trademark, package, goods, or proposition indelibly upon the buying sense of moving picture
show audiences.”22
20
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Like a high-tech version of hanging a sign on a theater curtain (visible when the curtain
was closed between each act), the advertising slide separated the pieces of the film program,
acting as a buffer zone in the intermissions between short films and between program repetitions
as a whole. For films longer than one reel, slides would have acted as an intermission. As such,
lantern slides were an onscreen but formally distinct type of advertising, in which the
advertisement was delivered in the same space as the entertainment, but in a form distinctly
different from its ‘moving’ nature (and possibly containing content disruptive to an ongoing
multi-reel film narrative). Additionally, unlike the advertising curtain, where the quantity of
advertisements had no necessary impact on duration, lantern slide advertising was ‘discrete’ but
‘fleeting’: only one advertisement appeared at a time, giving it the best possible chance of being
read, but an advertisement had to clear the screen (never to return during that program turn)
before another could take its place. As such, an onscreen disruption (or, if one chooses to
discuss the slides individually, a collection of disruptions) would occur repeatedly, every fifteen
minutes, as the theater changed reels, and the duration of the disruption would be measurable,
roughly, by the number of slides shown. The advertising lantern slide was, therefore, the nearest
sibling the silent era cinema possessed to the contemporary television commercial spot: it was
seen, at least in the early 1910s, as a caesura integrated into the film program at regular intervals,
and was as often as not regarded as an imposition to be avoided (perhaps with a trip to the
restroom or a conversation with a friend).
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A Brief History of the Early American Slide Advertising Industry, 1908-1922
The history of the lantern slide as a medium dates back to at least the 17th century, though
19th century developments in lamp technology were responsible for its widespread use.23
Despite their disparate dates of invention, early motion picture exhibition tended to treat film and
slides as fellow travelers, as early storefront theaters and itinerant exhibitors would integrate
motion pictures with slides in their programs. Indeed, well known itinerant showman Lyman
Howe toured with slides exclusively before transitioning to films at a later date.24 In early
nickelodeon screenings, with the demand for films exceeding the supply, many exhibitors turned
to technologies like the “Stereoptigraph” – a motion picture projector with a lantern slide
attachment – in order to easily integrate song and news slides into film shows. As such, the
interaction of lantern slides with the early film industry is a concrete example of an old medium
helping to delimit and define the horizon of expectations of a newer medium. Indeed, Charles
Musser has argued that the experiential and communicative properties of motion pictures were
largely worked out in direct comparison with stage performance (vaudeville) and the magic
lantern.25 As stable, film-oriented theaters emerged, the ‘combined show’ was, for many, the
pinnacle of nickelodeon exhibition.26

23

Charles Musser, The Emergence of Cinema: The American Screen to 1907 (New York and Toronto: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1990), 20, 38.
24
Charles Musser, High-Class Moving Pictures: Lyman H. Howe and the Forgotten Era of Traveling Exhibition,
1880-1920 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).
25
Early motion pictures were integrated into both vaudeville programs and lantern show exhibitions. Charles
Musser indicates, however, that these might have been independent movements. Though any combination of two
was not uncommon, one would rarely if ever see all three in the same show. Charles Musser, The Emergence of
Cinema: The American Screen to 1907 (New York and Toronto: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1990), 42. Lara Cain
Gray argues, for example, that slides were used to help define the film as a continuation of the legitimate stage, as a
moving lantern slide giving the appearance of an opening curtain would often be shown just prior to a film. Lara
Cain Gray, “Magic Moments: Contextualising Cinema Advertising Slides from the Queensland Museum
Collection,” Queensland Review 18.1 (2011): 82.
26
See Richard Abel’s assertion, referenced below, that the song-slide added a touch of class to theaters in Iowa.

78
However, the pairings appear to have been largely entertainment oriented – the slides
were generally song slides or news images.27 Although there is evidence for the existence of
direct advertising slides in the late 1800s – the advertising screenings of New York’s
Commercial Advertising Bureau, Fred A. Clark’s ad subsidized screenings in department stores,
and an exhibitor who claims to have interspersed Civil War slides in the 1880s with advertising
material28 – this use was presumably uncommon. Indeed, all such screenings of advertising
slides would likely have been experimental; every advertising slide would have been either a
one-off or part of a very limited production run. The slide was, like the film, a medium
predominantly of entertainment. There was simply no market for mass-produced advertising
slides.29
The transitional moment was 1908, when the major film producers regularized output by
shifting to studio-bound production of fiction films.30 The massive upswing in available product,
combined with the popularity of cheap amusements in the wake of the Panic of 1907,31 allowed
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for a boom in nickelodeon businesses, and a corresponding boom in slide production. Song-slide
usage, already common in earlier exhibition – especially vaudeville – peaked around 1910, as
sheet-music publishers used the sing-a-long slide performance in motion picture theaters as a
form of indirect advertising to increase the popularity, and therefore the sales, of their new songs.
Slide historian John W. Ripley asserts that nearly every motion picture theater regularly
integrated song slide performances at this time, as a means to avoid the interminable ‘reel
change’ announcement slide.32 Richard Abel, identifying it as an almost exclusively American
element of nickelodeon display, argues that the boom was facilitated, at least in small town
theaters, by its addition of a patina of ‘class’ to motion picture exhibition.33 As such, the song
slide was a pivotal transitional form – a proto-advertising slide which both stabilized the
presence of slides in motion picture theaters and provided a backdrop for theorizing the presence
of advertising within the cinema program.34
The increasing number of theaters likewise produced a greater need for announcement
slides – such as “Ladies, Please Remove Your Hats” – and increased the circulation of news
slides (a slide alternative to the irregularly circulated filmed news footage that existed prior to
the 1911 advent of newsreels). The demand for such content boosted the flow of film exhibitor
dollars into the slide industry. Nickelodeon exhibition, flooding the slide makers with cinema
related cash, triggered a dramatic increase in both the circulation and quality of slides. Slide
32
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makers attempted to outclass each other with their products, and attempted to shame exhibitors
into purchasing the latest and best slides. For example, the Levi Company traded on recent
improvements to slide quality as early as December of 1908, when they declared that only a
“Bumble Puppy” would still be using announcement slides of the previous generation.35 New
companies, offering either more aesthetically pleasing, more humorous, or sometimes simply
cheaper announcement slides flooded the market to compete for these dollars.
It was this 1908 flourishing of the slide market which also gave rise to the nationally
circulated, massively reproduced advertising slide.36 Frank B. Howe, a silent era slide maker
writing for Camera Craft magazine in 1917, asserted that “the development of present day
slides,” including the advertising variant, could be traced to 1909. As late as 1906, Howe
asserted, “the only variety of slide in use was the…‘picture slide’…[used for] lectures,
travelogues, and home entertainments.”37 Howe’s history, unlike many of the early trade press
histories of in-cinema advertising, appears to be accurate. The earliest examples of advertising
slides appear in 1908, we can reasonably date the proliferation and standardization of the form to
a point prior to 1910. There were two important logics underlying the shift. First, the era from
1910 to 1915 witnessed “rapid growth” in national consumer advertising.38 Tied to rising
interest in marketing to immigrants and the poor via mass repetition of imagery (technically
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advertising to the illiterate), the advertisers were also in the market for new, image-based ways to
reach the masses.39 Second, the burgeoning cinema slide market boosted interest in cinema
applications. The rapidly developing slide industry became a cut-throat business almost
overnight, as every successful new concept was imitated by a multitude of competitors within
months of its premiere.40 As such, companies were seeking not only new product lines to sell,
but also ways to reduce their price point so as to gain market share through lower prices.
Advertising could serve both of these ends. Though, as we shall see in successive chapters, the
relationship that developed between advertisers and slide makers was not a unique one (many
forms of cinematic advertising developed almost simultaneously), it is very apparent why the
two would have been drawn together at this juncture. Advertisers were seeking an audience, and
the rapidly proliferating slide businesses – in desperate need of regular income – were seeking
other revenue streams.
Research into the trade presses of the early twentieth century, with particular focus on the
display advertisements which slide manufacturers placed within their pages, shows a dramatic
upswing in advertising slide production between 1908 and 1910. The first evidence of
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advertising slide production in the Moving Picture World was the April 1908 advertisement from
Boston’s Preston Lombard, in which he offered “Announcement, Advertising, [and] Special”
slides.41 Although slides were not mentioned directly in the article, the Young Advertising
Service of Manning, SC, was also engaging in ad slide sales by 25 July 1908. The Moving
Picture World declared that the company had “originated a good advertising proposition” in
which they had “arranged with several moving picture establishments for space upon the canvas
between acts.”42 Within four months, on 7 November 1908, commercial lantern slides were
common enough for the Moving Picture World to caution against their proliferation:
[q]uite a business was done Election Night [November 3rd] in several dime
theaters…with advertising slides. We venture to caution these places, however,
that this advertising the grocery, shoe, drug, and other stores in their
neighborhood will in time drive the people away from their shows. They come
there and pay to see moving pictures and illustrated songs and not to get
quotations on green apples from some local grocer.43
During the latter half of 1908, then, the notion of the advertising slide arose – perhaps
independently in multiple cities – as a viable product for use in nickelodeons. Importantly, the
unproven assumption that advertising was incompatible with the cinema audience’s desires was
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asserted almost immediately. Both the use of slides and the assumption that they were an
inherent evil in the cinema would swell enormously over the course of the next five years.
Slide manufacturers, both established and newly formed, quickly jumped into the
advertising slide field. The Well’s Moving Picture Enterprises’ included the tagline
“Advertising and Special Lantern Slides Made” in their display ad of 24 October 1908.44 On 21
November of the same year the Ohio Transparency Company included a consumer goods
advertising slide – a stock slide for cigar merchants – as the image in their trade press display ad,
while the copy claimed “[s]ome exhibitors are paying their rent by exhibiting Advertising Slides
before the show.”45 The Levi Company, Inc. (later to change its name to the Perfection Slide
Company), offered the “brand new idea” of advertising slides in their display ad of 15 May
1909.46 On this same date, the Brayton Manufacturing Company took out a full-page display ad,
devoting more than half of the space to their new line of advertising slides. The ad declared, at
the top of the left hand column, “Advertising Slides will pay your expenses,” and included two
photographic examples of their work: one for the Schulze Baking Company, and one for the
Union Furniture Carpet Company.47 Cleary, as far as Brayton was concerned, the market for
advertising slides had grown so rapidly in the preceding year that the cost of a full-page ad in the
top flight cinema trade journal, Moving Picture World, was not a wasteful expense.
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By June 12th of that year, a short article in the Moving Picture World concurred, avowing
that “[w]ithin the past year a pleasing change has developed in the quality and character of
the…announcements and advertising slides shown in nickel theaters,” and placed Brayton at the
forefront of the movement that had “opened up a field of remuneration to the exhibitor.”48
Between April 1908 and the end of 1910, at least twenty-three slide makers offered advertising
slides through display ads in the pages of the Moving Picture World.49 The major centers of
slide production – New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia – were also the hub cities for the ad
slide trade.50 Companies dotted the countryside, however, with an unexpectedly large number of
advertising slide manufacturers sprouting across the state of Missouri, for example, presumably
to take advantage of a nationally central location.51 As such, it is undeniable that the advertising
slide went through a phase of rapid development between 1908 and 1910, mushrooming across
the country and attaining early widespread adoption by both slide manufacturers and film
exhibitors.
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Though it is clear that the nascent field was in full swing by the end of 1910, it is equally
clear that small manufacturers and local merchants were the predominant clients in the early
years. The unsettled and local nature of early slide business is directly evidenced in the fact a
pair of sixteen year old boys from Sandusky, Ohio began an advertising slide company of their
own and, by late May of 1909, were “getting out, after school hours and on Saturdays, twohundred advertising slides a week.”52 The fact that young boys in Sandusky had heard of the
concept implies its commonality, while their audacity in starting up and apparently succeeding
with a business of this type strongly implies that, to this point, local manufacture was still more
common than postal order or dealer ‘helps.’ By early 1911, columnist Thomas Bedding, in an
article in Moving Picture World, came near to directly stating that such conditions persisted.
Bedding admitted surprise that the ‘soulless’ advertising man, who would “advertise on a funeral
hearse” if given the chance, had not adopted the motion picture theater for advertising purposes.
While his mocking tone was not exactly inviting to advertisers, it is clear from his article that
“Mr. Postum, Mr. Moxie, [and] Mr. Munyon,” among other major advertisers, were not at this
point attempting national brand advertising through the medium of slides.53 As such, the
quantity of active advertising slide producers in these first few years likely greatly exceeds the
number advertising nationally in trade presses like the moving picture world, as the bulk were
producing local slides for local use.
There are several plausible reasons for the rapid proliferation of commercial slide
companies at this time. While local demand may have been the primary determinant for local
production, part of the proliferation of national advertising slide companies might have been
caused by what we could term a slide diaspora. At least one major slide manufacturer ‘gave
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birth’ to a second around 1910. A news report from the time declares that A.V. Cauger had
“formerly lived [in Neosho, MO] and was interested in the Neosho Slide Co.” before moving to
Kansas City and “start[ing] the Kansas City Slide Co.”54 In the first half of the 1910s, both
Neosho and Kansas City Slide were in the top tier of national slide companies. A second reason
may be the fact that one could open and operate a slide company with very few employees.
Though the Kansas City Slide Company already had thirty-two employees in 1912 (which
ballooned further to 64 by 1914), the North American Slide Company of Philadelphia was able
to operate with only three employees from 1916 to 1919.55 Two blocks up the street, the NoDestructo Slide Company employed only six Philadelphians in 1916.56 Third, the explosion of
spending in the industry would undoubtedly have drawn prospectors to the field. The relentless
expansion of both the advertising industry and the slide industry at this point in American history
created a perfect storm for start-up businesses to enter the field in search of a quick buck.57
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Fourth, and most important, however, was the established relationship between slides and
motion pictures in nickelodeon exhibition practices. Dedicated film theaters delivered a series of
short films – one reel (roughly 15 minutes) in duration – from a single projector. Both song and
announcement slides had developed as common means of filling the pause created during a reel
change. This gap was a clear and established zone of indeterminate (but definitely non-filmic)
content, during which a seated audience patiently waited for the next film. With exhibitors
already seeking ways to fill this technologically mandated pause, and already turning to slide
manufacturers to do so – especially the promotionally-inflected song-slides – advertisers
interested in reaching the large and growing customer base of the motion pictures had an obvious
form on which to focus their attention. Offering to pay the cost of announcement slides in
exchange for including advertising, or, better yet, offering to pay the exhibitor a small weekly fee
for the space (helping them ‘pay the rent’), it would not have been difficult for advertisers to
stake claim to a part of the temporal flow which the film industry proper seemed incapable of or
uninterested in filling. As such, though dated, lantern slide advertising emerged specifically as a
way to capitalize on a large audience rendered idle by a reel change.
For the first few years, however, the young commercial slide industry was so flooded
with small businesses – “many of which…were incompetent in the extreme”58 – and was so
devoid of standards of practice that it looked as though it would soon self-destruct. Witness, for
example, the story of the Marshaw Slide Manufacturing Service, criticized not once but twice, in
early 1909, by the editors of the Moving Picture World. Though Marshaw claimed that business
had suffered only a minor hiccup as they transitioned to larger quarters, complaints circulated for
weeks about their failure to fill orders or even respond to queries. The World claimed to have
their wares before the public.” Jno. T. Hendry, “About Advertising Slides,” Moving Picture World 16.4 (26 April
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received “dozens” of complaints, including that of LeRoy Bickle, of Ardmore, Oklahoma’s
Theatorium, whose slide order was weeks late – though the check had been cashed – and whose
letters to the company had been ignored.59 While Marshaw itself was singled out as a
particularly poor business in these notes, the company can be held up as a historical emblem of
the poor business practices rampant in early advertising slide production.60
The slide industry’s most pronounced problem was price-cutting, resulting in largely
unsatisfactory slides being made just as they were becoming common in theaters. As
photography journalist T. Stanley Curtis asserted, in late 1911:
a number of men who possessed more business acumen than photographic or
artistic talent…have entered the field and flooded it with worse than mediocre
work, cutting their prices to the detriment of the conscientious slide makers.
Curtis also helpfully added that “[i]t was at the time when the demand increased so suddenly that
the ‘shyster’ slide-makers started their work,” implying the importance of the nickelodeon boom
to the rise of ‘shysters,’ without directly stating the fact.61 Corroborating evidence for this
assertion exists at least as early as 1908, when New York song slide makers engaged in a price
battle.62 By early 1909, the Ohio Transparency Company was already using a price-cutting
reference as its company slogan: “The Best not the Cheapest.”63 By the middle of 1911, the
Niagra Slide Company humorously attempted the reverse tactic, taking out a display ad in which
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they claimed to have all been “Arrested…for selling slides too cheap.”64 Publicly declared
prices – still common in slide company self-advertising during these early years – also show a
clear downward trajectory. The Brayton Manufacturing Company was advertising hand-colored
advertising slides from custom copy for fifty cents each in December 1908.65 In March of 1909,
the Levi Company dropped their price to thirty-five cents per slide, attributing the reduction to
“increased facilities.”66 Later that same year, the Marshaw Slide Manufacturing Service matched
that price.67 In mid-1912, the Erker Bros. Optical Company of St. Louis used the thirty-five cent
price as a launch special for their new designs, and even offered to cut further (four dollars per
dozen, or thirty-three and one-third cents per slide) for larger orders.68 That same year, George
Birt of Indianapolis offered advertising slides for thirty cents each, and had cut corners so badly
that he was openly admitting that his slides were merely black letters on color-tinted glass.69 By
1913, the Greater New York Slide Company had dropped its offer as low as eighteen cents per
slide, if ordered in quantities of one-hundred, and (quite accurately) called it “an extremely low
price for good advertising slides.”70 In the surviving data, the historical low point is found in a
one-year contract, commencing in late 1914, signed by the Advertising Slide Company of St.
Louis in which the company agreed to a price of sixteen cents per slide.71 However, slide maker
Frank B. Howe, in his 1917 historical overview of the market, even asserted that hand colored,
custom designed slides could be had for as little as ten-cents during this period.72 Knowing these
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conditions, it is perhaps unsurprising that companies could form and fold in less than a month –
as Louisville’s Advertising Specialty Company did in early 1912.73
The quantity of producers and rapidly dwindling pricing had dramatic effects on the
industry as a whole in its early years, as companies tried every tactic imaginable to gain
attention. As early as 1909, the Levi Company attempted to draw the eyes of trade press readers
by heading a self-advertisement with the title “MURDER,” and then openly admitting that it was
a ploy to get the reader’s attention.74 Apparently even at that date a mention of slides was no
longer a draw to the potential client’s eye. More problematically, in the hyper-competitive early
years of advertising slides, popular images would be rapidly pirated by unscrupulous opponents.
Such companies would even publicly boast of their superior renditions of the work of others. A
1913 catalog from the Kansas City Slide Company, for example, included a page with eight slide
images: four of which were the original designs of their competitors, while the other four were
their own ‘superior’ renditions.75
In this wildly competitive market, a subset of slide companies – the larger companies
regularly advertising in the trade press – attempted to add elements to their business model to
help carve out a stable and profitable niche. Most of these elements ran directly parallel to
principles of the established, print-focused advertising agencies: cultivating a notion of
professional expertise, space brokering, and offering ‘services’ like distribution and screening

73

Formation: “Correspondence: Louisville,” Moving Picture World 11.5 (3 February 1912): 406. Dissolution:
“Correspondence: Louisville,” Moving Picture World 11.6 (10 February 1912): 506.
74
Display Ad, Moving Picture World 4.24 (12 June 1909): 810.
75
The third slide is a design that was used heavily in self-advertising for the Columbia Slide Company of Chicago.
It is clear, therefore, that the Kansas City Slide Company was openly declaring their pirating of competing slide
content. “Some Slides for Advertising in the Moving Picture Show,” p. 77, Box 4, Kansas City Slide Manufacturing
Company Records (K0637), SHSMO-KC.

91
assistance.76 An oligarchy of high-end slide makers developed through these efforts to combat
the price-cutting problem.
‘Professional’ rhetoric – assertions that one could be a slide advertising ‘expert’ – ran
rampant in these early years, as companies attempted to mimic the ‘full service’ notion of
traditional agencies by marketing themselves as not only manufacturers of slides, but creators of
both visual and written copy. The Brayton Manufacturing Company, in their first full-page
display ad, used the word “Artists” five times (along with the words “Original” and “Alive”) as a
buffer between the two columns.77 The following month, Brayton asserted that profit was just a
side effect of their public respect as “artists,” with the claim that “money-making is not our
business or pleasure.”78 As early as 1911, the Lee Lash Company asserted that the weight of
experience – its long history of ‘censorship’ of advertising curtains – had given the company
keen insight into advertising copy.79 By 1912, the Thornton Advertising Company encouraged
advertisers to see its hiring of B.S. Presba – described as a man with years of experience in slide
advertising – as “evidence that…[they had] standardized Theatre Slide Advertising, and brought
it to such a state of efficiency that it demands careful attention.”80 In 1913, the North American
Slide Company brought the term ‘expert’ into the industry for the first time when it declared that
its slides were “made by experts – the copy prepared and the drawings made by trained
specialists,” resulting in their slides having “character…snap and go.”81 Within a decade – by
1922 – even the mainstream New York press was able to identify George Toner, of the Unique
Slide Company, as a creator of “cornucopias, curlicues, and similar ornamental dingbats” under
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the assumption that the reader would understand the description as a recognizable sub-field of
commercial art.82 For the general newspaper reader of 1922, ‘slide artist’ was a definable, if
somewhat eccentric, profession. That same year, the Kansas City Slide Company declared in its
monthly catalog update “Slide News,” that the price of slides was for the art rather than
materials; as such, a decrease in the price of glass would not decrease the cost of slides because
they were “drawn by high-salaried experts.”83
This, however, was simply the explicit rhetoric. Many companies also tacitly declared
expertise by publishing catalogs of stock slides – implying clearly that their creativity was what
was for sale. Although A.V. Cauger of the Kansas City Slide Company claimed to have been
“the first concern in the slide business to put out an illustrated list,” the Levi Company catalog
was already in its ‘second edition’ as early as 1908 – two years before the Kansas City Slide
Company opened for business.84 Perhaps Cauger was referring to his time with the Neosho Slide
Company, which offered a sixteen page catalog, with ad slides included alongside announcement
slides, by the end of 1909.85 By 1910, the Brayton company had taken to publicly referring to
them as “Stock Advertising Slides.”86 Within a few years, many of the more prominent slide
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producers – including Scott & Van Altena, the Niagara Slide Company, the Erker Bros. Optical
Company, and Burden & Salisbury - offered catalogs in their self-advertising, and many others
were likely circulating catalogs without offering them nationally through trade press selfadvertising.87 By 1917, the practice was so common that photography expert Thomas P. Mason
asserted that anyone thinking of starting a commercial slide company should, as their first act,
“classify his possible customers according to their lines of business and then make up…some
ready-to-serve designs” that could be made and sold immediately through a catalog list.88 In the
absence of (or possibly in addition to) a catalog, some companies would even send one slide free
as an example of the high quality of their work. Both the Mica Non-Breakable Slide Company,
in 1912, and the Columbia Slide Company, in 1915, even offered to make a free sample from the
advertiser’s copy.89 As such, either through direct claims or the weight of catalogs, advertisers
were encouraged to see slide copy as an expert service provided by slide companies.
‘Professionalization’ was not just implied in copy writing practices, however. In an
attempt to indicate that slide advertising was a stable and accepted medium, slide producers
either offered, or explicitly guaranteed, distribution in various ways. Space brokering – the very
same concept which the print-based agencies had used in the late 1800s to stabilize magazine
and newspaper advertising90 – was the method of choice for the Motion Picture Advertising
Company and Lee Lash Company, both of New York City, and the Auerbach Advertising
Agency of Butte, Montana. Space brokering in motion pictures consisted of the signing of
exclusive contracts with a number of theaters and then ‘reselling’ the contracted advertising
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space to clients as part of the cost of a slide purchase.91 The Lee Lash Company had enough
theaters under contract that a one-year advertising deal, running until the 31st of May 1913, was
valued at $87,946.92
In the absence of space brokering, two other forms of ‘guarantee’ were attempted:
offering a check-up service, or offering to aid in contracting theaters.93 At least one, the
Thornton Advertising Company, took the former course and attempted “to absolutely guarantee
service” by using a system of “territorial managers” to personally double-check that slides were
being screened as promised, and in good condition.94 Although Thornton is the only example I
have uncovered, this method would have been relatively easy for small, locally focused slide
producers to integrate. Multiple slide concerns – such as the Harold Ives Company and the
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Neosho Slide Company – went the latter route and offered to aid in contracting with theaters for
screenings of finished slides.95 These methods of ‘guaranteeing’ circulation in the absence of
space brokering contracts with theaters were, likewise, attempts to prove that slide advertising
was not a scattershot and unprofessional affair, and that the professional slide maker had the
experience and knowledge necessary to get advertising slides onto screens.
In short order, the larger slide producers began describing themselves as ‘full service’
agencies for motion picture theater advertising. The Neosho Slide Company declared, by 1912,
that they made slides “complete from the design to the guaranteed delivery of the slides to your
trade.”96 By 1914, the Kansas City Slide Company was offering contracts for service that
included new slides weekly, conceived, made and mailed with no need for continual advising by
the advertiser.97 In 1921, the Standard Slide Corporation’s notion of a ‘full service’ slide
manufacturing concern was clear from the following description:
We prepare the layout of the copy for the slide; explain how the slides can be used
to the best advantage; secure the dealer’s cooperation and take entire charge of the
distribution of slides direct to dealers with return card check-up.98
Integrating elements of all of the above – copy writing, consultation, and distribution assistance –
the slide manufacturer as professional expert on slide advertising became common by the mid1910s, as slide manufacturers effectively became cinema-based ad ‘agencies’ in an American
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advertising culture where medium exclusivity was still a common way of differentiating
advertising companies.
Much of the above professionalization, despite the slide industry’s largely catalog (and
therefore local merchant) based business, included one further rhetorical spin designed to imply
strength and stability: the implication was always that slides were plausible for national
campaigns. The attempt to draw national advertising contracts as a way to legitimize and
stabilize both a company (through windfall profits) and the industry (by association with
mainstream advertisers) was often rhetorically bald-faced. Overt name dropping, of national
manufacturers who had once used a slide maker’s service, proliferated in self-advertising. Often
such mentions included example images printed as part of the display ad. For example, wellknown brands and manufacturers like Arrow Collars and the American Tobacco Company
appeared in the self-advertising for the Greater New York Slide Company and Niagara Slide
Company respectively.99 The Advertising Slide Company of St. Louis even circulated a
portfolio of previous work for national advertisers like Coca Cola, Sunkist Oranges, and the
Heinz (“57 Varieties”) Corporation.100 Other companies overwhelmed a lack of concrete detail
with large numbers – like Neosho’s 1912 declaration that “40 National Advertisers” were using
their distribution service, or the Novelty Slide Company’s boast that “115 National Advertisers”
had at one point signed a contract for their slides.101 The presumed endorsement of national
advertisers, on top of full-service appeals, made top-flight ad slide manufacturers look quite
stable.
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Despite all these efforts, the advertising slide business, in the short term, was a troubled
realm. Price competition by small, often fly-by-night producers had placed individual company
profit above market health and had devastated the public reputation of the form. Regardless of
the attempts by the larger manufacturers to attain professional credibility, cut-rate slide
producers, and their many clients, created an avalanche of shoddy product and poor display
practices…and a massive backlash against advertising slides.102 To the vexation of the larger
slide makers, in-cinema advertising became not only common, but so often ‘incompetently’
produced, that public complaints proliferated. A parade of exhibitor rejections and legal
restrictions of slides appear in the historical record between 1912 and 1916.
As spectator complaint expanded, many exhibitors took it upon themselves to try to force
advertising off of cinema screens. At least one prominent member of the film press – the Moving
Picture World’s own Epes Winthrop Sargent – playing on growing anti-advertising feelings,
made claims to a supposedly higher moral standing that the ‘manager’ had over the ‘billposter,’
asserting the need to “[h]ave respect for your business even if you have none for yourself.” For
Sargent, the exhibitor who would turn a screening of ‘Quo Vadis’ into a “store show” by
breaking it up with slides indicating “that the bull Ursus kills represents a well known brand of
smoking tobacco,” was the epitome of capital influenced moral degradation.103 Exhibitors
themselves often simply refused to run ad slides (occasionally using such a decision as a reason
for chest-thumping in the press.) A few theaters in Louisville, Kentucky, for example,
voluntarily abandoned slides altogether in 1912 on the grounds that “the public…[was] not
meeting the show-slide with particular warmth, and that not enough business [could] be secured
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to make the shortening of the shows worth while.”104 The Dreamland Theater, of Augusta,
Georgia, was more boisterous in its rejection, asserting not only that “[n]o advertising slides go
on our screen…at any price,” but also that they would not even place advertising in their printed
programs.105 Multiple public refusals of this nature are recorded in the motion picture trade
press.
Two specific legal attacks on slide advertising, in the wake of public outrage, have also
come to light. In 1915, Bloomington, Illinois, added an extra $20 per year to the licensing fee
for theaters using “advertising slides or curtains.”106 Acting as both a deterrent (for theaters who
did not want to pay an extra $20 before inaugurating a possibly damaging advertising line), and
an act of acceptance (simply an added tax on increased profits), the Bloomington advertising fee
indicates not only the commonality of debate of the topic, but also the public’s difficulty in
knowing quite how to respond to it. The double-edged law implies the existence of both quality
professional slides and cheap profiteering. Legislators in Boston attempted to pass a bill in 1916
of much less ambiguity: the bill would have made it illegal to show any advertising onscreen in
Boston – “with the exception of…religious or charitable institutions or events, or when it refers
to his own theatrical affairs” – with a mandatory fine of $50-200 for violators, and a license
revocation for repeat offenders.107 By the mid-1910s, then, public condemnation of slides had
reached such a fever pitch that local government was stepping in.
In the absence of the defunct song slides, and with the growing reluctance to use
advertising slides to fill the gaps between reels, the advertising slide began slowly slipping out of
typical theater programs. Many exhibitors turned increasingly to self-promotion to fill gaps.
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During the early 1910s, an increasing use of home-made slides to announce either the next film
in the program, or the program for the following day, led to an eventual professionalization of
the ‘coming attraction’ or ‘advance’ slide. In 1911, F.H. Richardson, in early advertising for his
typewriter slides, declared that “Up-to-date theaters use them for announcing future programs” –
a practice which surely dated back to old scratch and handwritten slides in the earliest film
theaters.108 Earlier that year, exhibitor Samuel Acri, in a letter to the editor of Moving Picture
World, requested that the practice be professionalized. Acri asked studios to circulate advance
slides with images and names of actors and actresses on the grounds that the drawing power of
certain performers could improve box office receipts if it was used to advertise.109 Over the
following years, the ‘coming attraction’ slide would be inaugurated in a number of formats, by
independent (non-Patents Company affiliated) studios, in an effort to increase the competitive
value of their films.110 In July of 1912, both the Crown Feature Film Company and Universal
were offering ‘announcement slides’ for their upcoming productions.111 Reliance offered
advance announcement slides – made by high-class slide producers Scott & Van Altena – by
1913.112 Between 1912 and 1913, a number of general slide producers also began circulating
coming attraction slides (apparently without studio consent or funding), including the Novelty
Slide Company and the Manhattan Slide Company. 113 By early 1913, however, the practice was
still so haphazard that the Windsor Cut-Out Slide Company of Baltimore was offering, for 75
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cents per week, rudimentary ‘coming attractions’ slides which featured nothing but a list of the
next program’s titles cut out of plain paper.114 Discussion of the Windsor slides, in Moving
Picture World, provides evidence for the growing use of the pause between reels to streamline
audience pleasure. Rather than frittering away the pause on advertising or songs, only to have
spectators get up to leave in the early moments of a film (after realizing that the program has
started to repeat), Windsor advocated for the use of film-title slides not only to announce the next
program, but even to announce the next picture in the current sequence. In this way, patrons
would “have a chance to leave before the [actual film] is thrown on the screen.”115 The
‘advance’ slide, then, became a standard form of exhibitor discourse with patrons in the early
1910s, both to keep the program running smoothly, and to entice patrons to return for more.
Other forms of theater self-publicity joined the ‘coming attraction’ slide in the pauses in
the program. One example was the Novelty Slide Company’s advocacy of regular screenings of
a slide indicating that the theater was “A Member of the Exhibitor’s League of America.” This
information would supposedly indicate that one’s program was consistently of the highest
quality.116 Such self-advertising tactics are indicative of a transition in exhibition philosophy
before 1915, when exhibitors would attempt to either phase out the reel change pause (by
installing a second projector and moving to a model with only one intentional ‘intermission’
between turns of the program117), or use the pauses for theater business. This streamlining of the
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program sequence, purportedly for the benefit of patrons, while not completely incompatible
with continued advertising slide use, reduced the amount of space available for their integration.
Quality cutting had clearly damaged both exhibitors’ and advertisers’ faith in the standard
advertising slide. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that the commonly reported ‘hissing’
at slides by angry spectators was not a natural response to an unwanted imposition into the film
program, as silent era critics would contend. Rather, slide hatred was the outgrowth of a
particular historical moment in which the slides themselves were ugly and often screened for
months on end, even when dirty and broken,118 and in which the quantity had escalated beyond
the tolerance level.119 Indeed, a 1921 article in Moving Picture Age declared that “[a]lmost any
theater owner will agree that it is the poor slides that draw the kicks. For this reason the…theater
manager…must insist on good slides.”120 Though a minority of voices likely continued to
oppose advertising slides throughout the silent era – decrying them as a generic ‘evil’ of the
motion picture theater121 – the origin of viewer and exhibitor displeasure was abusive early
business practices which put slide-industry competition above spectator desires.
Although the print-based ad agencies were, even then, waging a successful battle against
public distrust,122 the lantern slide industry – less entrenched in the business model of exhibition
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than print ads were to magazines and newspapers – struggled to fight a battle against public
distaste in the absence of clear financial underwriting of the exhibition field. The evolving
oligarchy of large manufacturers, while shifting their business model to full-service and their
rhetoric to national advertiser appeals and professionalization, paralleled their self-elevation with
critique of the problems in their industry. Decrying price-cutters as the bane of the slide field,
this minority of major slide makers both admitted and condemned the state of their industry, in
an attempt to put themselves above the fray. In seeking to rationalize and solidify their industry,
and to shift the public perception of slides from ‘parasite’ to legitimate cinema adjunct, major
slide manufacturers did not simply offer better product, but argued explicitly that quality was the
opposite of low cost. High price became almost synonymous with quality production.
Although T. Stanley Curtis asserted, in late 1911, that the price-cutting situation was
starting to improve,123 the movement for higher quality slides would not become apparent in
slide-maker self-advertising until 1912 and 1913. As early as 1912, direct mention of prices in
display advertising began to disappear. Many, including the Kansas City Slide Company,
eventually began to hold the line on prices in order to keep quality up – their minimum price for
stock advertising slides was fifty cents each in 1913.124 Signs of the coming transition to pricier
slides appear in the advertising from the Niagara Slide Company in 1913, which held to the then
common thirty-five cent price tag only for duplicates; the first iteration of any ad slide would
cost fifty to seventy-five cents.125 The Neosho Slide Company was attempting a rhetorical
flourish to justify higher prices as early as 1914, claiming “the best is always the cheapest” (a bit
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of linguistic double talk which, though still capable of drawing business from someone scanning
the page for the word cheapest, actually meant that the greater returns from a more expensive ad
paradoxically made it a ‘cheaper’ advertisement).126 In their previously cited 1912-13 contract,
the Lee Lash Company legally claimed the value of its slides at $1 each – a claim that was not
contested.127 In 1914, the Perfection Slide Company offered any two slides, out of a pictured
eight, for $1.50.128 By 1915, a letter to the editor of a journal for piano tuners indicated that
Neosho’s price for stock slides was also seventy-five cents at that point, and the Best Slide
Company took to openly deriding price cutting in its catalog, saying “[t]he price cutter never
commands respect.”129
Though it is difficult to name a date for when, or even if, the major players in the industry
entirely ‘won’ the price cutting conflict and rallied around a stable minimum of pricing, it is
clear that the problem drug on, in some regions, at least as late as 1917. Camera Craft magazine
published two articles in 1917 in which descriptions of price-cutting were worded to imply that it
was a current problem. Frank B. Howe’s previously cited article of February 1917 still claimed
that coming attraction slides could be had for nine cents in 1917, and asserted that only two
companies were then holding the line on prices.130 Thomas P. Mason, though he was writing six

126

G.R. Lowe, “Slide Advertising for the Retail Druggist,” American Druggist and Pharmaceutical Record April
1914: 44. Philadelphia’s North American Slide Company tried something similar two years earlier by claiming that
“[t]he quality of our slides is remembered long after the price is forgotten.” Display Ad, Printers’ Ink 81,4 (24
October 1912): 83.
127
“Lee Lash Co. v. Northwestern Consol. Mining Co.,” Federal Reporter with Key-Number Annotations, Volume
218 (St. Paul: West Publishing Co, 1915), 910.
128
Full-Page Display Ad, Illustrated Milliner April 1914: 45.
129
C.E. Livengood, The Tuner’s Magazine 3.1 (January 1915): 29-30; and The Best Booster November 1915, p. 10,
Box 4, Folder “Best Slide Co – Catalogs 1915,” Kansas City Slide Manufacturing Company Records (K0637),
SHSMO-KC.
130
Frank B. Howe, “Commercial Lantern Slides,” Camera Craft 24.2 (February 1917): 68, 70. Judging from the
included imagery, the two were the Kansas City Slide Company and the Novelty Slide Company. The Vitaslide
Company also had images reproduced, but as they made complex technological slides rather than traditional slides
(see below), they would not have been included in Howe’s estimate. The Kansas City Slide Company’s catalog was
even quoted directly in this article as stating: “Poor, cheap slides are hurting the business. Time will change this, as
the tendency is to give more attention to the matter of better slides.” A form of this claim was being printed in

104
months later, still took the time to mention that one could not cut costs to twenty-five cents or
less and maintain quality because“[i]t costs an average of thirty cents each to make and market
the slides.”131 As such, fading, low-end manufacturers might have persisted in price-cutting up
until the start of American involvement in World War I.
In New York, where small, cut-rate producers were so common as to threaten the entire
local industry, a more direct attack on price competition was attempted. Rather than simply
holding the line on prices and attempting to use rhetoric to sway advertisers to better quality
slides, a small group of slide manufacturers attempted, in 1914, to form a local slide monopoly.
Late in the year, an undisclosed ringleader company (most likely Joseph F. Coufal’s Novelty
Slide Company) sent letters to all the prominent New York concerns suggesting a group meeting.
This ringleader made two arguments for amalgamation: first that one large unit could more
effectively drive out price cutting – thereby both guaranteeing “a high standard of work
generally” and a stability of profit that would “encourage new business and ideas”; second, that a
combine could appeal to national advertisers more effectively.132 As such, this was a plan
designed to combat price cutting by creating a single, large, service-oriented organization, in the
name of more effectively and profitably courting advertising dollars.133
Though nothing appears to have come of this initial effort in the short run, two years later
an association, rather than an amalgamation, of quality slide producers went into effect – most
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likely for the same reasons and featuring the same major players. Led (in this case definitely) by
the Novelty Slide Company, seven powerful New York slide companies banded together in an
official association. Envisioned as a slide centered adjunct to the National Association of the
Motion Picture Industry (NAMPI – an early film industry organization designed to ‘clean up’ the
movies), the group operated under the slogan “Unity of Action Spells Screen Success.”134 This
association was designed “to promote the quality of the lantern slide, and to insure for exhibitors
a standard of workmanship in slides” – in part by “[s]tandardization of prices with a fixed
minimum,” banning the “imitat[ion] of another’s design,” and by eliminating free samples, free
design work, and other “illegitimate competitive methods.”135 The association thus directly
attacked poor business practices in the field. Though no extant information on this organization
stresses advertising as a fundamental issue, it is worth remarking that, of the seven charter
members – Novelty Slide Company, Manhattan Slide and Film Company, Perfection Slide
Company, Commercial Slide Company, Greater New York Slide Company, Excelsior
Illustrating Company, and Long and Heller, Inc. – all but the latter two had been openly
soliciting the business of national advertisers for years.136 The additional fact that, by 1920,
“[t]he kind of slides in demand are used mostly for advertising purposes”137 makes any action by
slide companies effectively into a decision regarding advertising dollars.
The association of price with quality – so obvious in Coufal’s slide maker association –
was paralleled by attempts to encourage both advertisers and exhibitors to engage in more
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responsible screening practices. For advertisers, this was accomplished through a transition to
long-term service contracts which included mandatory slide changes on a regular basis. For
exhibitors this included exhortations to limit the quantity of slides integrated into the program.
Changing the slide weekly, or at worst bi-weekly, became something of a mantra for
those interested in regularizing the form. G.R. Lowe of the Neosho Slide Company, “Old Man
Best” of the Best Slide Company, and independent advisors Frank Farrington and Ernest A.
Dench all encouraged the use of a new slide every week.138 Most worded the advice
pessimistically, citing advancing levels of irritation, though D.H. Harris optimistically declared
that “change of copy…brought the largest response.”139 Keeping the patrons from seeing the
same slide multiple times was deemed essential to evading spectator irritation.140 For a cinema
culture not yet used to ‘reruns’ (a common experience for the television and home video
generations), repetition of slides was seen as an inherent fault.
Proliferation was also an issue deemed worth of comment. It is not uncommon to run
across, in the trade press of the early 1910s, hyperbolic condemnation of the quantity of
advertising slides in a given show. Take, for example, the criticism from “[a] correspondent” in
Guthrie, OK, sent to the Moving Picture World in 1914, “protest[ing] against a twenty or thirty-
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minute siege of advertising slides at moving picture houses.”141 Excessive slide usage was
common enough that many slide proponents felt moved to suggest a specific numerical limit. In
late 1911, Motography’s resident projection specialist, William T. Braun, proposed that “no
more than two or three should be run at each show,” and asserted that further congestion could
be relieved by dispersing that limited number into multiple reel-changes.142 By 1913, John B.
Rathbun – author of a guide to film production and exhibition – asserted that “three slides should
be the limit in any case,” and warned strongly against screening any outside of the intermission,
“after the theater is darkened for the show.”143 The most permissive (and most common)
quantity which has turned up in my research was twelve per program. Ernest A. Dench asserted,
in 1916, that in a good theater “the slides do not exceed one dozen.”144 Exhibitor S.L. ‘Roxy’
Rothapfel proposed the same number that year as well.145 As such, the spectatorial experience
was to be disturbed minimally, and always with fresh, professional looking advertising material.
Although no published sales material from slide companies declares such to be the case, it is
plausible that both space brokering and other forms of exhibition assistance were inaugurated
specifically for this reason – as a way for slide producers to help limit the number of slides any
given theater would screen.146
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Through these efforts by top-flight slide producers to legitimize and professionalize the
field, at the expense of any small slide producer which attempted to compete on price alone,
large national advertisers were becoming sold on the value of slide advertising. More and more
consumer goods manufacturers dabbled in the field, to varying degrees of success. The makers
of Calumet Baking Powder found, in a survey of dealers in 1912 and 1913, that slide
advertisements were dramatically increasing sales; in one extreme case, a dealer, after regular
slide advertising for two months, saw a 50% increase in total sales.147 The trade press for
druggists had declared slides the best form of advertising for soda as early as 1914.148 The
“Question Box” section of the 1914 Monthly Bulletin of the National Commercial Gas
Association was also enthused, as all but one dealer reported good results from slide advertising,
provided regular changes were maintained, and seasonal articles were stressed.149 Goodyear was
also sold on slide advertising by 1914, as their “Dealer Help Book” for that year asserted that the
movie theater patron “sees [advertising] at a time when his mind is not only most influenced by
what you have to say, but when you are sure of his WHOLE attention.”150 Some combination of
slide producer professionalization, cinema psychology rhetoric, and measurable financial impact
had developed a distinct appreciation of the short, direct advertising slides in cinema programs.
As the quality of slides improved, a few exhibition groups changed their tune as well.
Two state exhibitor leagues – Ohio and Michigan – along with the exhibitors association of St.
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Louis (which consisted of fifty theaters), went so far as to allow theaters to pay their monthly
‘dues’ to the association by running a slide for which the association, rather than the theater, was
paid – effectively making the association itself a space broker. Although all three groups made
allowances for exhibitor reluctance, allowing them to pay dues in cash if they desired, the fact
that regional exhibition groups had accepted slides to such a degree indicates a generally
dwindling exhibitor hesitancy.151 Likewise, tirades about abusing cinema patrons all but
disappeared from the trade press after 1916.152 Every published mention of slide advertising
from 1918 to the early 1920s was an unreserved recommendation. Surprisingly, then, the era of
slide hate – so overblown in the historical memory of the form – was actually relatively brief and
very early. It was largely a memory by the mid-teens. While it may be a stretch to assume that
advertisers, exhibitors, and spectators had found mutually acceptable ground, at the very least,
the public debate had burned itself out and moved on to other areas (like product placement,
industrial films, and advertising trailers, all of which were much more common after World War
I). The advertising slide industry was, with the disappearance of large scale public
condemnation in print, left to persist or dissolve on a company-by-company, and exhibitor-byexhibitor basis.
The fact that it persisted, even in the wake of the advent of advertising trailers (see
chapter four), indicates that the implied reduction of antipathy was, in practice, an actual one.
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This stabilization of the commercial advertising slide industry was historically abrupt and must,
therefore, have owed a debt to tangentially related experiences in exhibition at mid-century. It
cannot be coincidence that the apparent stabilization of the form occurred, much like all early
20th century advertising, in the years immediately surrounding World War 1, when an avalanche
of patriotic advertising was created for the war, and consumer goods advertising increased in
response to the excess profits tax.153 Indeed, a cursory glance at the wartime issues of the
Moving Picture World – a journal which openly detested advertising slides during their first
decade – might lead one to assume not that slide advertising had stabilized, but that it had
suffered a rapid (and appropriate) death. The few wartime mentions of consumer goods
advertising slides in the journal were entirely self-congratulatory descriptions of their supposed
disappearance under the weight of patriotic slide needs. An early editorial comment on patriotic
slides attempted to differentiate them from commercial advertising, openly calling ad slides
‘business’ and saying “no one ‘talks business at a club,’” while political talk was inexplicably
described as “wonderfully appropriate.”154 Thornton Fisher, in a delightfully snotty tone,
included a paragraph of ‘Reminiscences,’ in a 1918 column, remembering the ‘old’ days:
[w]hen they used to throw slides on the screen between pictures. After having
basked in the light of love’s fond dream in one reel your vision would suddenly
be startled by a slide announcing “Henry Beermeister, Delicatessen, Liverwurst
and Sausages,” or “Visit Smith’s Emporium. Clothes for all the family. Your
father bought his pants from us. Why not you?”155
For Fisher, commercial startlement had two contexts: placement between reels of a multi-reel
film (a practice technologically outdated by 1915, as most theaters had switched to two
projectors), and the directness of advertising exhortation.
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The film industry was seemingly incapable of describing this outpouring of unpaid,
charity and propaganda slides during film screenings (including at least 100,000 Liberty Loan
slides) as a furthering of cinema ‘advertising’156 – this despite the fact that major ad slide
manufacturers, like their ad agency counterparts, were central to the movement.157 Rarely, in
published material, was a political exhortation considered ‘startling’ to an entertainment seeking
audience. This is likely due to the fact that charity and political advertising was tacitly or
literally forced on exhibitors.158 Two stories of exhibition groups grumbling about charity slides
were recounted in the pages of the Moving Picture World, in 1915, in which the exhibitors
lamented the abuse of their generosity. Social welfare groups pressed so strongly for free
assistance that refusal to help was tantamount to anti-social behavior.159 Election slides were
equally problematic. Jamestown, New York exhibitor M.L. Woods, in late 1916, refused to run
political slides in his two theaters on the grounds that they “stirred up strife and confusion, and
attracted the attention of our regular patrons from the screen.”160 As such, political and
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charitable slides were opposed both for their refusal to pay and for their incompatibility with
entertainment programs; both critiques echoed attacks on cinematic advertising.161
Once the Creel Committee began inundating exhibitors with demands for patriotic
inclusions, the compulsion for assistance included a real threat of punishment. New Hampshire
exhibitor Charles H. Bean made the threat nearly blatant in his letter, late in 1917, in which he
encouraged cooperation with Creel Committee requests in the following terms:
In view of the fact that the United States Government has been lenient with
motion picture exhibitors on the recent proposed tax of 10 per cent of gross
receipts…every exhibitor…should show its appreciation and patriotism…by
doing his bit in helping lend the fullest support of his screen to our government.162
In November of 1917, one exhibitor – J.H. Ruerup of Bozeman, Montana’s Gem Theater – had
his exhibition license revoked after purportedly declaring “[t]o hell with the government,” and
refusing to allow Creel’s ‘Four Minute Men’ – touring patriotic exhorters – to speak in his
theater.163 The following year, H.J. Paradis – manager of the Oasis theater of Wilson, North
Carolina – was likewise “investigated” for refusing to allow the Four Minute Men to speak on
the far less inflammatory grounds that “it would disarrange his program.”164 Though Paradis
was eventually acquitted,165 it is clear that rejection of government propaganda (or: political
advertising) was a dangerous choice which could arouse both cultural and governmental
retribution.
In an atmosphere in which public condemnation and even loss of one’s theater were
plausible outcomes, it is not surprising that exhibitors accepted the intrusion of political
advertising on their screens. The film press helped to cover over exhibitor hesitation by heaping
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praise on theater men as leaders of their communities. As early as mid-1914, W. Stephen Bush
declared that the professional exhibitor was to be praised not for being a showman, but because
“[t]he great forces which to-day are working for the good of mankind are coming after the
exhibitor to enlist his aid” through the screening of ‘Safety First’ and Department of Health slide
messages. Piggybacking on screen advertising rhetoric (see chapter two), Bush described the
cinema screen as the best way to “reach all the public” because, unlike print pages which could
be skipped, “you cannot escape the screen.” The door opened by advertising slides – or, as Bush
would have it, “[t]he space which the cigarette makers could not buy at any price and which few
exhibitors sell at any price for any advertisement” – became the avenue for the exhibitor to flex
his social conscience, as it became the exhibitor’s ‘job’ to “mentally and morally” improve his
community.166 The coerced exhibitor could at least bask in the glow of public praise while he
struggled to organize a pleasurable show around government slides, patriotic films, and the Creel
Committee’s mandatory political speakers.
Regardless of exhibitor consent, however, these political and philanthropic slides –
shown largely from 1914 to the end of World War I – obliterated any advertiser, slide maker, and
even exhibitor hesitation about the effectiveness of slides as an advertising medium. While some
(perhaps even a majority of) exhibitors may have continued to harbor reservations about the
intrusion of advertising onto their screens, there could be no doubt after the war that the site was
an effective means of reaching the public. In 1914 and 1915, the pages of Moving Picture World
clearly indicate a growing use of slides for these philanthropic and political purposes.167 The
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campaign period of late 1916 witnessed substantial use of slide advertising for drives as disparate
as voter registration in “a large Southern city,” preservation of Cincinnati’s Zoological Gardens,
and road improvement in Battle Creek, Michigan.168 As often as not, such slides were, in an
echo of the bygone song-slides, indirect advertising for major manufacturers, such as the ‘antifly’ slides circulated by the International Harvester Company, and the Detroit Brick
Manufacturers and Dealers Association’s fireproofing campaign.169
Most common of all was the political campaign slide featuring either the face of a
candidate for office, or an endorsement for a ballot issue.170 As political tensions increased, the
quantity of campaign slides escalated. Indeed, many of these slides were ‘justified’ – i.e. not
seen as an imposition or as patently offensive to the audience – when they became more openly
self-serving. Countless theaters took up slide campaigns opposing motion picture censorship and
Sunday closings.171 Exhibitors in the state of Illinois went so far as to mandate that any
candidate who desired to run a campaign slide in a theater must first publicly oppose legal
censorship of motion pictures.172 Moving Picture World itself circulated anti-censorship slides
as early as February of 1915, even taking ad agency N.W. Ayer & Son’s old slogan “Keeping
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Everlastingly at It Brings Success” as their own.173 Renowned film director D. W. Griffith
himself circulated slides, at his own expense, supporting the re-election of New York Mayor
Charles S. Whitman, who had vetoed a state censorship bill in his first term. Whitman won reelection.174 In 1917, theater manager Joseph L. Steurle used cinema advertising slides to come
within 158 votes of the Democratic nomination for city auditor of Louisville, despite being a
political unknown.175 Though many exhibitors did not consider this a form of intrusive
advertising, campaign slides were, like any other advertising, generally screened for a fee;
“[p]ractically every theater in the city” of Louisville was attaining “[a] good price…for this
service” in 1915.176 With three distinct benefits – profit, furthering anti-censorship, and the
integration of the theater into the modern information web – it is understandable why so many
exhibitors would have found ways to integrate them into the program.
Even openly self-serving advertisements for consumer goods were acceptable to certain
theaters. For example, some theaters offered to run slides advertising local papers in order to
encourage them to have larger film sections.177 As the theatrical self-advertising slide pushed
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traditional advertising slides further and further out of the program, a few consumer goods
producers found clever means to disguise advertising slides as announcement slides, indicating
the class and quality of the theater. In exchange for a price break, the company that provided
one’s fire extinguishers or air purifiers would also give the exhibitor a slide indicating that their
equipment was a primary reason why the theater was a safe and healthful environment.178
Post-war histories of the moment, however, would give virtually all credit for the success
of political and cultural advertising in motion picture theaters to the Liberty Loan and other
related Creel Committee slides.179 Indeed, the U.S. government put a massive amount of money
into slide advertising for wartime funding. Two New York companies – the Novelty Slide
Company and the Unique Slide Company – received multiple payments for services rendered to
the Departments of Food and Fuel Conservation during the war, some as high as four digits. For
example, Novelty – whose president Joseph F. Coufal was part of Hollywood’s War Cooperation
Committee – received $7,811.76 on the 23rd of October, 1917 from the ‘educational fund’ of the
department of Food and Fuel Conservation.180 Unique received $1,080 from the department of
Fuel Conservation on 31 August 1918.181 The war also brought with it the first definite attention
in the historical record which slide advertising received from major ad agencies; the food
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conservation campaign was being handled, free of charge, by powerhouse ad agency J. Walter
Thompson.182 Wartime advertising dollars and the tacit ‘blessing’ of a mainstream agency may,
therefore, have stabilizing the oligarchy of quality slide producers that had been developing prior
to the war in the wake of price-cutting. It would be an extreme coincidence if wartime dollars
and prestige did not aid Joseph Coufal’s 1919 combine of slide manufacturers, in which roughly
half of the founding members of the 1916 New York association officially became a single
company: the Standard Slide Corporation.183
After philanthropic and compulsory wartime propaganda had legitimized the presence of
advertising in theaters, on the grounds that it was a public good, it remained only for commercial
advertisers to reclaim the site. Over the course of the war, several changes, problematic for
advertising slides, had become common across the exhibition community. The integration of a
second projector, so as to eliminate reel-change breaks, had become the mode of exhibition in
most theaters.184 The construction of picture palaces and establishment of studio-owned chains
of theaters had solidified both a class divide, and a split between urban and rural viewing. In the
cities and/or in the large theaters, overt ‘class’ consciousness was, as often as anything else, tied
to an explicit rejection of screen advertising.185 Additionally, the commercial trailer (see chapter
four) had grown to prominence and was in competition for the same program space. As such,
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the lantern slide never regained the cinematic prominence of the early 1910s, though it did make
a permanent re-entrance after the war.
Not coincidentally, an early form of advertising convergence, in which the same ad was
run over multiple mediums, began to flourish as way for companies to spend ballooning
advertising appropriations (caused by the excess profits tax) after the war. As early as January of
1915, the camera-producing American Optical Company was already running a single image in
newspaper, slides, posters, circulars, and even ‘blotters.’186 After the war, clothier David Adler
& Sons was mandating that the Advertising Slide Company of St. Louis “co-ordinate their
national advertising into slides.”187 The post-war business environment rendered this mode of
advertising common. A history of advertising slides in Moving Picture Age in 1921 reveals that
[d]uring the post-war years slides came to be used in practically every line of
business. The tendency was to advertise through every possible medium, and the
dealers used all channels of help to continue the prosperous times. This abnormal
period was so protracted as to allow commercial slides to become firmly
entrenched as a successful advertising medium, not because the unusual situation
encouraged products which had no merit, but because dealers used commercial
slides and found that the investment yielded definite results.188
This cross media blitz was tied to a concept of ‘reiteration,’ as multiplying a single message was
seen as productive advertising.189 As such, slide acceptance went hand in hand with advertising
convergence and proliferation in the post-war boom. The entrenchment of slide advertising in
motion picture theaters occurred, therefore, after the period of reluctance, and can be credited to
the same post-war flood of advertising dollars that drove the entire advertising industry to greater
heights after their successful work as wartime propagandists.
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Though, with the continuing growth of trailer advertising and the repeal of the excess
profits tax in 1921, slide dollars tapered off,190 slide-vertising – as the Standard Slide
Corporation became fond of calling it – had attained a level of acceptance that it would never
truly relinquish. A slowly dwindling number of entrenched companies would continue for
decades to produce slides that were acceptable and desirable to national manufacturers, local
distributors, and theater managers alike. In an almost triumphant note, the Standard Slide
Corporation estimated that, in 1921, “more than 8,000 theaters in the United States…and many
more abroad” were open to slide advertising.191 Though estimates vary, this would have
accounted for roughly half of the active theaters in the United States at the time192 – an
astonishing level of integration for a form of advertising which, a few short years earlier, was
considered by many to be naturally offensive to film patrons.
The slide had also made inroads with the mainstream advertising community. At least
one prominent slide maker – the Advertising Slide Company of St. Louis – had developed a
presence in their local advertising association.193 By 1920, the Standard Slide Corporation –
Joseph Coufal’s New York conglomerate – was attending the yearly convention of the Assocated
Advertising Clubs of the World, and openly solicited established advertising agencies by
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offering a special “Agency Rate Card.”194 Slides were deemed a safe enough investment that
mainstream manufacturers were, by the 1920s, generally having custom slides made; as Moving
Picture Age somewhat inaccurately declared in 1921, “stock slides are practically a thing of the
past,”195 as the notion of cross media advertising reiteration took firm hold. Philanthropic
advertising continued to act as a bulwark; its existence offered a convenient way to defend slide
advertising as a valuable information service to the American public; for example, the American
Humane Education Society circulated free slides for ‘Be Kind to Animals Week’ in 1921.196 The
lantern slide – and its commercialized variant, the advertisement slide – had become an accepted
adjunct to the film industry as a whole, and its progeny extend, though in increasingly
circumscribed placement, all the way to the digital projectors of the present day.197

Why Slide-vertising?
Lantern slides, as the most successful form of early in-cinema advertising, were generally
described, by both slide makers and slide advocates, in broad rhetorical strokes. Overstatement
was common, regardless of whether the slide proponent was discussing audience psychology,
financial viability, or the possible superiority of slides to other advertising media. The Lee Lash
Company called slide advertising the “Front Cover Medium,” likening it to getting one’s ad onto
the front cover of the magazine, implicitly declaring slides to be both a continuation and a
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perfection of print ads.198 This exceptionalist description – in which the slide was an
unavoidable and spectacular perfection of the print model – is a microcosm for the type of
overstatement rampant in slide rhetoric.
Central to slide advertising, as with all in-cinema advertising of the 1910s, was the notion
of audience ‘captivity’ (see chapter two), which was asserted almost universally, by slide
proponents, to be an accurate description of the cinema audience. It is virtually impossible to
find a single argument for the use of slides as an advertising medium which does not make some
mention of slides being a ‘one-hundred per cent medium’ due to the assumption that “folks, in
the darkened hall, must concentrate upon the screen.”199 As early as 1912, the Thornton
Advertising Company claimed that slides were “[t]he only medium which guarantees a reading
of the advertiser’s message.”200 Frank Farrington, the most vocal advocate of slide advertising in
the first half of the 1910s, claimed that slides in cinemas had “no waste circulation” because
“[e]very man, woman, and child there sees the advertisement, and if it is given fair display
and…allowed to remain long enough to be read, every man, woman, and child will read it and
know what is advertised.”201 The Motion Picture Advertising Company likewise asserted that
every spectator “positively will see and read” your advertisement when thrown on the screen,202
while the Neosho Slide Company asserted that “Ad Slides Compel Attention” and that, as a
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medium, it had “[n]o waste circulation.”203 Standard Slide Corporation employee D.H. Harris
even declared that audiences could “see nothing else, read nothing else, and think nothing else”
while a slide advertisement was onscreen.204 This was, of course, no more true for slide
advertising than any other form of advertising, but advocates of onscreen advertising preferred to
ignore the fact that the room, even when dark, could not entirely compel.
As the first and most widely used form of in-cinema advertising, the ‘active’ audience
was almost never acknowledged by proponents of screen advertising. Slide proponents were
uniformly focused on creating and preserving the myth of the receptive cinema audience. An
unsigned article in the March 1921 issue of Moving Picture Age was as close as ad slide
proponents would get, in the transitional era, to acknowledging viewer empowerment, as the
author made the marginally more hesitant assertion that the slide “is in front of [the viewer] and
he has to look at it or close his eyes. With an attractively gotten up slide, preferably in color, he
does not close his eyes.”205 As a unit, the advertising slide industry wanted advertisers to see the
cinema theater as a site of audience passivity – where messages could be inserted into open eyes
with no waste.
The correlated concept of the ‘receptive mood’ was likewise asserted almost universally
in support of slides. If spectators had no choice but to read your advertisement, one would hope
that they would not do so with hatred in their hearts. Thankfully, as far as slide makers and
proponents were concerned, the motion picture theater was a zone of uniformly happy people.
Farrington noted that “[n]o other form [of advertising]…is received in so favorable a frame of
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mind.”206 Moving Picture Age asserted that the motion picture theater was a perfectly
comfortable environment, in which “every body [was] relaxed to enjoy the exhibition” and
“every mind [was] alert to receive impressions.”207 The Harold Ives Company assured the
advertiser that “[t]he psychological moment to offer your sales arguments is when your listener
is in an agreeable frame of mind” – a frame of mind only attainable by advertising during
“pleasant, leisure hours.”208 The Levi Company even went so far as to assert that their slides
were “Good for Sore Eyes” and were, therefore, “a distinct relief to the monotony of the film.”209
A happy audience, doing a pleasant thing, greeted with a restful slide…no wonder slide
advertising was so popular!
Of course, popularity and influence would have meant little if the people receiving the
message could not be relied upon to actually spend money on the goods advertised. As such, the
notion of the motion picture theater as a site of potential consumers – stressing, regardless of
class, their possession of and willingness to spend cash – was also common. Farrington asserted
that advertising in cinema theaters could “reach a class of people whom it is often hard to reach
in other ways[, including…] the transient population…the lower middle classes…[and] the
poorer class. It reaches many people who do not read newspapers. It takes in all
nationalities.”210 The Thornton Advertising Company went so far as to assert that the slide
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“gives you a circulation that reaches every class.”211 An unsigned article in The Furniture
Worker, in 1920, also asserted that “the people who attend the moving pictures are the ones who
are on the street and ready to spend money, and it pays any man with goods or services to sell to
get his name before these crowds.”212 In fact, all writers except Ernest A. Dench – who, without
any stated reason, declared that lower class theaters should be avoided213 – thought that the
existence of a ticket price indicated that all cinemagoers, regardless of class, possessed spending
money that advertisers should court. This notion of motion pictures opening advertising up to
lower class spending was important as it was, contrary to magazine advertising, described as a
medium for the masses. An aggregate of small purchases by film fans was openly part of its
‘lower class’ oriented advertising philosophy, and those who adopted it were, therefore, acting
on a theory of advertising that was mass rather than class oriented.214
Motion pictures weren’t simply attended by people willing and able to spend money,
however. They offered a type of audience selection that was rare in print media. As opposed to
newspapers – which generally targeted everyone in the city – and magazines – which targeted
everyone in the country, limited only by magazine topic – the motion picture theater was
‘sectional’ and represented a stable local audience. Much like direct mail (which might be
thrown out, unread) or billposting (which had the tendency to annoy), slide advertising reached a
massive proportion of local inhabitants.215 This was especially true of neighborhood theaters –
as opposed to the ‘scattered’ circulation of downtown theaters – and it was these neighborhood
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theaters that were most likely to accept advertising.216 As such, the cinema theater was, it was
argued, ideal for advertising because, in general, it had the broad class appeal – even attracting
the illiterate – of newspapers, but the targeted appeal of a local clientele. As such, one could
advertise to very particular audiences, in ways impossible in the other media. Farrington, for
example, even suggested that one put on an advertisement in a foreign language at a theater that
catered to a largely immigrant population – an action that would be implausible in all but the
smallest circulation newspapers or magazines, as large circulation print materials did not give
price breaks to advertising that was not geared to general readers. Such immigrant targeted
advertising in the city-wide or national press would have been phenomenally wasteful – nowhere
near ‘100% circulation.’217 As such, though mass appeal was still the goal, cinema slide
advertising allowed for local advertising as an element of mass campaigns.
One of the most interesting arguments about the cinema’s specific value as an advertising
medium was Neosho Slide Company owner G.R. Lowe’s assertion that motion picture viewers –
who were already out of their home and on the town – would see screen advertising at the same
time of day that certain stores were open (in Lowe’s argument, it was drug stores). As such, they
could “go right from the show to the store” while the advertising compulsion was fresh. Lowe
encouraged druggists – and by extension any business with hours of operation similar to a theater
– to use slide advertising on the grounds that it could be reasonable assumed to have the least lag
time between seeing the ad and shopping.218
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Taking these last three elements together, the cinema had unique values as an advertising
site beyond the notion of the ‘captive audience.’ Slide advertisers considered messages to have
the greatest sales values when they: 1) spoke to the spectator as a member of a particular cultural
community, 2) spoke to the under-class – the biggest purchasing group for cheap goods – rather
than the upper class, and 3) spoke at the same time that the viewer was already out of the home
and on the town. In slide rhetoric, this provided slide advertising with benefits distinct from
print, which was perused while in the home, and was, by necessity, not tethered to the flow of the
day’s events.219
Though all of this was asserted on behalf of slides, the bulk of the foregoing theory is
simply cinema specific, not slide specific. Most of the arguments for the use of slide advertising
specifically were connected to its cheapness (as opposed to the expense of producing an
advertising film, or even the expense of a print campaign). As Quality Slide and Photo Makers
bluntly claimed, a slide “Reaches More People At a Smaller Cost Than Any Other Advertising
Medium.”220 Though estimates of the cost of a motion picture were extremely variable, and
determined as much by selection of production company as by length of the final product that
one was after, by World War I a custom made glass slide would generally cost about a dollar –
shipping included – and sometimes significantly less. The Kansas City Slide Company was still
charging seventy-five cents for stock slides as late as 1927. Even custom slides were only $1.25
at that late date, if the advertiser included their own artwork.221 In 1920, the Furniture Worker
estimated a price of seventy-five cents to one dollar for a custom slide, given that the illustration
Advertising,” Moving Picture World 13 September 1913: 1178). As such, even being out of the house was not
enough for ad success for Rittelmeyer.
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was provided by the advertiser, and not designed by the slide manufacturer’s staff.222 This was
undeniably cheaper than all but the smallest print display advertisement.
Additionally, the cost for running a slide in a given theater was typically low. Although
we must remember Dench’s assertion that “[t]here are really no standard rates” for exhibition, as
“[e]ach exhibitor has his own ideas in regard to the value of the location and size of his
theater,”223 we do have some indication of the range of prices at the time. From the exhibitor’s
perspective, the income – based on quantity of slides and the amount the house was able to
charge – could be as high as four digits; the Bijou Theater of Mt. Clemens, Michigan, claimed to
be making $800 per year on the date that they abandoned advertising slides (on principle) in
1915.224 From an advertiser’s perspective, Farrington claimed that the absolute minimum cost
was 25 cents per week for small houses where they ran films 3 nights a week.225 An upper
estimate would have to be that of the two top-flight theaters in Louisville which were pulling
down $10 per week, per slide, in 1915.226 The Keeshen Advertising Agency claimed, also in
1915, to be able to guarantee a minimum of four showings, every day, in five first run Oklahoma
City theaters for $80.00 per month – an average weekly screening cost of only four dollars per
theater.227 Ernest Dench, despite being very hesitant about standards, offered a (very wide)
estimate of five to ten dollars per theater, given a six-month contract. The latest estimate, from
1920, was “from fifty cents to two or three dollars, depending on the locality.”228 That said,
some ‘public service’ advertisers, like libraries for example, were often capable of getting
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theaters to screen their advertising slides gratis, as if they were a charitable organization.229 As
such, although there was at least one assertion that a slide campaign would bear no fruit if it
lasted less than three months,230 the total outlay for slide advertising was generally assumed to be
much lower than any other form of mass advertising.
The cheapness of the medium was not simply a generalized positive. Specific value
arguments were made. First, it was cheap enough to allow individual dealers to use it quickly to
“couple up their name with products which are continually advertised in the magazines and
newspapers.”231 Though an individual store may not have had much of a budget for advertising,
the fact that they dealt in nationally recognized brands, especially if those national brands
distributed glass slides for free as a selling ‘help,’ could allow the local store to piggy-back on
widely recognized advertising campaigns. As such, a very small outlay for a local store could
effectively allow them to receive massive collateral advertising from newspapers, magazines,
and billboards hawking national products.232 Additionally, with the commonness of exclusive
advertising contracts, the appearance of having a monopoly on a national brand could make
cinema advertising seem like very cheap advertising indeed, for a local merchant, compared to
the benefits it offered.
Thirdly, cheap slide advertising allowed for rapid, even constant, change in copy with
minimal cost. A change of slides did not add any work for the exhibitor, and the easy
availability of stock slides rendered the transition simple for the advertiser. As such, one could
change slides at will. Additionally, the wide availability of extremely cheap home-typed or
hand-written slides – purchased blank, in bulk, at an average rate of one penny per finished
229
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slide233 – allowed one to slip in a quick update when desired, letting regular customers know of a
sale or special event. Provided one had been advertising regularly in the theater, and the sale
announcement was seen as beneficial information, the audience would likely not take too
unkindly to the general ugliness of a home-made slide.234
A final argument for slide advertising should not go unmentioned, as it was surprisingly
common. Despite lantern slides being a very old technology, and full motion film
advertisements being made as early as 1910, slides were often sold as a hip, ‘now’ medium of
advertising. The North American Slide Company declared that “Up-to-date Manufacturers”
were using them, while the Levi Company claimed that “[e]very up-to-date and progressive
theater” was using their slides.235 The Harold Ives Company declared that “[y]ou can’t hold your
trade by last year’s methods, [so] give [your dealers] selling helps that are this year’s styles.”236
Correlated to this trendiness of the medium was a notion that ‘last year’s styles’ had worn out
their welcome with the public, and that slides should be adopted because “[i]n many
towns…[they] have not been overworked as yet.”237 These notions that in-cinema advertising
via the glass slide was novel and trendy, were important elements in the rhetoric for its adoption.
Novelty is, as Pamela Walker Laird has asserted, an important factor in the adoption of an
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advertising medium.238 For a small number of years in the early 1910s, the lantern slide was the
hot new novelty in advertising.

Why Not?
As with most new concepts in advertising, supportive arguments from makers were
partially balanced with counter arguments by viewers or media owners (in this case, exhibitors).
None of these arguments carried enough weight to end the practice, but they raised sufficient
concern that in-theater consumer-goods advertising struggled mightily between 1913 and 1918,
and remained a marginal practice for decades. As such, these arguments kept slide advertising
from becoming as ubiquitous as magazine advertising and billboarding, but did not keep it from
developing as a useful, minor practice in theaters.
The most common assumption about the non-viability of slide advertising was that
“many patrons of motion picture theaters look[ed] upon advertising slides as an imposition upon
their time.” The Moving Picture World, probably the most implacable opponent of advertising
on the theater screen, used this as its reasoning. Regular columnist Epes Winthrop Sargent
compared it to allowing a man in a sandwich board to walk across the stage during a live theater
performance, and declared:
The screen advertisement is not the same as the advertisement upon the wall. It is
thrust upon the patron. He must read it whether he wishes to or not. There is no
alternative. It is thrust into his face. […] There is no objection to a few house
slides, but the foreign advertisement has no place on the screen.239
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Indeed, slide opponents generally did not take issue with the assumption of compulsory attention
at all.240 On the contrary, it reveled in it, arguing instead that the compulsory nature of the ads
destroyed the ‘receptive mood’ of a theater audience. Roy D. Mock argued in 1916 that unlike
magazine advertising which, if read was read voluntarily, ads in the cinema were “forced to his
attention” for as much as ten minutes while he was “kept in his seat.” As such, it would not
leave him in “a very satisfactory frame of mind,” and would instead result in a backfire, as rather
than “being inclined towards the advertiser…[he would] become biased against him.”241 Often
this destruction of the ‘receptive mood’ became an implicit argument for ‘active audiences.’
George M. Rittelmeyer argued, in 1913, that
[a] few nights ago…I looked around the house to see how many people were
reading the slides that were being shown. I counted probably a dozen people in
an audience of about one hundred and fifty. The balance of the crowd was
passing the time away the best they could, waiting patiently for the ads to cease.
The disinterest was so obvious that he professed to see life return to the “bored, tired” faces of
the crowd when the first reel finally came on.242 Though this type of description was
undoubtedly slanted by personal opinion, overstatement, and the happenstance of a ‘worst case
scenario’ experience, it was common among opponents of slide advertising.243
Some writers bolstered the sense of audience irritation by reference to ticket cost,
asserting that not only was the audience being annoyed, but they were being forced to pay for the
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privilege. Indeed, in 1909, a “good many picture theater managers…declare[d]…that the
exhibitor ha[d] neither the right to expect continued patronage nor the right to collect admission
fees” if showing ads.244 An unsigned article in 1915 voiced the still commonly heard opinion
that advertising was incompatible with ticket costs, as “[p]assing a dime into the box office
makes one the proprietor of the screen…and anything that is shown without contributing to the
amusement of the audience…is going to be frowned upon.” The result was bound to be “hisses
on the part of a good many people in the theater.”245 As such, arguments about advertising as an
unwelcome imposition carried significant weight with a particular crowd which considered not
just entertainment, but paid entertainment as a zone where commercial exhortation should not
intrude.
While it is probable that, as noted earlier, general opposition to advertising was based in a
historical moment when the slides were particularly poorly made, other elements of the slide
experience could have exacerbated and extended audience frustration. Regardless of slide
quality, and despite persistent comments about limiting advertising slides to a comfortably small
number (probably twelve) in any given program, exhibitors could and did often engage in
behavior that was actively destructive of viewer pleasure, and therefore of the value of slide
advertising to the advertiser. Rittelmeyer, likely with a bit of overstatement, declared that a
theater not only ran slides in the middle of a two-reel film, but ran them “for five or ten
minutes.”246 This clearly would have consisted of more than three ads, and would
understandably have felt like overkill, as the slides would have been nearly equal in duration to
the entertainment. A collected list of humorous ‘advice’ for projectionists, published in early
1916 – effectively a summary of poor exhibition practices at the time – included “[c]atch[ing] up
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on your sleep” during the ad slides as one of its ‘suggestions,’ assuring the projectionist that the
audience would “talk to the Lord about you for teaching them the gentle lesson of patience.”247
Even if duration was not the problem, quantity could still be a source of concern. Ernest
A. Dench mentions the persistence of the problem of the “slide dodge,” a term for when the
exhibitor would run the slides for which he had contracted, up to thirty or more at any one time,
all in a rapid burst at the end of the program, rather than scattering them throughout the program
and leaving them onscreen for a reasonable reading time.248 The appeal of the ‘dodge’ to the
exhibitor was undeniable. Flipping through thirty slides in a minute could have allowed the
exhibitor to keep the advertising dollars, and also keep the most valuable screen-time for
coming-attraction slides and other announcements that were more directly beneficial to the
theater.
This latter possibility would, of course, have done as much to harm the advertiser as the
spectator. Exhibitors could also abuse the advertiser’s faith while leaving the spectators
unaware. They might elect to show the coming attractions slides before the advertising slides;
the coming attractions generally indicated that the program was over, and would have largely
cleared the theater of spectators before ads had run.249 Alternatively, the exhibitor might take the
money and simply not show the slide at all. As such, anyone booking a single slide for screening
in a theater, without having developed a longstanding relationship with the exhibitor, had to
double check that they were being screened, and screened properly – a difficult procedure
considering the business model of a motion picture theater. Unlike magazines, where you could
pick up a single issue and find evidence that it had been printed in every issue, to completely
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check up on slide projection required someone to be present all day, every day, at every
theater.250
One further persistent counter argument deserves mention, despite its limited importance.
A small collection of slide opponents – generally makers of advertising films – asserted that
slides were not valuable because the cinema screen was a site where motion was expected. This
argument was only partially effective for two reasons. First, slides were, as mentioned,
significantly cheaper than full motion films; as such, the fact that they were on the screen for so
much less expense may have been seen as a valid tradeoff. Second, those who still saw motion
as a necessity but didn’t want to spend the money on a film could choose from some of the
technological slides discussed below. As such, the ‘lack of motion’ critique was less dissuasive,
at least prior to 1915, than it might otherwise have been.

‘Slide Psychology’
Most opposition to slide advertising was phrased in very unflattering generalities. Even
Ernest Dench’s 1916 book-length study of the subject asserted that “[t]he majority…are merely
plain business notices that…remind one only too strongly of the early days of newspaper
advertising, when every advertiser thought it sufficient to have a formal announcement,
unchanging from year in to year out.”251 Despite the apparent commonality of simple slides,
‘slide psychology’ was relatively well thought out by some – most notably by Dench himself, in
articles he published in 1918. In much the same way that magazine advertisers argued about the
importance of images, the quantity of copy, and the placement of an ad on, say, the left or right
side of the page, slide advertising was theorized in terms of its position in the program, and the
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most productive use of image and copy. Though, by this time, most theaters had integrated a
second projector and abandoned the reel-change pause, the theoretical writings of Dench and
others offer a tantalizing notion of how complex slide theory could have become, had feature
films and multiple projectors not radically reduced the space.
Most commonly, notions of best practices in slide advertising were broad
pronouncements, intended as advice for all advertising slides in all circumstances. Ernest Dench
once asserted that, if you were going to use humor in your slides, you would be best served by
using a stock slide rather than writing your own humorous copy. Dench’s logic was that stock
slides, as they were designed to sell nationally, were “prepared especially to appeal to the
universal sense of humor as distinct from that of the sectional brand.”252 As such, Dench
downplayed the frequently local nature of slide advertising in the name of a more broadly
accepted, national sense of humor. Dench equally poo-pooed the use of “gloom” in slides, under
the assertion that “[t]hey should strike an optimistic note at all times [because p]eople go to the
movies to thrust aside their worries and responsibilities and not to be reminded of the dark and
seamy side of life.”253 Frank Farrington held a similar opinion, claiming that “[a] lighter,
brighter form of advertising can be used…in a place of amusement than…in the newspapers. A
little humor carefully handled is not out of place at such a time…though it would act as a
boomerang in the printed medium.”254 As such, slides in general were expected to be light and
fun – more so than any other medium.
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Other pieces of advice were intended to be rarely implemented and therefore be an added
interesting feature which would help certain slides stand out from the crowd. Dench proposed
both the ‘poetic slide’ and the ‘serial slide’ to gain audience attention in the maelstrom of less
creative advertising slides. Poetic slides were simply slides in rhyme – like a jingle without the
music – but with no other pretensions to literary merit. The very existence of rhyme would set it
apart from other slides which often said “stereotyped things in a stereotyped way.”255 Rhyme
was an aid to both pleasure and memory, providing a hook to help lock the copy in the viewer’s
memory. Serial slides could add a bit of drama to a slide campaign by making the audience look
forward to the next slide in the series, much like a film serial. Engaging the audience’s interest
for a period longer than the traditional duration of a slide’s projection would likewise improve
attention and retention. The problem with this serial concept was making sure that the bulk of
your audience didn’t miss any slides in the series; as such, Dench proposed that the advertiser
only use serial slides when piggy-backed on the presentation dates of a film serial, so that the
appeal of the film serial would stabilize the audience for the advertiser’s own slides. The serial
slide was used frequently enough that slide manufacturers carried stock versions that could “be
filled in to suit almost any business.”256 Turning advertising into a game by offering a prize to a
viewer who could correctly spot several intentional spelling mistakes was another clever
suggestion for encouraging attention to specific ads.257
Ernest Dench, the most thoughtful author of in-cinema advertising of any type in the
1910s, even worked out a theory (that he termed ‘slide psychology’) in 1918 that linked slide
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content to position in the program.258 Dench asserted that the state of mind of the audience after
– or, in the case of the feature, during – any given part of the standard program should determine
the type of copy on an advertising slide. If one’s slide was run following the newsreel, the slide
should contain copy in an informational or descriptive tone similar to the news: for example,
telling, in a sober and professional tone, of a new shipment of goods or an imminent sale. If your
slide followed an educational film, it should display the inner workings of your business, piggybacking on the educational mood. If it followed the comedy, the tone should be light and comic.
Only the most beautiful, dramatic, and thought provoking slide should be run during or following
the main feature, as a feature picture was the classiest form of film, and was often a very
engaging drama. In order to maintain variety in one’s advertising, Dench suggested the purchase
of one slide of each type, allowing the tone and program position of one’s advertising to change
from week to week.
By January of the following year, Dench was also asserting that slide copy should be
altered for special screenings, such as children’s matinees, encouraging not just tone and content
that would appeal to children, but perhaps even offering the children a creative contest where the
best advertisement created by one of the children would be rendered in slide form and thrown
onscreen at the next matinee.259 One can imagine that Dench would offer similar advice for
heavily ethnic theaters, or those defined by class or religious persuasion.
This notion that the best slide was not determined just by quality of copy, but by the
context in which it was screened, allowed for a great deal of variety and complex thinking in the
258
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creation and display of slides. While it is undoubtedly true that the bulk of advertisers did not
put nearly so much thought into their slides, there was nothing inherent in the medium which
kept it from being used in a pleasantly complicated variety of ways. Repetition and boredom in
slide advertising was, therefore, a failure of individual thinking, not of the form itself.

Technological Slides – Spectacle and Public Service
Typically, the response to fears of slides irritating the audience was not a turn to
Denchian slide psychology. Rather, an attempt to add clever nuances to the technology –
preserving or improving on the novelty of cinema advertising – was the common approach. Two
ideas in particular deserve discussion at length, as their existence is emblematic of two particular
philosophies of advertising active at the time: the drawing power of spectacle, and the
reluctance-defusing power of ‘usefulness.’ Each was most productively used by a single
company, though many parallel concepts can also be cited.
As film was often considered a spectacle in and of itself, the notion that greater eye
appeal would necessarily result in a more productive advertisement was not uncommon. For
most, this was simply a reason for better or more creative visuals. Any company, from the
Novelty Slide Company, to the Kansas City Slide Company, to the Levi Company / Perfection
Slide Company would make assertions to the greater drawing power of their imagery. The Levi
Company once asserted about its own product that “there is no other Slide made that grips the
attention of the audience and holds it as ours do. They are…dazzling in their variety, full of
humor and surprises…[and] will be found to be a source of unqualified delight.”260 Such claims
were common, and almost always referenced the superior creative powers of the company
hawking their wares. Several American companies – the Vitaslide Company of San Francisco
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and the Perfection Slide Company of New York, most prominently – took the idea of ‘eye
appeal’ farther than the others, into the realm of technology and motion, seemingly the purview
of motion pictures, not the stodgy old lantern slide.261
As early as January 1913 – the date of his first patent – Earl L. Gilmore, president of
Vitaslide, had conceived of a fully functioning moving-picture slide, requiring no extra
equipment from the exhibitor (though Gilmore had also designed automatic slide projectors with
the Vitaslide in mind262). Rather than simply having a photograph printed in between two pieces
of glass, the Vitaslide contained a fluid filled chamber, in which a portion of the design was
included on a moving piece. When not in use, the slide was to be stored right side up, so that the
moving piece would sink to the bottom. During projection – which, due to the construction
idiosyncrasies of lantern slide projectors, occurred with the slide positioned upside down – the
moving part would appear to slowly rise in the image, as it began, in the projector itself, to sink
to the ‘top’ end of the fluid chamber. During projection, the presence of a fluid chamber was
disguised by design, so that the appearance of motion had no clear cause. The added fact that the
apparent motion was upwards rather than down appended a level of mystery to how the motion
was created.
The visible interaction between the stationary and moving parts of the image could create
a variety of onscreen events, ranging from the very simple to the very complex. Three were
described in the patents. The simplest included a diagonal trench, so that, for example, an image
of a car could appear to drive uphill. A more complicated design included a ‘Merry Christmas’
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message where the words were broken into two collections of apparently meaningless scratches;
as the bottom half of the image rose to meet the top half, the scratches would align and render the
message readable. In the most complicated iteration of the method – a variation of the standard
‘Ladies, Please Remove Your Hats’ announcement slide – the moving part rotated rather than
moving upwards. In this concept, the lady’s hat was attached to one end of a pivot; at the other
end was an image of an usher connected to the hat by a line. As the hat was made of heavier
material, it would ‘sink’ upwards in the image during projection, making it appear as though the
tiny usher had flipped it skywards by jumping on the other end of the shaft. As if this weren’t
complicated enough, this slide also used the message-forming scratches to spell out the
announcement.263
With these various approaches possible – angled, straight, and rotating motion – Vitaslide
could create eye-catching advertisements unlike any other slides on display in the theater. Ads
which not only were more interesting and therefore more memorable than the stationary ads, but
also avoided the potential problem of a still slide being disruptive in an environment dedicated to
moving pictures. Vitaslide motion was so unexpected, when compared to other advertising
slides, that they were reportedly able to “create the remarkable situation of a theater audience
applauding an advertisement.”264 Indeed, they were so surprising, that moving slides capitalized
not on blending in with the flow (moving pictures), but on doubling disruption (a moving ‘still’).
By adding motion to a part of the program in which all other imagery was still, motion slides
provided a triumphant return to motion imagery: a noticeable improvement over stills as well as
a return to the established norm of moving pictures.

263

Trench designs: E.L. Gilmore, “Motion Slide for Stereopticon,” U.S. Patent 1,083,679, filed 27 January 1913,
and issued 6 January 1914. Letter fragments: E.L. Gilmore, “Motion Slide for Stereopticons,” U.S. Patent
1,113,610, filed 9 December 1913, and issued 13 October 1914.
264
“At the Golden Gate,” Moving Picture World 24.9 (29 May 1915): 1406-1407.

141
Despite the time it took to create working designs (their early announcement slides were
released one per week beginning in April 1914265), frequent reports from 1914 to 1915 indicate
that the company was effectively an overnight success. The cross country sales trip of Bernard
Wolf, from San Francisco to New York City (stopping at all major cities along the way) resulted
in slides “being ordered extensively by business men for advertising purposes,” including a
single order from New York City which accounted for 100 slides all by itself.266 Considering
they sold for $3.00 each – approximately three times the cost of a regular slide – adoption
represented a relatively large expense for advertisers. George Breck, Gilmore’s partner and
manager of the Vitaslide Company, was circulating Vitaslides to such great success in mid-1915
that the company was able to focus entirely on yearly contracts rather than single orders. Even
after increasing their productivity 50% by hiring more staff, they were “still behind on orders.”267
As this was reported in the notoriously anti-slide-advertising journal Moving Picture World, it
should be taken as quite a successful technology indeed. And with good reason: if the slides
were looked on as both pleasing and entertaining, they would have defused the common critique
of viewer displeasure.
The Perfection Slide Company patented a much more complicated design that would
create a spiraling effect in the background of a slide.268 Perfection (in their days as the Levi
Company) also contracted to be the exclusive producer of Spiegel Motion Slides – a complicated

265

Half-Page Ad, Moving Picture World 11 April 1914: 273; Display Ad, Moving Picture World 18 April 1914:
433; and Display Ad, Moving Picture World 9 May 1914: 896.
266
“Exhibitors News: San Francisco,” Moving Picture World 30 May 1914: 1280; and “Exhibitors News: San
Francisco,” Moving Picture World 20 June 1914: 1711.
267
“Other San Francisco Notes,” Moving Picture World 23.1 (2 January 1915): 99; and “Other San Francisco
Notes,” Moving Picture World 23.12 (20 March 1915): 1791. It’s not clear from the wording of these articles, and
the following self-advertisement, whether these yearly contracts were with advertisers or exhibitors. Display Ad,
Moving Picture World 13 June 1914: 1611.
268
F.A. Apfelbaum, “Stereopticon Slide Carrier,” U.S. Patent 1,116,201, filed 9 December 1913, and issued 3
November 1914.

142
slide technology which, like their patented spiral technology, required a special projector.269 The
Enterprise Optical Manufacturing Company, the Illinois Motion Picture Advertising
Corporation, and the Genre Transparency Company also dealt in motion slides of one make or
another.270 A non-motion variant was the Florida Photographic Concern’s “Color-Changing
Chameleon Slide” which would fade “from green to reddish-brown,” presumably from the heat
of the projector lamp.271 Though still decidedly less impressive than real film, these slides could
likewise join more comfortably into the sequence of films, appealing to the same interest in
motion pictures, while simultaneously standing out as something special as they were (hopefully)
compared favorably to other slides, rather than being compared unfavorably to the films. It
elevated the slide via spectacular effects in an attempt to be the most likely slide remembered. 272
In contrast to this, other slide makers added a technological element in order to attempt to
make sure that their slides were not victims of the ‘slide dodge,’ or simple failure on the part of
the exhibitor to screen the slide. The concept became known under the shorthand of the ‘clock
slide,’ and was created by at least five different companies at one time or another, though in fact
the technology was patent controlled. Originally filed for patent on 12 September 1911 by Hans
A. Meinhardt and Thomas J. Urell of Pittsfield, MA, the clock slide featured no clock work and
as such included no spectacular onscreen motion. What it did possess, however, was manually
adjustable hands which could be set by the projectionist so that an accurate time could be flashed
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onscreen at intervals to the paying spectators.273 Clock slides purportedly cut through any
reticence towards advertising slides by both exhibitor and audience members by providing a
valuable public service – i.e. they would provide easy access to the time for women, who
generally did not wear watches, and for men, who had trouble seeing their watches in the
darkness of the theater.274 As Meinhardt’s original patent declared, the slide was designed so
that “the attention of the audience is held in an agreeable manner.”275
The history of the clock slide is convoluted. Meinhardt and Urell initially attempted to
sell the invention themselves but, due to inexperience, failed to turn a profit on the invention.
Their many missteps included not fighting patent infringement; indeed, they apparently did not
realize such clone clock-slides were even being made.276 In their innocence and inexperience,
they apparently failed to notice blatant national advertising by the Kansas City Slide Company,
the American Slide & Poster Company, and the Novelty Slide Company for clock slides. Kansas
City Slide advertised their clone first, advertising its availability in February of 1912; the
company even had the audacity to claim “patent applied for.” Kansas City Slide offered stock
versions for $1.25, but would append an advertising message to the bottom for twenty-five cents
more.277 American Slide & Poster and Novelty Slide may have pilfered the idea slightly later,
but their clones were likely the driving factor in Perfection’s purchase of the patent rights and
attempt at legal reprisals. American advertised the availability of clock slides in May of 1913,
and Novelty in May of the same year. American was asking 75 cents, while Novelty offered the
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lowest price: 50 cents.278 Several other companies may also have been infringing the patent; if
they were, however, they were not advertising in national trade presses. The Best Slide
Company of Kansas City, for example, included four clock slides in a catalog – offering them for
75 cents if blank, one dollar if a merchant’s name was appended – though they never publicized
these offerings in a national trade press.279
By the 17th of May, 1913, the Perfection Slide Company had not only purchased the
patent rights from Meinhardt and Urell, but had proceeded to pursue legal redress from the
infringing companies. Perfection took out a display advertisement in the pages of Moving
Picture World declaring that exhibitors displaying clock slides not made by the Perfection Slide
Company would be “party to the infringement and, therefore, liable.”280 Such patent control was
likely necessary to keep circulation of the product high, as illuminated clocks could take theaters
permanently off the market; the city of Louisville, for example, claimed to be devoid of clock
slides, as all theaters had illuminated clocks as early as 1913.281 Regardless of patent issues, the
makers of clock slides were all trading on the value of passing information along to the audience
as a means to defuse irritation.
Similar notions of adding elements of practical benefit to advertisement slides exist.
Calumet Baking Powder offered to add standard announcements like “Another fine picture
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coming up next” as the text portion of a slide otherwise dominated by an advertising image.282
The Fisk Rubber Company likewise made a “Good Night” announcement slide (to be shown at
the end of the last show of the night), that contained the company logo and the witticism “Time
to Re-Tire,” alongside a picture of a tired child holding a Fisk Tire.283 Book stores were
especially well suited to this form of ‘announcement’ advertising, as any film adapted from a
book could mention a bookstore right on the ‘coming attraction’ slide.284 Neosho’s G.R. Lowe
likewise suggested that doctors might get free advertising by asking the exhibitor to ‘call’ them
to the telephone or the lobby in an emergency via the use of a slide which displayed their name
to patrons. Such a slide could be shown free as it was a service to the exhibitor (no need to stop
the show to call the doctor), and it would get across the doctor’s name more clearly that an
announcement while also implying that he was in demand.285
These two types of technological slides were both a means to diffuse the irritation caused
by compulsory attention – motion slides through pleasurable spectacle, and clock slides through
practical use value. In any of these examples, however, the advertising was rendered palatable
by its seemingly secondary status. As a precursor of the later notion of sponsorship, the
advertisers seemed to be providing a service or a form of entertainment, and merely declaring
their philanthropy openly. As such, these types of slides are indicative of the struggles of the
slide industry to fully integrate with motion pictures. Direct advertising needed a little boost in

282

Chalmers L. Pancoast, “Picture Slides as Business Getters,” Advertising & Selling 22.9 (February 1913): 77-8.
The slide in the ad is openly described as a product of Scott & Van Altena. Display Ad, Moving Picture World
19.3 (17 January 1914): 326.
284
Epes Winthrop Sargent, “Advertising for Exhibitors,” Moving Picture World 22.8 (21 November 1914): 1067.
285
G.R. Lowe, “Slide Advertising for the Retail Druggist,” American Druggist and Pharmaceutical Record April
1914: 44. Though it is certainly possible for an idea to arise independently in multiple places, it is possible that this
concept can be traced directly to the publication of a note in Moving Picture World in 1913, where a quick-made
slide was used to call patrons out of the theater in a family emergency. In reporting this act, Moving Picture World
proposed that physicians use slides in this way; the wording indicates that they thought it a novel proposition.
[Untitled], Moving Picture World 15.6 (8 February 1913): 575.
283

146
order to ‘get over the footlights,’ as it were. The impending advertising trailer revolution (see
chapter four) was, from a certain angle, simply another technological step in this process.

Conclusion
From their plausible inception in motion picture theaters in 1908, to their incomplete
1920s integration, advertising slides developed a stable, profitable, largely unquestioned, but
decidedly marginal presence in motion picture theaters. This presence set the tone for the other
advertising concepts that would arise and develop over roughly the same time period, as lantern
slides were the first to encounter and negotiate the thorny problems of exhibitor and spectator
reluctance. Through experimentation with various business models, slide manufacturers taught
the advertising industry that film goers would accept the ‘intrusion’ of commercial messages into
entertainment for which they had paid under the express conditions that it be presented in a form
that was not cut-rate and in a quantity that did not dominate the proceedings. If the slides could
include elements of entertainment (preferably humor or inventive motion) or some element of
public service (such as a clock or other informative announcement), so much the better.
The perceived failings of slides either added weight to the adoption, or directly inspired
the creation of other models of in-cinema advertising. The sense that direct sales exhortations
resulted in viewer antipathy led some to push forward with industrial films and product
placement. The notion that antipathy was related to the compulsory entertainment pause led
others to move slide techniques off the screen and onto the walls. The sense that viewers were
simply displeased by the outdated, motionless technique spawned the advertising trailer.
With the lantern slide, then, the typical motion picture theater opened its doors –
hesitantly – to consumer goods advertising. Though longstanding assumptions about audience
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displeasure would cause direct sales messages to slowly decrease in favor of sneakier advertising
like product placement, the cinema theater would never again be entirely devoid of advertising.
Slide advertising successfully navigated its early troubles, maintaining not just a place for itself
in cinema theaters, but tacitly supporting further investigation of the venue. Slides proved the
logic that the ‘captive audience’ of the theater – though perhaps more psychologically complex
than hoped – was in truth a profitable and desirable community. Their flaws only encouraged
national advertisers to further experimentation with the best way to profitably draw this
community’s attention.
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CHAPTER 4. “SCREEN SUGAR PILLS”: THE COMMERCIAL TRAILER AND THE
MARGINALIZATION OF ONSCREEN ADVERTISING

It was felt by advertisers that the lantern slide had had its run.
People yawned at the still picture on the screen. Some method
of knocking them down and dragging them out had to be devised.
The little ad-plays turned the trick.
- Jonas Howard (December 1919)1
In the first quarter of 1938, the J. Walter Thompson Company’s Fred Fidler encouraged
the company to experiment with motion picture advertising, primarily on the grounds that it
would “provide invaluable preparatory experience against the time when commercial public
television arrive[d] and demonstration share[d] description’s importance as an advertising
technique.”2 After 40 years of “agency apathy” towards cinema advertising,3 and more than a
decade as a major player in radio, J. Walter Thompson finally gave serious consideration to the
moving picture.4 Historically, there are two very important elements to Thompson’s change of
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heart. First, they asserted that cinema advertising had been a qualified success, despite early
exhibitor and spectator reluctance, due largely to persistence. By carrying on, advertising film
makers had “developed an appreciative tolerance on the part of the audience,” neutralizing
complaints by simply refusing to leave.5 Second, they claimed that “[s]ome of the finest film
work that has been done from an advertising standpoint has gone into the making of trailers that
would have real ‘punch’ so they would be used right along.”6 Trailers were short, generally one
minute, film strips designed to advertise consumer goods, complete with a merchant’s ‘video
business card’ as the culminating image. It is therefore telling that a mainstream ad agency, on
the cusp of the development of television’s ‘participating sponsorship’ model, was interested in
the cinema trailer as a parallel to the radio ‘spot’ (then still largely restricted to daytime
programming).7 The analysis throws into sharp relief two important elements of cinema
advertising history: that the threat of published complaints about onscreen advertising was
parried by advertiser persistence; and that the motion picture advertising trailer is directly related
to the televisual development of the 60-second broadcast ‘spot.’
The commercial ‘trailer’ rose to prominence shortly after the advertising slide, and would
slowly usurp, over the course of two decades, the much of the positioning of its technologically
simplistic sibling in motion picture theaters. Indeed, commentators of the time saw the trailer as
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a direct replacement for the outdated lantern slide, which “had had its run.”8 The perceived
value of motion to the power of image-based advertising (see chapter two), combined with a
growing sense that the cinema audience was frustrated with slides, drove cinema advertising
producers to develop the advertising trailer to capture and captivate an audience which, it
seemed, had not been properly approached via slides. Some of the more prominent slide
producers concurred with that thinking, and attempted to shift production to the trailer model
over the course of the 1910s and 1920s. One example was the Kansas City Slide Company;
company President A.V. Cauger, as part of his shift in focus from slides to films, trained his
young artists Walt Disney and Ubbe Iwerks – originally hired in 1920 to produce “Cartoon and
Wash Drawings” for advertising slides – to produce advertising trailers. Disney, who was to
make himself a household name, thus discovered cartooning largely due to cinema advertising
trends, as the slide lost ground to the commercial trailer.9 Most early participants in the trailer
field, however, were new companies which saw themselves as directly competing with the
struggling slide makers.
Trailers, like slides before them, were designed to be inserted into an entertainment
sequence in the ‘gaps’ in the program, perpetuating the ‘single voice’ model, but without the
disruption of breaking up full-motion images with stills. Paradoxically, however, the increasing
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technological suitability of the form to the cinema correlated to a historical moment when pauses
for advertising were diminishing in programs rather than growing. Trailers, despite their
suitability for use at the end of each reel, commonly wound up strung together on their own reel
and used as a form of ‘intermission’ between turns of the program. It is in the marginalization of
the trailer where the cinema found its stable form – unbroken feature films (and, to a decreasing
degree, shorts) surrounded, in lower-end theaters, by an intermission buffer zone of advertising
clips. The notion that paid admissions were ‘naturally’ incompatible with intermittent
advertising breaks normalized in the public consciousness through an accidental confluence of
events.
This chapter shall chart a course very similar to chapter three. Opening with a clear
description of the trailer form, and the production methods employed in their creation and
screening, the bulk of the chapter will recount a history of trailer development as a commercial
adjunct to cinema culture. Following this historical breakdown, public rhetoric both positive and
negative about the trailer form (spoiler alert: it’s almost all positive) will reveal the ways in
which trailers were ‘sold’ to both the film and business community as a viable advertising
medium. The chapter will conclude with a case study of the early years of the Alexander Film
Company – the predominant trailer manufacturer from the early 1920s to the advent of
commercial television and beyond.

What Was a ‘Trailer’?
Referred to variously as ‘minute movies,’ ‘photoplaylets,’ and ‘Visual Publicity
Telegrams,’10 trailers were very short advertising film strips which played out like temporally,
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rather than spatially, organized slides. Most often they were made, like lantern slides, to
promote generic products, with a dealer identified in the concluding moments of the film.
Trailers could, and did, promote national brands, but even then would almost invariably have had
a local dealer name and address eating up the final seconds.11 Commonly the running length of
an individual trailer advertisement was roughly 45 feet for the ‘story’ and 15 feet for the name
and address of a local business where the product could be purchased. Due to the variability of
projection speeds in the silent era, the actual viewing of an advertising trailer may have taken
much less than the commonly presumed one-minute running time of 60 feet of film. Roughly
one-minute was, however, the standard estimate, if not the standard experience.
At their inception in the early 1910s, trailers, as the name would imply, were intended to
be appended to the ends of entertainment reels that ran a bit shorter than the typical 1000 feet,
and were thus circulated individually. Research by the J. Walter Thompson ad agency, in 1929,
asserts that mainstream films of this era could run “as short as 650-700 feet,” causing exhibitors
to look with a good deal of favor on film novelties running about 50-250 feet…which could be
patched onto the ends of short reels when it was desirable to lengthen the program, or left off
when it was preferable.”12 Custom trailers were usually made-to-order and purchased outright,
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with circulation decisions often left up to the advertiser him or herself. The typical cost for a
custom trailer was between fifty cents and one-dollar per foot, or about thirty to sixty dollars per
trailer.13 Although custom trailers persisted throughout the life of the form, the growth of spacebrokering by trailer producers (signing contracts with exhibitors which allowed the trailer
producer to re-sell a certain number of minutes per program) led to the growth of an alternate
model of distribution in which the trailer producers would send a reel of multiple trailers.
Predominantly of the ‘stock’ or ‘syndicate’ variety – generic trailers selected from a catalog for
merchants in particular lines of business14 – such collections of trailers were designed to be run
in sequence as a standalone reel somewhere in the program. Stock trailers had wide variation in
cost – ranging from four to twelve dollars – depending on whether they were rented or purchased
outright.15 By 1916, both models were possible, and operated simultaneously; any given
company offered both custom and stock trailers.16
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Despite the vast differences in cost and production style inherent between custom and
stock trailers, form and content (what the cinemagoer actually saw onscreen) had little variation.
Custom production was a means to more completely integrate the brand, not a way to create an
ad of higher formal quality. Although they could be made in live-action,17 the typical advertising
trailer was animated.18 (See the history section below for detail on the appeal of animation in the
mid-1910s.) Designed to be both short (to defuse exhibitor reluctance and keep costs low for the
advertiser) and direct (making them memorable to the viewer, unlike subtle product placement
and sponsored educational shorts), trailers were like full-motion slides, offering a clear salespitch for a given product as briefly and pleasurably as possible.
The ‘copy’ style was thus generally humorous, relying more on ‘soft sell’ strategies than
slides,19 used a limited number of words (so as not to waste running time), and was – as was
typical for 1910s advertising – an either explicit or implicit comparison of life with and without
the product.20 Jonas Howard described this narrative structure of playlets as providing “[a] sort
of object lesson, negative or positive,” in order to persuade the viewer of “the necessity for new
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shoes or a safety razor.”21 These ‘object lessons’ could be either rational or emotional appeals –
either ‘reason why’ or ‘impressionistic’ copy. Howard described the rational argumentative
copy of a corset film, in which the near indestructibility of a corset was personified in the actions
of two rambunctious children who used a corset to play tug of war before soaking it in a tub.
The quality of the corset was assured by a narrative assertion that it would neither tear nor rust
easily, implying superiority to a life with a lower-quality corset. An example of ‘rational’ copy
from the time with more overt comparative structure is a cement film which juxtaposed a thin,
grumpy hog whose food kept sinking in the mire, to a fat and happy hog dining off of a concrete
floor.22 Howard likewise provided an example of more emotional, impressionistic comparative;
a shoe advertisement linked the quality of a man’s shoes to his romantic appeal, having an
onscreen love interest refuse to marry the romantic lead until after he had purchased a new pair
of shoes. Such binaristic arguments – the simplest means of integrating salesmanship into
narrative structure – are the structuring motif of virtually every published example of the form.23
Most variation in style was, thus, not copy related but confined to minor aesthetic
differences. A multitude of aesthetic possibilities, largely determined by the technology
developed by a given company, were available. Trailers could be made in live-action, handdrawn animation, or cut-out puppetry (the most common method).24 The ‘Rowntree Process’ of
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the Scenic Film Company was designed to backlight cardboard “figures...cut out in the fashion
of paper dolls.”25 The Kansas City Slide Company used a similar method; Walt Disney once
described his work there as the manipulation of “little puppet things” with joints.26 The Federal
Development Company, as revealed in a self-advertisement, used hand drawn animation highly
reminiscent, due to color inversion (black marks registering white onscreen), of the ‘chalkboard’
style of Emile Cohl’s famous film Fantasmagorie (1908).27 The Rothacker Film Manufacturing
Company preferred to deal in live-action, and expressed a, probably not uncommon, weakness
for “pretty girls.”28
Unlike lantern slides which, for several reasons (see chapter three), developed a
propensity for black backgrounds extremely early, trailer animators commonly operated in both
white-on-black and black-on-white styles. The Scenic Film Company, which openly described
its animation as consisting of “silhouette and manikin effects,” and which reproduced several
black silhouette images in a 1916 article in a local newspaper, appears to have been comfortable
with black-figures on a white background.29 Sample images in the display ads for the Dra-Ko

animation, and as such no simple way to show direct aesthetic influence from the advertising industry to the
entertainment animators. The cut-out model is, however, part of a secondary strand of puppet animation practice,
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Film Company also reveal black-figure production.30 B.F. Goodrich appears to have circulated
animated trailers in black-figure as well.31 However, Artfilm Studios’ Reginald V. Stambaugh
not only made white-figure animation, but strongly asserted that a white background “contrasts
uncomfortably with the usual background of motion picture plays…[by] produc[ing] a high light
that is out of place.”32 The previously cited Federal Development Company image was also
white-figure production.33 It is possible that the decision was technologically or financially
determined; certain methods may have simply produced better or cheaper product in one or the
other form. It is also probable that black backgrounds were more common with those who
continued the hand-coloring practices of slide production; black backgrounds allowed for easier
‘slopping’ of color across a space, as the background would hide the color which fell outside the
lines. Of course, it is also plausible that American entertainment animation from Winsor McCay
and Bray Productions, as black-figure productions, may have convinced most trailer animators
that the whole subject was unimportant. In any case, it appears that white backgrounds were
common in trailer production – far more so than in slide production.
Aesthetic variation was also partially the result of textual concerns. Some stock trailers
makers, in an attempt to construct trailers which left written copy in the hands of the advertiser
as much as possible, concocted numerous methods for integrating text throughout trailers. While
the Alexander Film Company was content to limit dealer copy to the last fifteen seconds, and the
Rothacker Film Manufacturing Company kept copy open to change by integrating it via
intertitles (as was typical for live-action film), Reginald V. Stambaugh performed technological
30
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gymnastics to try to put stock animation and custom copy on the same frame of the trailer.
Stambaugh left open spaces in his animation designed to accommodate custom dialogue and then
developed a complicated dual-threading process in which two pieces of film (a shooting negative
and a completed animation positive) would run through the camera simultaneously.34 The
location and specificity of copy could, therefore, vary widely depending on the trailer producer.35
In terms of exhibition, trailers were a national, but limited, phenomenon – they skewed
towards rural and suburban areas. As the growth of the form coincided with the rise of the urban
picture palace, which commonly rejected commercial advertising intrusions across-the-board, the
advertising trailer found a home in mid-range and low-end theaters and, effectively, wound up as
one of the myriad ways in which first-run, downtown, palatial theaters were differentiated from
other theaters in the silent era.36 The exhibitor was almost always paid for the screening time –
either by the merchant who had paid for the film (directly, if placing the film himself, or
indirectly, if he hired a space-broker to produce the trailer), or by the consumer-goods
manufacturer (if it was a national campaign). Any given film was guaranteed, as far as possible,
34
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botched before finally revealing his own technique. As such, he gives considerable data on the variations in
advertising animation practice at this early date. His own process involves the filming of text with the negative
resting directly against the stock animation film strip. As such, the animation prints directly to the finished film at
the same time that the lettering comes through the lens. Reginald V. Stambaugh, “Process of Making Moving
Picture Films,” U.S. Patent 1,226,135, filed 26 May 1916, and issued 15 May 1917.
35
This was probably the most important difference between silent and sound era production. Provided animation
remained a prominent practice, sound re-recording could easily integrate brand specificity into generic animation
with only minor impact on ‘lip-sync.’ As such, Stambaugh’s attempt at creating stock ads with textual variability
was a dead-end for silent era production but prefigured production choices from more than a decade later.
36
‘Roxy’ Rothapfel asserted that this split had developed as early as 1916, in the wake of emergence of the picture
palace. By 1921, Francis T. Kimball asserted that “[o]f course, ‘first-run’ theatres in a few of the larger cities will
not put even the most sugar-coated trailer on their screens”; his article directly asserted that it was a mode of
advertising for “the thousands of cities and towns and hamlets of the United States which are not among the leading
few.” In 1956, research by the J. Walter Thompson advertising agency reveals that the split remained entrenched, as
urban theaters would not screen advertising films. S.L. Rothapfel, “First Aid to Theater Men,” Motography 16.2 (8
July 1916): 78; Francis T. Kimball, “The Film Trailer and What it Will Do,” Moving Picture Age February 1921:
11; and Fred Fidler and Wallace Boren, “Commercial Movies,” 1 February 1938, p. 9, Box 7, Folder “1937 Nov. 9 –
1938 Oct. 25,” J. Walter Thompson Company, Staff Meeting Minutes, 1927-1938, David M. Rubinstein Rare Book
& Manuscript Library, Duke University. For further information on differentiating rural and urban viewing during
the 1910s, see: Kathryn H. Fuller, At the Picture Show: Small-Town Audiences and the Creation of Movie Fan
Culture (Washington and London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1996).

159
to be screened according to contract, either by sending a man to ‘check-up’ on the exhibitor, or
by developing longstanding, mutually-respectful relationships with exhibitors through spacebrokering. As such, commercial advertising trailers – though not as common as lantern slides in
the years between 1910 and 1913 – would have been seen by the bulk of film patrons as a normal
piece of the program. If a viewer saw one advertising trailer – hawking either a national product
like Coca Cola, or a local one like “Jones’ Toys” – it was unlikely to be a one-off experience, but
a part of a larger pattern witnessed every time they went to their favorite theater.

A Brief History of the Advertising Trailer, 1914-1922
It is difficult to discuss the history of the advertising trailer without a little pre-history, as
filmed advertisements are nearly as old as film itself. As early as 1896, a film featuring Sunlight
Soap, called Washing Day in Switzerland, was screened at Keith’s Union Square Theater in New
York.37 The Edison Company’s paid filming of passenger rail was in full swing in their early
short productions by 1897.38 By 1898, there were advertising films screened in New York (and
possibly elsewhere) for products like Dewar’s Scotch Whiskey, Maillard’s Chocolates, Columbia
Bicycles, Piel’s beer, and Hunter’s Rye Whiskey. Future animation pioneer J. Stuart Blackton,
along with his partner Albert E. Smith, made commercial films, along with slides, for their
Commercial Advertising Bureau – projecting them from rooftops onto canvases hung at busy
intersections.39 There is even evidence that the use of humor as a salve for advertising content is
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an early innovation. When Sears and Roebuck catalogs began to offer projectors and films in
1898, they added to the available product by selling films, for only three dollars (40% less than
non-advertising films), which subtly advertised the Sears name – displaying subjects like
employees leaving Sears for lunch. In order to counter the undoubted reluctance of some to
purchase advertising footage, even at a cut rate, some of films were graced with the description
“very funny.”40 The extant 1897 commercial film Admiral Cigarettes relies likewise on humor,
through its ridiculous imagery of a ‘cigarette fairy.’ Though it is important not to oversell the
comparison, all of these early advertisements were, in effect, proto-trailers, as the jokes and lastsecond slogans were integrated into a (then common) running length of roughly one minute.
As film expanded, however – both in terms of celluloid running length and national
audience – between 1900 and 1914, advertising films expanded apace, relegating the extremely
brief advertising film to the rubbish bin as an outdated form. Large film producers continued to
make commissioned films stylistically parallel to their entertainment fare. Charles Musser, in
the most detailed study of advertising in the pre-nickelodeon era, asserts that American Biograph
was so heavily engaged in producing commissioned advertising and public announcement films
that “[o]f the 653 films [they] made from 1 May 1903 to 1 May 1904, more than 120 were
sponsored by large corporations or the United States government,” including films for “Shredded
Wheat Biscuits, Mellin’s Baby Food, and the Gold Dust Twins.”41 Vitagraph – Blackton and
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Smith’s second film venture – experimented with product placement and was able to extract
fabulous sums from advertisers for the service; they were eventually sued for commissions on
these contracts, which included $25,000 from American Tobacco for a hanging sign during the
Johnson-Jeffries fight, and $15,000 from Wrigley for a close-up of a girl unwrapping a piece of
gum.42 The National Cash Register Company was also using film at the St. Louis Expo in
1904.43 As such, advertising – via one-reel shorts and product placement – was everywhere. It
was likely to be screened in every plausible American venue prior to the establishment of the
nickelodeon, from Edison’s kinetoscope parlors, to vaudeville performances, to general public
celebrations of modern technology at fairs and expositions.
With the stabilization of exhibition practices in nickelodeon theaters, however,
advertising motion pictures began losing ground. As the industrial advertising short and tourismboosting travelogue fought for integration into cinema programs between 1908 and 1913, the
roughly 15 minute duration of a standard reel became a problem. Once film had lost its status as
inherently spectacular, advertising annoyed patrons at the length of a full-reel. More and more
advertising in motion pictures was camouflaged with a veil of ‘human interest’ or educational
content, and reduced to an indirect, ‘soft-sell’ integration of trademarks.44 As the advertising
component of a reel became less and less noticeable, the fantastic costs of making such films –
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reaching as high as $5000 apiece – became less and less attractive.45 Slides, on the other hand,
could be picked from a catalog, ordered for a dollar, and taken to every local motion picture
theater in turn until some exhibitor agreed to run them. The cost of failure was dramatically
different. With the success of advertising slides prior to 1910, numerous articles dreaming of a
future for the advertising film were published,46 but attempts at full-reel production simply
weren’t working. By 1913 – after significant efforts from industrial film producers like
Watterson Rothacker, Arthur N. Smallwood, and the industrial division of Essanay – the
advertising film appeared to be destined for a life on the non-theatrical circuit.47 The expensive
indirect approach found few adherents when forced to compete with direct advertising via cheap
slides.
By this same date, however, even the ‘direct’ advertising slide was struggling through a
wave of negative publicity. Ugly slides made by cut-rate slide manufacturers had markedly
increased public resentment of the form, as unpleasant (and often broken) slides would be
screened for months on end. By 1913, exhibitor elimination of advertising slides was in full
swing (see chapter three). The American advertising industry was, however, going through
45

A 1910 article asserted not only that a good estimate for film production with a plan for seven months of theatrical
circulation (the rough lifespan of a print in constant use) was $5,000, but also that “no contract for less than $2,500
worth of film is taken” by the average advertising film producer. As such, an advertising short was an expensive
risk for companies willing to experiment. James H. Collins, “Advertising Via the Moving Picture,” Printers’ Ink
70.8 (23 February 1910): 28. For the lifespan, see: Ernest A. Dench, Advertising by Motion Pictures (Cincinnatti:
Standard Publishing Co., 1916), 28.
46
See for example: James H. Collins, “Advertising Via the Moving Picture,” Moving Picture World 6.11 (19 March
1910): 422-423; H.F. Hoffman, “From the Cradle to the Grave,” Moving Picture World 6.21 (28 May 1910): 877;
and Horatio F. Stoll, “Value of the Moving Pictures for Advertising,” Moving Picture World 8.10 (11 March 1911):
519.
47
See, for example, the publications of industrial film maker Watterson Rothacker, who clearly preferred the
making of films for use by traveling salesmen, as theatrical release was simply a “blunderbuss that makes a big
noise [by] aim[ing] at anything and everything.” Watterson Rothacker, “Pictures as an Advertising Force,”
Motography February 1912: 71. The history of the industrial advertising film, product placement, and sponsored
newsreels is, admittedly, far more important to the development of cinema advertising in the silent era and will be
dealt with more fully at a later date. See the following references to Watterson Rothacker’s work: Mack Sennett,
King of Comedy (Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, 2000), 122; Kathryn H. Fuller, At the Picture Show: Small-Town
Audiences and the Creation of Movie Fan Culture (Washington and London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1996),
83-84; and Nanna Verhoef, The West in Early Cinema: After the Beginning (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University
Press, 2006), 313-314.

163
significant expansion in this period; Quentin J. Schultze points to the era between 1910 and 1915
as a period of “rapid growth” in national advertising in the United States.48 As such, the mass
rebellion against industrial reels and advertising slides, in an era when the desire to advertise was
expanding rather than contracting, opened a clear space for advertising films in cinema
programs…provided the films were short enough to fit into the same gaps. Enter the trailer film,
appended to the ends of film reels or distributed as a short reel of one-minute long
advertisements, which began its rise in 1914.
Over the course of the following two years, it was common, among trailer producers and
advocates, to openly describe the trailer as the logical replacement for the faltering lantern
slide.49 The earliest known trailer producer – Houston’s Southern Film Service – directly
declared, in its 1914 self-advertising, that their films were “not to be compared with the ordinary
slides.”50 The Fort Wayne & Northern Indiana Traction Company justified its use of trailer
footage that same year on the grounds that it involved neither the pause nor the resentment
inherent in slides.51 Atlanta’s Scenic Film Company used simple derisive metaphors to critique
the impertinence of using still slides in moving picture theaters. For example, their claim that
“[e]ven a piece of paper, blown by the breeze across a screen, will attract attention and would be
watched by anyone, when something still may stand unnoticed for a long time.”52 Harvey F.
Morris, advertising manager for the Hickey-Freeman clothing company, concurred, saying that
slides represented “a decided drop from the pictures between which they were shown” and “were
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not successful in interesting the audience.”53 By the end of 1916, advertising journalist Ernest A.
Dench reduced the critique to the simple assertion that lack of motion was “a serious defect” in
slides which could be remedied through the adoption of trailer advertising.54 As such, the
rhetoric of the trailer as an improved form of the slide both adopted and advanced the public
sentiment that motion pictures were a form of communication which bypassed critical faculties.
Culminating in the mid-decade ‘psychic infection’ film theories of Hugo Münsterberg and the
Mutual Decision (see chapter two), advocacy of trailers at the expense of slides implied not just
an improvement in technology, but a strengthening of advertising power.
Although slide usage continued (and continues) in American motion picture theaters, the
1913 backlash against slides was, therefore, a necessary pre-requisite for the boom in advertising
film. It not only inspired the creation of short, cheap, and direct advertising film (rather than the
subtle camouflaging tactics of product placement and ‘educational’ reels), but also opened up a
simple rhetorical argument for adoption: ‘upgrade your slides’ with the more captivating and
pleasurable moving advertisement. In short, the trailer industry was a parasite on the slide
industry, pushing condemnation of still advertising in favor of its own full-motion product.55
The trailer method appears to have arisen independently in at least three places: Houston,
Atlanta, and New England.56 In Houston, the Southern Film Service, Inc., began offering
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“Mysterious Writing” advertising films, designed “[t]o be attached to your daily film.” Using
the slogan “An unseen hand in letters white on a darkened screen appears to write,” it is clear
that their ads were nothing more than stop-motion writing, projected in negative to achieve a
white-figure effect.57 Atlanta cameraman Carl B. Rowntree, of the Scenic Film Company,
produced a more complicated practice of full scale puppet animation, claiming to have invented
his process for producing short animated ads in the middle of 1914.58 By early 1915, he had
filed his animation technique with the United States patent office, was regularly soliciting the
business of Atlanta merchants and manufacturers, and openly declared that his cartoon films
were, likewise, to be used “by attaching them to the end of regular moving picture reels.”59 New
England’s National Advertising Motion Picture Weekly, Inc., also in the latter half of 1914,
contracted with sixteen nearby theaters to run a weekly five-minute reel containing five distinct
advertising films.60 In short, both business models – the ‘appended trailer’ and the ‘reel of
trailers’ – were in use in the United States by the end of 1914. The idea would spread
remarkably quickly, with at least seven further companies adopting the form by the end of
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1915.61 A total of at least thirty-one trailer producers were, or had been, in operation by 1921 –
including Tilford & Tilford, a Chicago company which made trailers exclusively for black
theaters.62 The form was so successful that, by World War I, the mainstream film industry
would adapt the method to replace ‘coming attraction’ slides.63
While it is not entirely clear where the idea came from, there are several plausible origins
for the thinking. The term ‘trailer’ was in use no later than 1910, as the inverse of the term
‘leader,’ to describe the short strips of informational film at the end of a reel: company logos,
‘The End’ tags, and censor board approvals. At times the production of such material was even
outsourced to a company that specialized in the form.64 It would not have been a great leap for
such a company to branch out into sales messages, as they were effectively acting as film
branding agents already. A secondary influence may have been ‘split-reel’ and newsreel
releases. In split reels, two films – neither of which was a full reel in length – were released
together as a single product. By 1914, one half-reel film, Fireproofing Children, was said to be
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“released as a trailer,” seeming to indicate that the line between a ‘split-reel’ film and a ‘trailer’
was breaking down.65 Newsreels were similar to split reels, in that they strung together largely
unrelated footage, which could be shuffled or dropped at will, on a single reel.66 The fact that
advertisers continually attempted to get brief footage into newsreels – culminating in the Ford
Motor Company producing newsreels of its own from 1914 to 1921 - indicates early interest in
the placement of short advertising strips onto larger reels of unrelated material.67 Newsreels,
split reels, and informational ‘trailer’ footage were all, therefore, common practices in
entertainment cinema which, in hindsight, were logical precursors to the advertising trailer
concept.
As likely as these entertainment concepts are as stimuli, however, it is perhaps more
likely that the commercial advertising film industry was inspiring itself. Attempts at getting
advertising into newsreels were but one piece of a much larger interest in the powers of veryshort advertising footage. A January 1913 article reveals that advertising films intended for
theatrical release and those intended for use by salesmen were being distinguished by referring to
the former as “regulation lengths” and the latter as “short lengths.”68 It is possible, then, that the
creation of full-reel (approximately 15 minute) advertising films was always seen as a formal
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imposition and an unnecessary expense. If salesmen could make do with less, why couldn’t the
consuming public? The same article also provides a practical example of a one-reel advertising
film in which the most popular and influential piece was a quasi-trailer magic trick at the end of
the film. A film for Waterman Pens called The Story of the Fountain Pen (presumably 1912)
was believed to be successful largely for its animated ending in which pieces of rubber and gold
assembled themselves into a pen and then drew pictures which were made to “come to life.”
Audiences loved this part of the film, which was described as “about a minute” in duration.69 At
a time in which ‘impressionistic copy’ was already making inroads into mainstream advertising,
it is not implausible that the Waterman company, along with other business men, would have
begun to wonder if the roughly nine-hundred feet of film prior to this novelty animated section
was entirely superfluous.
Even if this particular film had no direct bearing on trailer development, it serves as
perfect transitional moment, due not only to the duration and placement of the sequence, but also
its reliance on animated effects. Sharply highlighting just how much the margins of the
advertising industry could differ in opinion from the agencies, early trailer producers embraced
entertainment and pleasure, and made their advertisements almost exclusively as humorous
animated cartoons.70 Ernest A. Dench was almost misleading when he asserted that animation
was simply “[t]he most popular” form of trailer up to 1916.71 Between 1914 and 1916, nearly all
film production companies known to have been experimenting with trailers were dealing
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primarily, if not exclusively, in animation.72 The only known live-action footage in these early
years were one-time uses: the Fort Wayne & Northern Indiana Traction Company’s
electrification footage in late 1914, and the trailer advertising the Portland Rose Festival in
1915.73 Animation wasn’t simply popular; it was so predominant as to render non-animated
trailers a decided anomaly.
Popular animation was in a very early stage of development at this point: Bray
Productions, the largest early animation house, did not release its first cartoon (The Artist’s
Dream) until 12 June 1913 and was still seeking a wide audience for its work, and Winsor
McCay did not begin screening his highly influential third animated short, Gertie the Dinosaur,
until 8 February 1914.74 As such, from mid-1914 to mid-1916, we can comfortably assert that
animation did not just dominate the trailer business, but that the trailer business also dominated
animation. The Moving Picture World reported that, by mid-1916 ‘animated ads’ had “to a very
large extent” replaced slides entirely in New Orleans.75 Three months earlier, the Atlanta
Constitution strongly implied that any viewing of animation in a cinema theater was an animated
ad, saying “[y]ou have seen it – if you’re a picture play-goer – queer little cartoon-like characters
that perform all manner of intricate antics…in exploitation of the merits of this trade shop or
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that.”76 The trailers of the Hickey-Freeman Company help to roughly pinpoint the moment that
live-action trailers became more common; the company made animated trailers in Fall 1915 and
Spring 1916 before making their first live-action trailer for the Fall of 1916.77 In short, the rise
of the trailer was inextricably linked to the rise of animation.
In the short run, the focus on animation had two practical benefits, one which helped
convince advertisers that the form had value, and one which helped defuse exhibitor reluctance
to screen the films. For advertisers, the need to produce recognizable sales copy (i.e. written
persuasive claims) in a medium of motion virtually required that letters be kinetic. Early trailer
producers almost universally promoted ‘moving or mysteriously appearing letters’ as their
primary asset.78 Although advertising animators believed that minimizing written content
produced better ads,79 all advertising films had to include a small amount of written copy – at the
very least providing a dealer’s name and address. One could use stop-action and animation to do
this with flair in many ways: letters which appeared in a place previously occupied by another
object, which flew around the screen and formed words, or which seemed to write themselves
without a visible hand, to name just three examples. Simple stop-motion tricks could render the
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onscreen reproduction of words a dynamic experience.80 Likely emerging from pre-narrative
trailer practice, in which an abstract visual was made to reveal a product or merchant name – like
the Scenic Film Company’s ad for Nunnally’s chocolates, in which the letters appeared out of an
exploding heart – the persistent need to include written advertising copy kept animated letters at
the forefront of trailer practice in the early years.81 Animation was, therefore, a means to inject
spectacle not just into the action of the film, but into even the most mundane of content.
Animation also had a direct appeal to exhibitors and audiences. It was a form with
inherent spectacle and novelty. Early commentators remarked on the “unusual interest” which
the audience expressed in animated trailers, and proposed that this may have been a result of the
novelty of animation, as the audience was “try[ing] to figure out how that [was] done.”82 Add in
the fact that trailer producers also oriented their scripts towards pleasure – the Dra-Ko Film
Company went so far as to hire Frank A. Nankivell, famous for his work in the humor magazine
Puck, to head their art department83 – and the animated trailer had distinct appeals across-theboard: directness and cheapness for advertisers, brevity and humor for audiences, and cash for
exhibitors. (For more regarding the appeals of animation to advertisers and exhibitors, see the
following section on positive rhetoric.)
Although brevity was intentional, the thirty to ninety second running time was likely not
a technological or exhibitor mandated maximum, but a choice. Over the course of roughly a
80

This focus on integrating kinetic written words fundamentally distinguishes advertising filmmakers from their
entertainment oriented counterparts, whose use of the written word was more often a crutch for faulty or incomplete
visual narration.
81
By the 1920s, an example of a Jeweler’s merchant-strip shows that the Alexander Film Company was attempting
to surround letters with moving objects, rather than make the letters themselves move. In this particular strip, an
undulating string of pearls surrounded the otherwise immobile merchant name. [Sample Images from Jeweler
Trailer], Box 2, Folder 4, Alexander Industries Records (MSS 0056), Special Collections in the 1905 Carnegie
Library, Pikes Peak Library District, Colorado Springs.
82
“Kansas City Trade,” Black Diamond 58.5 (3 February 1917): 101. See also: Display Ad, Moving Picture World
19.10 (7 March 1914): 1330; and W.A. Harris, “History, Future and Possibilities of the Advertising Film Industry,”
Simmons’ Spice Mill 40.3 (March 1917): 357.
83
Full-Page Display Ad, Moving Picture World 6 May 1916: 1033.

172
year, the typical running time slowly but perceptibly increased in published accounts from thirty
seconds to one-minute. In mid-1915, the Raymond Anderson Company was producing trailers
with a uniform running length of thirty-five feet.84 A general article on the form from the end of
1915 declared that one could succeed with a cartoon trailer using “not more than twenty or thirty
feet of film.”85 The Scenic Film Company, in early 1916, though offering durations ranging
anywhere from twenty-five feet to multiple reels, asserted that thirty-five to fifty feet was the
norm.86 By September of 1916, Harvey F. Morris, advertising manager for the Hickey-Freeman
Company, claimed that sixty to seventy feet was the norm for a trailer film.87 By 1919, however,
there had been no further change, as two of the most prominent trailer producing companies –
the Rothacker Manufacturing Company and the Alexander Film Company – were continuing the
practice of one to one-and-a-half minute long advertising trailers. This duration would remain
constant throughout the 1920s.88 It appears, then, that the roughly one-minute running time
developed as a standard, between 1914 and 1916, partly as a compromise: it was long enough to
integrate rudimentary narrative, but short enough to fit onto a film reel which was only slightly
below full.
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Of course, cost-control likely also had some impact on running time. Ernest Dench, in
1916, declared that the average price per foot for a trailer film was fifty cents, resulting in a cost
of $30 for a one-minute trailer – a drastic increase over the typical $1 cost of a lantern slide.89
The Scenic Film Company quoted the same price that year, though the price would double to $1
per foot if the advertiser wanted to handle the bookings himself.90 Even at durations under one
minute, trailers were a financial burden to merchants with small advertising budgets. This
pricing issue rapidly led to the development of the ‘syndicate’ or stock catalog trailer to cut costs
further. The Dench article cited above actually used the cost estimates for custom animation as a
contrast to the newly developed stock trailer, which was priced at the more affordable rate of $4
to $5. Copying the idea of a stock slide – selected from a catalog with a specific dealer name
appended – eventually shifted the trailer business from a purchase to a rental structure, resolving
at least two cost problems.91 First, it distributed first copy costs across unrelated businesses.
Second, as with entertainment fiction before them, it allowed trailers to “be made in a central
location and on a predictable basis,” reducing idle labor and travel expenses.92 It also added to
the profitability of the form, as exceptionally popular copy could produce nearly unlimited
89
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profits. The Alexander Film Company worked exclusively on a rental system for its stock
trailers, as revealed in its 1921 sales manual. As such, keeping the duration to roughly oneminute kept the trailer as affordable as possible, while allowing sufficient time for rudimentary
narrative.
The developmental period of trailer advertising, then, was a two-year-long attempt to find
a compromise between quality and cost. The result was experimentation with three modes of
production – custom, stock, and ‘partially-stock’ (in which only the imagery was pre-made, with
gaps left in the image to add onscreen dialogue later). Each had its strengths and weaknesses.
Custom copy, of course, was the most controllable – allowing the advertiser to have input on the
style, copy, and duration. Unfortunately, it was also the most expensive – a problem which
compounded if the advertiser failed to drum up enough exhibitors willing to screen the film.93
Stock product inverted the strengths and weaknesses. Although the cost was minimal, especially
under the rental system, almost all decision making was taken out of the hands of the advertiser.
Indeed, not only were advertisers forced to select pre-conceived films, they would choose them
from an illustrated catalog, not after a personal screening of the available options. Much of the
suitability of the trailer, therefore, had to be taken on faith. The ‘partially stock’ model
attempted to split the difference, allowing for cutting costs in animation, as the character work
was all done in advance, while gaps remained for the advertiser to integrate his or her own copy
throughout. The problems were increased cost (including a return of the problem of drumming
up screenings – one couldn’t rent custom copy), technical difficulty (getting both action and
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copy to match up without ‘wobbling’ was challenging),94 and narrative weakness (as the ‘plot’ of
the animation portion needed to be vague enough to integrate variations in copy).
As one can readily see from this breakdown, the fully stock model – which would
eventually become the dominant model – was not necessarily superior, nor can we presume that
its users believed it to be. The American advertising film industry intentionally sacrificed
elements of message delivery, like specificity and advertiser-written copy, to cost considerations.
In the absence of an easy way to fund and nationally circulate trailer cartoons for specific brands,
trailer producers targeted merchants by producing the cheapest possible variant.95 As such, the
other two modes of production (custom and partial-stock) shifted into the background due
entirely to cost and circulation problems, not technological inefficiency or aesthetic dislike.
Trailer producers therefore integrated copy writing services at a very early date out of necessity;
production was generally too expensive if the producer allowed advertiser input.
During the two-years of experimentation, adoption of the format increased steadily.
Perhaps the best evidence for the growing popularity of the animated trailer prior to the war is
that it spawned fraudulent behavior. ‘Salesmen’ promising the delivery of commercial cartoon
trailers would abscond with down payments from merchants. One (individual or group) ravaged
Bainbridge, Georgia in late 1916 offering twenty-five foot cartoon ads from a non-existent
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Nebraska company.96 In mid-1917, a similar film fraud was perpetrated in Kansas. Five
merchants in the town of Ellis “were induced to make a preliminary payment of $5” on a
contract for thirty-two weekly film ads, “eighty feet in length.” Again, the offer was made in the
name of a company quite distant – the ‘National Film Company’ of New York – and the
merchants were promised circulation over an entire circuit of theaters.97 The low-cost combined
with the superiority of the trailer to slides rapidly rendered trailer advertising so popular that
businessmen of all sizes were willing to part with a few dollars in down payment on very little
evidence. The trailer had become the model to beat in cinema advertising.
Despite the marked difference in public approval (slides largely derided while trailers
were on the rise), the years 1916 to 1918 provided nearly identical problems and benefits for
trailers as they had for slides. The exhibition industry legitimized and stabilized the form by
adopting it for self-advertising, while the wartime work of the Creel Committee (among other,
private patriotic gestures) gave minor sanction to the intrusion of non-cinema related advertising
in theaters. The war and the film industry combined to culturally entrench the form, while also
usurping much of the space.98
Cinema self-defense and self-advertising via trailers entered a phase of large-scale
growth in 1916, as the ‘announcement’ and the ‘coming attraction’ trailers – experimented with
by outsiders in the preceding year – were both adopted by the studios. Industry defense
announcements were common in this era of expanding film censorship – Balboa, for example,
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was circulating an anti-censorship trailer in the first quarter of 1916.99 In short order, however,
the most prominent way in which the studios adopted the trailer format was in the production of
‘coming attraction’ snippets. In the transition of the motion picture industry from the early
decade dominance of the patents company, to the vertically integrated independent studios,
competition for viewership increased. In an effort to guarantee profitability in an environment of
increased competition and increased expense (due to the production of features, which the
industry believed required individual marketing), film promotion by the studios increased. 100 By
September of 1916, Famous Players “issue[d] an advance strip” to promote the upcoming film
The Quest of Life.101 The following month, the Triangle Film Corporation – with the assertion
that “the screen…is a most powerful advertising medium…that was not being taken full
advantage of” – began circulating ‘coming attraction’ trailers for their own products.102 By July
of 1917, Moving Picture World declared that such trailers had “come into use extensively of
late,” while reporting Selznick’s new concept of using behind the scenes footage to announce
coming attractions.103 Rather than closing off the open spaces in the program, then, exhibitors
and entertainment producers began to compete for usage of the space through self-serving
‘trailers’ of their own.
What space was not being maintained for film industry self-promotion was being adapted
for wartime use. As early as 1914, Universal (always the quickest to interact with cinema
advertising theory) had already adopted the direct advertising trailer model for philanthropic
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exhortation, when the company attached a 30 foot strip to each film as a ‘leader,’ encouraging
spectators to “Buy a bale of cotton” – a response to the overstock of cotton caused by the closing
of European markets during the early hostilities of World War I.104 By 1917, both the U.S.
government, through the propaganda campaign of the Creel Committee, and the public, through
growing patriotic sentiment, pressured exhibitors to integrate political advertising into their
programs. While the trailer form was adopted frequently for war work,105 the Liberty Loan was
again the watershed. The Creel Committee, of course, circulated official Liberty Loan trailers,
including some in the animated format.106 The movement was bolstered by a few motion picture
studios – like Kalem and Selig-Polyscope – who, eager to display their patriotism, produced
Liberty Loan trailers of their own.107 Other wartime patriotic trailers were circulated as well,
most notably the American Bioscope Company’s “Your Flag and Mine” trailer, which was
advertised heavily in the pages of Moving Picture World during the war.108 By March of 1918
patriotic messages were so ingrained in American exhibition culture that Moving Picture World
columnist Walter K. Hill even proposed that all features have a leader or trailer in which “the star
of the piece be posed…holding a sign” extolling the virtues of purchasing war stamps.109 The
proliferation of patriotic appeals on the screen solidified the presence of advertising copy in even
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the highest class theaters, and likely helped to develop an “appreciative tolerance” for direct
appeals in between film reels.
With the adoption of the form for both film industry self-advertising and the delivery of
political messages, the first two years of trailer development were followed by roughly three
years of transitioning business models. Major studio and government interest in trailers
decreased the available space. As the circulation of ‘coming attraction’ trailers increased,
exhibitors were faced with the decision of devoting a larger percentage of the program to trailers,
decreasing their use of commercial trailers, or declining to use the (free) self-advertising sent out
by the studios. With the increasing dominance, even ownership, of exhibition sites by
production companies, the exhibitor’s ability to decline decreased; exhibition was becoming a
national business, not a local one. Trailer producers attempted to survive the competition, and
the war, by escalating the scale of their operations as well. Most trailer makers abandoned their
piecemeal production – abandoning also their reliance on advertisers being confident of finding
circulation – and went through a phase of increased professionalization. In an echo of the slide
industry’s turn to ‘full service’ production and distribution, which had occurred over the previous
few years (see chapter three), trailer producers predominantly adopted space-brokering as a
business model, and shifted their focus to national advertisers. A number of trailer producers
even banded together in a professional association in an attempt to stabilize and grow the field,
even at the risk of sharing trade secrets with competitors. The increasing scale of contracts –
both with exhibitors and advertisers – added a patina of proficiency and efficiency to trailer
production.110 All of these changes occurred between late 1916 and 1918.
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While the development of the advertising trailer appear to have repaired the major failing
of slides, and could logically have resulted in a form of commercially subsidized cinema
exhibition in which an advertising trailer was appended to the end of each reel, this televisionesque form of exhibition did not arise. The advent of the trailer coincided with a shifting
emphasis from reel change pauses to a single intermission as a buffer between turns of the
program. The greatest boon to slide advertising was the fact that most early theaters had only
one projector, necessitating a pause at the end of each reel as the projectionist swapped out the
completed reel for the next one in the program. As even lower-end theaters shifted to a twoprojector model, in which the reel-change could occur without onscreen interruption, the need
for a distinct pause was eliminated. Debate over the best way to structure a ‘balanced program’
(leading the viewer comfortably through the tonal transitions of a multitude of genres) likely kept
hope alive for pauses between reels, as some exhibitors – most notably ‘Roxy’ Rothapfel –
preferred pauses for non-filmic entertainment.111 The industry-wide transition to feature films,
however, finally and irreversibly shifted the focus from buffering successive shorts, to creating
an intermission between turns of the program, stressing beginnings and endings rather than an
endless loop of shorts for ‘transient spectators.’112 The purveyors of onscreen advertising – both
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slides and trailers – did not hold enough sway over exhibition culture to militate against feature
culture, or persuade studios and exhibitors to break up such films with commercial pauses.
As such, the trailer, like the slide, drifted rapidly into placement in a single intermission
somewhere in the program. Jonas Howard’s article on Rothacker photoplaylets, published in late
1919, declared that good films must be able to “hold the attention of the audience between Mary
Pickford and the news weekly.”113 In 1921, the Alexander Film Company openly asserted that
their contracted films were screened “between the comedy and the feature” in most theaters.114
While it is difficult, if not impossible to determine an actual location in the program from
assertions such as this, it is clear that the typical screening model had shifted away from
appending the films to short reels, and towards the screening of a reel of successive
advertisements.115 Rather than encouraging exhibitors to split the films apart, then, complex fade
in and fade out transitions were included, and the reel was intended to be run as a standalone
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component of the program in a space contracted for by the trailer maker.116 In practice, the shift
of the trailer into an intermission was part and parcel with the film industry’s slow transition
away from the ‘transient spectator’ (who would arrive and leave anywhere in the program) to a
scheduled entertainment with a distinct beginning and end point.
Paradoxically, then, the running of all advertisements in a lump at the end of the program
– derided as the ‘slide dodge’ by Ernest Dench as late as 1916 – became the typical practice, as
advertising in most theaters became a form of ‘chaser’ which would help identify when the
program had completed a turn and was about to restart. Whether or not trailer makers were
responding to this shift in screening theory, or were simply adding weight to the transition is
unclear. It is a near certainty that space-brokering arose as a way for trailer producers to
regularize profit by normalizing and guaranteeing circulation. What is not clear is whether the
shift to circulating a reel of trailers was simply expedient, or if it was a response to the dwindling
‘gaps’ in the program caused by the rise of the feature film. If it was the former, then the shift
away from ‘commercial breaks’ was largely a serendipitous historical accident, as the open
spaces were on the verge of disappearance. In any case, by 1916 space-brokering, which had
appeared haphazardly in slide industry display ads over the previous few years, began to
dominate the business of trailer distribution. Building on the 1914 example of the National
Advertising Motion Picture Weekly, Inc., companies began circulating reels rather than
individual trailers, contracting for a specific amount of space in the program – generally at the
rate of about $100 per month.117
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Space-brokering, like trailer production itself, was a local practice before it became a
national one. At times the practice could be remarkably small. The Real Publicity Company had
contracted with only two Kansas City theater by mid-1915 – the Benton and the Royal – to
which they delivered weekly reels containing 12 ads each.118 Typically trailer producers would,
at the very least, attempt to control all theaters in their cities of activity. The Scenic Film
Company controlled seventeen theaters in Atlanta as early as May 1916.119 Nelson Motion
Picture Studios claimed sixty theaters across Detroit in 1918.120 Screen Press, Inc. dominated
Minneapolis and St. Paul by 1919.121 James P. Simpson developed a stranglehold on the state of
Texas by 1920.122 Over 1916 and 1917, a trend is apparent towards multi-state focus in spacebrokering. The Scenic Film Company attempted to expand into Boston and Philadelphia in
1916, in an effort to become an east coast power.123 More notable, however, was Screen
Advertising, Inc., and its chain of contracts with “1000 Better Class Neighborhood Theatres”
east of the Mississippi River. Organized in 1917, and contracting for 200 feet of advertising per
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program in each of their theaters, Screen Advertising Inc. not only offered the selection of precertified theaters, but also a ‘service department’ to help national advertisers contact dealers and
inform them of upcoming ad screenings (thereby presumably eliminating the need to append
dealer information to the trailer itself). On July 5th, Screen Advertising, Inc., claimed the
enormous vote of confidence of the Marcus Loew theaters of New York, which signed on for
their service.124 By 1921, the Alexander Film Company had transitioned from a west coast
company to a national business, and was contracting theaters across the United States for a reel
of between five and ten ad trailers.
In transitioning to space-brokering, then, trailer producers developed a model nearly
identical to early magazine advertising – placing large swaths of pre-contracted advertising in a
bookend position (the closest to an ‘optional’ position that the screen could offer), and stressing
audience selection as the form’s greatest strength. Screen Advertising, Inc., for example, used
detailed knowledge about the clientele of particular theaters to offer advertisers a selection of
audiences. While Screen Advertising, Inc., described all of its theaters as middle class, they
offered to rent space by neighborhood, city, or ‘zone,’ so that the advertiser could feel confident
of reaching his target audience without overpaying for valueless screenings.125 Signing contracts
in advance with the theaters guaranteed placement, allowing advertising film manufacturers to
approach advertisers armed with their list of theaters and allow the advertisers to decide for him
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or herself how many and of what type to use. Exhibitor reluctance was cut off before the film
was even produced, opening up the field to advertisers who had previously avoided film as a
questionable investment which might simply “repose peacefully in [its] can” after it was made.126
The contracting of multiple theaters to a single trailer producing company was likely,
therefore, undertaken in order to make the medium viable for national advertisers – a change
vital for the growth and stability of trailer production. This targeting of national advertisers
allowed for the integration of trailer advertising with the intensifying intermediality of ‘dealer
helps.’ Across the advertising industry, an early theory of convergence was arising in which
advertisers began to believe, or were encouraged to believe, that the most productive advertising
was not to tailor the message to the medium, but to distribute a single recognizable advertisement
through as many media as possible, providing pre-constructed, recognizable advertising, for
dealer’s to circulate in their home towns. By late 1917, Manhattan Slide and Film even turned
the connection into a selling slogan, declaring that “Animated Trailer Films” were “The New
Dealer’s Help,” pushing the novelty of the form in an attempt to maintain profitability in an
economy where the slide appeared to be falling out of favor.127 As such, the new national focus
– tied directly to space-brokering contracts – was driving the trailer industry.
The trailer industry’s adoption of the ‘uniformity’ approach is directly traceable to the
advent of the Advertising Film Producers’ Association in June of 1916. Formed during a
meeting of seven producers at the Associated Advertising Clubs of the World convention in
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Philadelphia – with trailer company representatives elected to all four offices128 – the
Association resulted in a homogeneity of sales rhetoric among trailer producers. W.A. Harris,
president of the Association and head of the Federal Development Company, became the
spokesman for the entire industry, publishing multiple articles on the history and promise of
trailer advertising. In these articles, he asserted that, not only had production quality seen
“marvelous” improvement through the association of producers, but the united front of trailer
makers had resulted in positive streamlining of the business model. For example, the AFPA
claimed responsibility for making film “admissible through the United States mails,” allowing
for the shipment of film “in three days by parcel post,” as opposed to the need for special transit
arrangements.129 The exchange of information among multiple businesses allowed Harris
additionally to make broad cost claims in print, as he could provide a general cost of trailer usage
(seven dollars per film) and a range of costs for weekly screenings (a minimum of one dollar and
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a maximum of five).130 The late-decade predominance of stock film production may also trace to
this association, as trailer producers learned tricks of the trade from their competitors.
The notion that advertising was not medium-specific but required a confluence of
multiple media – the Association’s most important rhetorical move – arose in their first year.
For the AFPA, the idea may have originated with the Scenic Film Company’s Carl B. Rowntree.
In March of 1916, Rowntree, during a presentation at an ice makers’ convention, asked: “how
much greater would be the results if your regular ads were also at the movies”?131 Rowntree was
a prominent early member of the AFPA – acting as their secretary at their inception in June of
1916, and carrying on in the post throughout their first year. By the September 1916 publication
of Advertising by Motion Pictures, Ernest Dench likewise asserted that no medium could go it
alone; each had weaknesses which it needed the others to counter.132 While it is unclear whether
Dench and Rowntree were in communication, were both responding to a wider ad industry shift,
or had independently concocted the same notion of advertising as necessarily intermedial, the
fact remains that the idea was growing, and AFPA members – unlike the reluctant print agencies
– were about to adopt the concept as uniform rhetoric for the adoption of trailer advertising.
By early 1917, the push to unite all advertising mediums into an array of united
advertising was central to W.A. Harris’ public declarations about the value of trailer ads. He
declared that
it has become necessary to take the advertisement as used in magazines and
newspapers…and blend these advertisements into real action so that, when they
are thrown on the screen of the moving picture shows of this country…[they]
strengthen the general publicity campaign of the advertiser.133
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Describing this as “a higher calling to the advertising film industry than ever was anticipated,”
Harris went on to describe an example: the animation of the Dayton Spice Mills (Coffee)
Company’s trademark of a pipe-smoking, fur hat-wearing Dutchman. For Harris and the AFPA,
one of the most important qualities of the trailer was that its running time was perfectly suited to
rendering print advertisements and brand logos, such as the Dutchman, in motion, thereby
integrating cinema into this widening sense of a complete campaign.134
Further evidence for the Association as the source of the rhetorical move comes from the
public statements of Chicago’s industrial film wunderkind Watterson Rothacker. Although his
company dabbled in trailer production – and he even claimed to have been the first company to
make them135 – at this date his interests were in industrial films. It does not seem to be
coincidental that Rothacker, who became a member of the AFPA at some point during its first
year, suddenly began to espouse copy-uniformity as well by the middle of 1917. Indeed, his
presentation at the Associated Advertising Clubs of the World convention was centered on the
ways in which film advertising could cooperate with print: “[i]n order to successfully engineer a
moving-picture advertising campaign it should be co-ordinated with the general advertising and
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selling campaign.”136 Despite the fact that industrial films were significantly longer and required
far less direct advertising than trailers, even Rothacker began to assert the theory of copy-unity.
By the time of World War I, then, AFPA members were targeting national advertisers
with the argument that a campaign without a film recapitulation was missing a central pillar.137
In the wake of wartime advertising – so successful in spreading Creel Committee messages
across multiple media – this early notion of intermedial advertising practice became industry
maxim. With the rise and rampant abuse of the ‘excess profits tax’ (a wartime tax which
compelled goods manufacturers to spend money on advertising rather than lose it to taxes),
media diversification became central to advertising industry practice.
In the shift to reels of trailer-length films, circulated regularly to contracted theaters, and
sometimes containing national advertising messages, the model had largely completed its
development. The years after the war (in this study, 1918 to the early 1922) witnessed little
change to the form other than growth and stabilization, as exhibitors continued to decrease their
use of slides. Former slide manufacturers – like the Manhattan Slide and Film Company (in
1917) and the Brite-Lite Film Advertising Company (in 1918), both from New York – joined the
transition and began to offer animated trailers as a second line of business.138 Leaping into the
fray, auto manufacturer Dodge shifted to the ‘minute movie’ model, also in 1921, producing
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three cartoons which they rented to dealers at the rate of $15 for the three.139 In the years after
the war, the trade presses for various industries clearly indicate the widening adoption of a
relatively stable form.
The point of debate after the war was not the viability of the trailer format, but the mode
of trailer production most suited to advertising. After inaugurating the form with a spectacular
flourish, animation came under direct attack from producers of live action trailers, as they
attempted to elevate trailer advertising to the level of sober, dignified discourse preferred by the
mainstream advertising industry. In an implicit echo of the J. Walter Thompson company’s 1903
claim “[w]e don’t believe in funny advertising” as “the expenditure of money is entirely too
serious…to be made the subject of a joke,”140 H.H. Dewey, of the Rothacker company declared
that “[t]he animated cartoon…would get a laugh at the expense of dignity.” Though he claimed
that cartoon trailers, even “the better grades of them[,]…failed to place the [quality and beauty
of] the merchant’s goods…upon the counter of the silver screen,” Dewey’s examples of his own
work otherwise varied in no noticeable way from the work of others. A short comedy about a
girl turning down a suitor because her current boyfriend buys her ice-cream, and a nostalgic story
about a husband and wife remaining in lifelong bliss through the aid of boxes of chocolates, can,
at best, be said to be more ‘dignified’ than the work of others by stressing romance.141 While
nothing really came of the critique – the dominant company of the 1920s was an animation
house, the Alexander Film Company – such industry infighting indicates that the form itself was
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no longer a bone of serious contention. It had achieved a level of stable integration with
exhibition culture.
By the early 1920s, trailer advertising was common enough that the Alexander Film
Company was reporting bewilderingly high commission rates for salesmen. A “Mr. Morris”
earned $23,757.54 in one year.142 (This would translate to a $275,000 salary in 2012.) Two
other employees, extrapolating from strong sales rates in brief windows (less than a year) of
time, were earning ‘at the rate’ of $10,000 and $40,000 per year in 1920 and 1921
respectively.143 W.A. Rice made $1,117.60 in June of 1924; Jack Woltz make $1,098.35 in his
first 22 days.144 Generally promising commissions as high as 35%, Alexander was clearly
turning a large profit even in its earliest years, and offered a profit-split to its salesmen which
kept the best men interested in selling Alexander trailers.145 In fact, Alexander became so used
to paying massive commissions to traveling salesmen that, by 1925, they began to manufacture
and sell light aircraft to salesmen in order to reduce the costs of their frequent travel.146 The
trailer was so stable throughout the 1920s as a form that Alexander had at least one client – a
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“ladies’ and children’s shop in Green River, Wyo.” – which used Alexander trailer films
unceasingly for eleven years (from 1923-1933).147
The history of cinema advertising after 1920, then, is largely one of entrenchment of the
trailer model – as product placement and industrials were comparatively minor in theatrical
advertising until the 1982 ‘star turn’ of Reese’s Pieces in E.T.: The Extra Terrestrial. By 1922,
then, the commercial trailer was the predominant mode of cinematic advertising, but had –
through a confluence of events – been relegated to a position reminiscent of very early magazine
advertising. For the cinema, the ‘magazine format,’ consisted of multiple small advertisements,
created and placed by a space-broker, and restricted to an advertising section at either the
beginning or the end of the content (depending on if one arrived early or left late, or both). As
such, the cinema had developed a spatially influenced structure in a temporal program, with the
advertising placed in the only position where patrons could regularly ignore it: in a bookend after
the completion of the program.

Why Trailer Advertising?
As with all cinema advertising rhetoric, audience captivity and the ‘receptive mood’
undergird all arguments for the adoption of trailers. However, arising as it did from early claims
about the “defect” of slides (their lack of motion), trailer advertising proponents were forced to
walk a middle line between passive and active audience rhetoric, as trailer makers wanted to
stress both the ‘inherent’ nature of their product and the ‘inherent’ failings of their competitors.
As the goal was profitability, of course, also prominent were the various ways in which trailer
147
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usage could decrease advertising costs, or make appropriations more efficient.148 Detailed
analyses of each of these broad argumentative motifs will be provided in turn in this section.
Clear references to the captivity of the audience, and the exclusivity of attention were, of
course, always the starting point. For most, this required little more than a regurgitation of the
assertion that trailers, like all onscreen cinema advertising, were a “100% medium” – a claim
made by W.A. Harris, Screen Advertising, Inc., and many others.149 The less complex
arguments simply stressed a lack of anything else to view, often tied to exclusivity of advertising
rights, as dual rationalizations for faith in ‘100%’ success. In the words of the trade journal
Clothier and Furnisher, “[c]an you imagine how more ideal conditions could possibly be devised
than to assemble your audience in a darkened theatre, all waiting to see what’s next – and then
flash your story on the screen before their eyes?”150 Proposals for the adoption of screen
advertising almost uniformly described it in this way: one shot, right between the eyes.
Additionally, if the standard screening contract included, as it did with slides, a guarantee that no
competing products would be advertised during the same week, then a guarantee of audience
attention to your product had a corresponding guarantee of inattention to your competitor’s
product.151 This basic argument about screen attention prompted the Alexander Film Company
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to describe trailers as the equivalent of buying “the whole front page” of a magazine – the same
metaphor that the Lee Lash Company had used for lantern slides a decade earlier.152 As such,
every argument for the adoption of trailer advertising included the familiar rhetorical claim that
cinema patrons could not help but see your advertisement, exclusive not only of the surrounding
environs but also the competitive market.
Unlike slides, however, which could only claim ‘captivation’ on the simplistic grounds
that slides were lighted images in a darkened spaces, trailers were sold to advertisers, by
producers and proponents, under the theory that onscreen motion was almost mesmeric,
possessing an appeal unknown anywhere else. Take, for example, the argument for animated
trailers offered by the Scenic Film Company’s Irvin A. Burdette in 1916:
Actions speak louder than words. […] Animated Films are 100% action. The
public is moved by Curiosity; all are wondering what the actions will develop into
next. The minds are receptive and accept your point of view through the ‘art of
suggestion.’ Animated Ads are ‘Direct,’ ‘Main Point’ Evangels of Trade. […]
Cartoon ads create a feeling of personal interest and confidence in you and your
product which must exist between the Buying Public and Successful Sellers. The
same subconscious ‘Good Will’ which the public have in the players.153
Burdette clearly presumes the superiority of the animated trailer because of the ‘magic’ of
animation. The fabricated motion links directly to suggestion, for Burdette, through an almost
involuntary “Curiosity” – of “wondering what the actions will develop into next.” The notion
that all of this was somehow occurring “subconscious[ly]” clearly prefigures trailer proponent
Francis T. Kimball’s 1921 assertion that cinema audiences were “absorbent.”154 AFPA President
W.A. Harris likewise asserted that “action compels attention.”155 (Indeed, note that in all of
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these phrasings, but especially that of Scenic, one can read a connotative slippage between
cinematic ‘action’ and consumer ‘action’ – between a moving [in motion] picture and a moving
[persuasive] one.) The Alexander Film Company persisted in this argumentation over the course
of the 1920s by asserting that human beings were predisposed to attend to motion out of selfdefense: variously using metaphors of predators in the bushes, snakes in boxes, and thieves
throwing bricks through windows.156
Even more compelling is Burdette’s notion that what animation was subconsciously
providing was “Good Will.” It seems that Burdette was referencing, here, the other side of the
appeal coin posited by trailer proponents – not only did they produce quasi-involuntary attention,
they also provided pleasure in an environment where pleasure was expected. What little of the
‘receptive mood’ was not attributed to viewer ‘captivation’ was credited – in a move which
likely alienated trailer makers from mainstream admen – to the appeal of ‘fun.’ Trailer
producers were caught in a rhetorical middle ground, critiquing a form (the lantern slide) via
assertions that the audience was actively voicing its displeasure, while trying to retain the notion
that the audience was happy and receptive. The Rothacker Company’s 1920 claim about the
undignified comic cartoon notwithstanding, trailer producers commonly asserted that pleasurable
delivery went hand in hand with receptivity to an advertising message. Indeed, a second Scenic
Film Company self-advertisement proudly proclaimed that their animated trailers would work
156
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“whether [the audience was] in a receptive mood or not”157 – expressing an almost gleeful
disinterest in the entire theory of picture psychology on the grounds that it was true of animation
in any case. The predominance of comedy in trailer advertising was part of a concrete theory of
audience receptivity, in which the stoic, critical viewer’s defenses were broken down with the
pleasures of laughter. Openly referencing the ‘hissing’ and irritation which could accompany the
slide, trailer producers attempted to both integrate and abandon ‘active audiences,’ by asserting
that the failure of slides had been rectified; slides were unpleasant, and trailers were fun.
As such, perhaps the most common argument in trailer rhetoric was a sense that humor
was the ultimate panacea. The Dra-Ko Film Company declared that animated cartoon trailers
were a form of advertising in which “[f]un predominates.”158 The Alexander Film Company
offered trailers with “Punch and Ginger and usually humor.”159 Trade presses interested in the
form repeatedly asserted that amusement was the way in which one kept the audience docile.160
This attempt to promote fun as a counter to active audiences could result in descriptions
uncomfortably close to outright manipulation; for example, Jonas Howard, in typical fashion,
asserted that Rothacker Company photoplays were “snappy” and had “laugh and a punch,” but
concluded that the style was “calculated to draw the unwary movie goer into a spending
mood.”161 The power of ‘fun’ was even at times promoted by admen who had previously held
the deeply entrenched position that humor and business were best kept separate. Printers’ Ink’s
unidentified ‘Little Schoolmaster’ was forced to declare, in early 1918, that his “poor opinion of
the short, comic moving-picture” ad was incorrect, as “the right kind of a comic goes big, even
157
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with very sedate business men.”162 By 1921, the ethos of pleasure was so ingrained in trailer
theory that Francis T. Kimball described the typical trailer via the euphemism “screen sugarpill,” and included two entire paragraphs likening the pleasure of trailers to the sweet-taste that
convinces children to take medicine.163 The pleasures of comedy, therefore, were central to
arguments about the appeal of trailers which opted not to trade on theories of universal
captivation.
By the end of the period under study, the two arguments – captivation and ‘screen sugar’
– had become a united front, as trailer advertisements, through the aid of humor, were described
like an injection or photographing of information directly onto the brain. The aforementioned
Francis T. Kimball used both metaphors in the space of only two sentences, in 1921, asserting
both that fun resulted in messages being “subtly and…irrevocably injected into the receptivity of
little Willie Audience,” and that trailers resulted in “[t]he dealer’s advertisement get[ting]…
‘fixed’ as surely in the mind of the spectator as it is in the emulsion of the film.”164 The
Monache Theatre Company, Inc., in a 1923 testimonial letter on behalf of the Alexander Film
Company called film advertising “a sort of photographic process registered permanently in the
brain cells of the prospective customer.”165 Even when integrating the critique of slides
(“hissing” for example) into their rhetoric, then, trailer advertisers persisted in describing cinema
viewers’ minds as blank photographic plates which would register whatever message the
advertiser could compel them to see.
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As the potential users of trailer advertising were businessmen, of course, many arguments
were also made around the decidedly more down-to-earth notion of finances, and the ways in
which trailer usage was monetarily sensible. Oddly, it was rare to assert, through concrete data,
that trailer advertising boosted sales. Even vague claims of this nature have only arisen once in
my research – an article on a particular Goodrich Tire ad included a smattering of dealers
declaring that the trailer had “increased my sales at least ten percent” or resulted in the need to
“put on another man” to handle the business boost.166 Again, plausibly indicating that trailer
rhetoric was primarily focused on competition with slides, the bulk of financial argumentation in
the early years was organized around assertions of cheapness, not added sales.
Often, in trade press descriptions, cost-efficiency was simply asserted. Sometimes such
assertions were vague – like Manhattan Slide and Film’s description of trailers being of
“reasonable cost,” or the National Builders’ Bureau’s assertion that cost was “nominal.”167
Other times direct dollar amounts were cited – such as Dench’s claim that trailers were $4 to $5,
or Rothacker’s $12 price – along with a declaration that such a cost was ‘cheap enough for
merchants.’168 Sometimes the same argument was attempted through an inversion. Despite the
500% (or more) increase in cost over slides, trailers were even described as cheaper than slides
in some cases by asserting that one may be able to get theaters to run trailers for less than they’d
charge for slides; as trailers were asserted to provide entertainment exhibitors, it was claimed,
would gladly run them free, as they’d otherwise have to pay for such entertaining parts of the
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program.169 Such attempts were clearly geared towards minimizing the difference between the
cost of slide and trailer adoption.
Towards the early 1920s, as the competition from slides became less pressing, financial
arguments began to focus on print. Detailed numerical claims attempted to show that the cost
per prospect of trailer advertising was actually superior to magazine and newspaper advertising.
Francis T. Kimball laid out a plain numerical comparison, confirming that
the cost of one page in one issue is about three-tenths of a cent a possible
prospect. And the ‘possible’ is used advisedly, because it is far from certain that
every individual in the total circulation is going to get the message.
[…Meanwhile] the trailer costs the manufacturer about six-one-hundredths of a
cent a prospect – and here the ‘possible’ is advisedly omitted, since in a motion
picture theater there is but one attention focus!170
Even if one removed the familiar ‘100% attention’ rhetoric Kimball used to heighten the
comparison, the comparison of ‘circulation’ figures clearly gave motion pictures the edge. In
1921, the Alexander Film Company explicitly compared their yearly contracts to full page ads in
magazines; while the latter cost $75 and only ran once, an advertiser could receive six months of
bi-weekly service on theater screens for only slightly more ($86).171 By 1924, Alexander had
adopted Kimball’s method and declared that film’s cost-per-prospect was “one-tenth to one-fifth
of a cent” – much higher than Kimball’s figure, but still superior to the cost of print
advertising.172
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Often, such financial argumentation was given additional weight through attacks on print
as an outdated form of communication. Anti-reading rhetoric was presaged in a late 1916 article
on trailers in the Clothier and Furnisher, in which the following (probably apocryphal)
conversation between advertising men was reported:
Why does not advertising in the magazines bring the results it used to?” Various
answers were suggested…until finally one man summed it up in a way which left
nothing further to be said. This man’s explanation was in effect as follows: “In
former times the whole family used to sit around the library table in the Winter
time or out on the porch in the Summer and read magazines from cover to cover.
[…] Nowadays, in all stations of life, it’s ‘Let’s go to the movies.’ I tell you we
advertising men have got to go to the movies, too. We’ve got to advertise where
the people are!”173
Fears that the birth of the film medium had resulted in a shift in the advertising values of old
media were encouraged widely by film advertising producers. In 1921, both the National
Builders Bureau (“Break Away from Old-Time Methods”174) and Francis T. Kimball (“the
majority…never read much of anything at all”175) voiced variants of the death knell of reading as
a reason to transition at least a percentage of one’s advertising budget to trailer advertising. As
late as 1927, the Alexander Film Company was still asserting that print was inferior to film as the
former required “the effort of reading” – described as an unreasonable requirement as “[t]he
mind is naturally lazy.”176
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Not surprisingly, these arguments for the cost efficiency of trailers, in between
disparagements of other mediums, also included positive assertions about the quality of the
‘prospects’ in cinema audiences. As mentioned above, Screen Advertising Inc., in an attempt to
elevate the ad industry’s perception of the class reached by its trailer service (and downplay the
fact that the larger urban palaces were still off-limits to advertisers), offered to its customers the
ability to select the theaters from its already selective collection of ‘high class theaters’: which
included “no nickel shows” and therefore reached only “the great middle class – the buying class
– the class that is most responsive to good advertising.”177 Others asserted that film, with its
broad audience base, reached the “representative families” of a community without any further
selective effort on the part of the advertiser or the space-broker: among the typical cinema
crowds were “a splendidly high percentage of just the people Mr. Dealer wants to be known to
and patronized by.”178 The Alexander Film Company went even further. Explicitly attacking
notions that even a minor amount of the film audience was ‘waste circulation,’ Alexander, like
slide makers before them, defended film as a means to reach the lower classes. Attacking the
typical American ad agency’s focus on the affluent, Alexander asserted that, even though a
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person may be the type “that spend[s] nearly all they make,” that did not mean they wouldn’t
“spend some with you” if enticed.179
As such, trailer proponents did some remarkable rhetorical gymnastics, including anticinema arguments only to minimize them as a problem solely for slides. The passive audience
did not naturally exist, but trailers could produce it. Film was admittedly expensive, but was
cheaper per prospect than any other form. The cinema contained a large number of poor
spectators, but cumulatively they were a lucrative market. As such, the trailer proponent’s take
on screen advertising seemed to agree with everything an advertiser had ever heard and yet
produced a positive assertion of value despite the criticism. In short, they made themselves seem
forthright and honest – gracefully accepting critique and then turning it into an advantage.

Why Not?
Unlike slides (chapter three) and offscreen technologies (chapter five), which were both
directly and heavily criticized, one of the most problematic aspects inherent in researching the
rhetoric surrounding advertising trailers is the nearly complete lack of direct critique in the
historical record. Indeed, as was implied above, the bulk of critical argumentation appeared in
historical documents which ultimately supported trailers. Comparatively speaking, there were
very few overt declarations that an advertiser should not adopt trailers as a medium. In fact,
among my research data, it occurred only once: an extremely early (July 1915) tirade against
cartoon trailers by a Chippewa Falls newspaperman whose advertising revenue was slipping.
Admittedly, his two-fold argument was relatively compelling: first he criticized their emptiness
of content, declaring animated letters to be an inconsequential “little frill”; second, and even
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more damning, he argued that trailers would generally be seen at “night when your business is
closed,” rendering memorability an overwhelming (and possibly unanswerable) concern.180 The
latter was a deceptively powerful critique of developing notions of the importance of making an
advertisement ‘sticky’ in a temporally fleeting medium.181 While print may have been an ‘opt
in’ form of advertising, where the reader could choose whether or not to give his attention, it was
also mobile and permanent. Print was a possession, not an experience. As print-centric agencies
continued to dominate the industry, advertisers undoubtedly had (and were encouraged to have)
doubts about the ‘fleeting impression’ given by a medium which the reader could not take
home.182 Unfortunately, while such claims were likely repeated often in verbal exchanges and
may have been a major factor in advertiser reluctance to use the form, they almost never reached
the stage of published argument. Anti-advertising film arguments in the trade press were so
obsessed with industrial films and product placement that trailers barely received a word of
direct condemnation. Whether this lack of open discussion was intentional (snubbing of trailers
by the film trades) or accidental (the focus of trade press reporters was elsewhere – the war,
features, the post-war boom in industrials and non-theatrical screenings, etc.), the result, for the
historical researcher, is the same: any attempt to lay out cultural opposition to trailer advertising
must come from more general concerns over the ‘hijacking’ of the screen.
180

“Do Local Pictures Pay?,” Moving Picture World 25.5 (31 July 1915): 846.
Note, additionally, that the Chippewa Falls newspaperman, like George M. Rittelmeyer before him, asserted here
an inversion of G.R. Lowe’s defense of slides: that certain businesses, like drug stores, could use them specifically
because they were open at the same hours as cinema theaters. There is, therefore, a fascinating but minor debate
occurring in this era about the relative merits of tailoring temporal advertising to store-hours versus simply making it
‘sticky.’ George M. Rittelmeyer, “Slide Advertising,” Moving Picture World 13 September 1913: 1178; and G.R.
Lowe, “Slide Advertising for the Retail Druggist,” American Druggist and Pharmaceutical Record April 1914: 44.
182
It is unfortunately outside the scope of this project to expand the research into the early growth of temporally
delimited advertising outside of the cinema. American billboarding, for example, was dealing with the development
of an ‘aesthetics of speed’ at this time, as automotive transit grew. Similarly, electronic billboards in cities –
particularly the work of Oscar Gude in New York – began transitioning to temporal sequencing through
electronically controlled lights, in a variant of the motion picture model. As such, the cinema was one element of a
larger cultural turn to temporal awareness in advertising. Catherine Gudis, Buyways: Billboards, Automobiles, and
the American Landscape (New York and London: Routledge, 2004), 66-70; and Darcy Tell, Times Square
Spectacular: Lighting Up Broadway (New York: Smithsonian Books, 2007), 34-46.
181

204
Much reticence regarding the use of trailer advertising was likely a holdover from
exhibitor-centered arguments. Regardless of whether or not exhibition culture openly admitted –
via self-promotion and wartime advertising – that the screen was indeed an excellent means of
reaching the public, the perception that exhibition culture remained hesitant about commercial
intrusion into theaters would have kept a rein on advertiser excitement. Remember that as early
as 1909, Moving Picture World was already asserting that slide advertising “tend[ed] to lower
the dignity of the moving picture theater.”183 This assertion remained prominent in film
advertising discussions beyond slides. The Motion Picture Patents Company went so far as to
ban the circulation of advertising films in their theaters, on the grounds that their inclusion
“would inevitably and rapidly degrade the business” by chasing away patrons.184 As late as
1931, an advertiser with film experience still asserted “[t]he screen…is dedicated to the duty of
entertaining those who pay their admission at the box office. Therefore it can offer nothing but
entertainment if it is to keep faith with the public.”185 Even when the exhibitor was not criticized
for the ‘hijacking’ of the screen, per se, the notion of quantity could become a problem, as it had
been with slides. New Orleans film journalist George M. Cheney was scathing in his indictment
of New Orleans theaters, in mid-1916, for simply transferring bad slide practices into the realm
of animated advertising films. Cheney asserted that “there are exhibitors who are running it into
the ground as they did the still slides” by running such ads for “ten to twenty minutes” – the
length of a full reel – and using films for consecutive days, rendering them repetitious and
“exceedingly boresome to an audience used to a daily change.”186 The notion that screen
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advertising, either by its nature or by excessive quantity, was an act of ‘bad faith’ clearly
remained a primary factor in exhibitor thinking throughout the silent era, even in the realm of the
tiny trailer advertisement.
However, one cannot forget that this critique was discordant. At the very same time that
exhibitors were told to steer clear of advertising, and often even in the very same breath, they
were being told to make sure that advertising was paid. Almost any critique included in
implication that the ‘defenders of the public’ were for sale – that there was a price for their
complicity. In banning advertising films from its theaters, the Patents Company did not just call
them degrading; they also asserted that exhibitors should have been earning royalties rather than
paying for the films.187 Complaints about product placement criticized the practice largely on
the grounds that “[i]t is not fair…to try to force the exhibitors to run advertising films free.”188
As such, the rhetoric against exhibition was as much an argument for profit as it was against
advertising, and it is understandable, therefore, that both exhibitors and advertisers would have
held inconsistent and even confused views on the subject. In such a milieu, trailers would have
been the easiest form to ‘sell’; they were brief (like slides), openly offered to pay (unlike product
placement), and yet provided motion (unlike slides) and even entertainment value (unlike most
industrial films). The trailer, then, was likely the least susceptible to struggle from entrenched
exhibitor reluctance.
With such weak opposition, it may seem like a wonder that trailer advertising didn’t
instantly lurch into ubiquity in all theaters nationwide. Perhaps the single largest problem for
trailers was not the content of such critiques but the response to them by trailer salesmen. At
least one company – the Alexander Film Company – recommended, in their training manual for
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salesmen, a delicate response to criticism in which the salesman was never to disagree with a
critique of the screen as a site. Instead of disagreement, the salesman was to overwhelm the
critique with a large number of unrelated positive claims. See, for example, the following
sample response: if the prospect says ‘onscreen ads make people angry,’ the salesman should
respond “[t]hat is good evidence…that they see the ad, otherwise it would not make them
mad.”189 While this massaging of the advertiser’s ego was likely a very successful approach to
sales, it encouraged erroneous preconceptions about film advertising in the name of boosting
Alexander’s bottom line. In this particular exchange the salesman was to avoid the very
persuasive rhetoric about the powers of both animation and comedy, and admit that onscreen
advertising angered patrons. (No advice was offered for the obvious follow up question: what
keeps an angry audience from forming ‘ill will’ rather than ‘good will’ towards the product?190)
In the same training manual, Alexander also encouraged salesmen to “stay as far away from
advertising agencies as possible.”191 While there are numerous likely reasons for this
encouragement, in the short run it closed the door to perhaps the greatest avenue for growth.
Agencies were the most powerful pro-advertising community in the country; to win their favor,
though it would have been difficult, could only have been an asset for the trailer industry at
large.
Alexander, then, not only held back from defending trailers, the company even implicitly
attacked its own medium in the name of ascending to the top of the industry. The limited
critiques of the form in public discourse were, therefore, likely exacerbated by the sales behavior
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of trailer makers. As such, the greatest strength of trailer rhetoric was also its greatest weakness.
The ‘honesty’ of admitting to criticisms did not just defuse them, but kept the criticisms in the
public consciousness; it kept discussion positive, but growth slow.

Case Study - The Alexander Film Company and the ‘High Class’ Trailer
Opened for business by brothers J. Don and Don M. Alexander, in Spokane, Washington,
in January 1919, the Alexander Film Company – which moved to Colorado for a “more
geographically central location” in 1923192 – represents the culmination of the cinematic trailer
advertisement. Its growth between 1919 and 1923 was meteoric.193 According to internal
figures, business increased roughly 1000% over these first five years.194 By 1923, the company
was already circulating trailers regularly in forty-two states, and had approximately 150
employees.195 By the end of the 1920s, they were circulating trailers to 2,400 theaters and were
receiving over 60% of the trailer business in the United States.196 By the middle of the 20th
century, Alexander’s circulation had swelled to include 16,000 theaters.197
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Alexander was not just a dominant company, however. It aided in the growth of the form
by taking a leading role in the development of national standards in the trailer community – the
very role the AFPA had hoped to serve in 1916. By the end of the 1920s, the national reach of
agency created radio advertising had thrown into sharp relief the major problem with cinema
trailer circulation: there was no simple way to show a single trailer in all available theaters. Such
a screening plan would have required days of contractual negotiations with a multitude of trailer
companies. Alexander helped to restructure the trailer producing community to meet the
demands of national advertisers. In 1929, in negotiating a contract for national advertising with
Chevrolet, Alexander was instrumental in creating the National Film Advertising Bureau:
allowing simultaneous access to the space-brokering contracts of multiple companies. The
Bureau made it easy for national advertisers to place advertising, with one purchase, in over
5000 theaters across the country – a uniformity of distribution which had been lacking in cinema
advertising since the beginning. As Alexander was by far the dominant partner (controlling over
half the available theaters), this effectively opened up even non-Alexander theaters to Alexander
service.198 By 1938, ad industry powerhouse the J. Walter Thompson Company singled out
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Alexander’s “library service” of stock trailers as the paragon of the form.199 The work of the
Alexander Film Company represents the perfection of the stock animated trailer.
In many ways, Alexander looked like any other trailer producer. Their theory of cinema
spectatorship invoked the common ‘captive audience’ and ‘receptive mood’ concepts, and
described the effects of film advertising as both “a photographic process registered permanently
in the brain cells” and, likened advertising to the chiseling of cavemen “carv[ing] creases in the
memories of…prospects with pictures.”200 The form of Alexander trailers was also in-line with
previous standards: running roughly one minute, stressing humor, with the final 25% of the
running time devoted to the dealer name, which maintained interest through motion and font
choice.201 Alexander, then, is indicative of the standards that had developed in the field before
the company was born.
What stands out about Alexander is the ways in which they streamlined their product and
their business model in order to achieve dominance both in local and national advertising.
Alexander’s strengths were two-fold. First, it provided extremely polished trailers, focusing
more on subtle pleasurable effects than early animators’ focus on spectacularity. Second, as a
business, the company operated, simply and efficiently, almost everywhere in the country
simultaneously, using complex information systems, modern transportation, and wide-ranging
contracts to please both locally and nationally focused advertisers.
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At the risk of implying that business success is a meritocracy, any discussion of
Alexander’s success must begin with a discussion of the polish which the company brought to its
trailer work. General high quality production elements are apparent, including filming in
negative (in order to retain “half tones and fine details”) and repairing or retiring prints before
damage became visible in projection.202 These choices indicate a company concerned with a
high-class image – both for its clients and itself. More important, however, was the company’s
desire to stress leisure and pleasure even in the high-pressure style of direct advertising.
Focusing on viewer pleasure as much as copy ‘punch,’ Alexander developed a more leisurely
pace for the merchant’s ‘business card’ at the end of the trailer, a highly restricted notion of word
use, fade transitions for consecutive advertisements, and a mood-based theory of color usage.
Each idea was clearly laid out as business policy in the company’s November 1921 handbook for
its traveling salesmen.
Their sense of written content was perhaps the most obvious difference between an
Alexander ad and a trailer from another company. While they followed the standard industry
maxim of 3/4 of a foot per word as a reading pace, Alexander mandated fifteen feet for a ten
word dealer strip, with an extra foot per word thereafter. As the bulk of trailer producers allowed
only ten feet for the dealer strip, Alexander was allowing for significantly more leisurely reading
even at maximum word counts.203 The company went further, however. By early 1925, Don M.
Alexander penned an article for the company’s house organ, the Alexander Cooperator, in which
he asserted that four words should be the target, as short copy was “dignified” and brevity was
not only “the soul of wit…[but] the soul of advertising.” Offering three examples (“Chesterfield
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Cigarettes – They Satisfy”; “Ivory Soap – It Floats”; and Alexander’s own “J.B. Gilmore – The
Jeweler”), Don M. asserted in the strongest possible terms that limited copy was the best copy in
the medium of trailer advertising.204 Stress-free reading at a leisurely pace was, therefore, one of
the primary ways in which the Alexander Film Company conceived of trailer advertising.
As the literal ‘trailer’ had, prior to 1919, given way to a reel of consecutively-screened
‘trailer-length’ advertisements, Alexander also took pains (and running time) to keep transitions
from jarring the spectator during the projection of the advertising reel. As their contracted
theaters would run “[f]rom 5 to 10” trailers in a row, Alexander made sure that the exhortations
had room to breathe. They not only used fade-ins and fade-outs to comfortably ease the
spectators into and out of an advertisement, they added “a couple of seconds” of solid black
footage in between, extending any given reel by ten to twenty seconds rather than fostering
irritation through abrasive jumps from trailer to trailer.
Their use of color overtly combined this sense of viewer comfort with theories of
impressionistic copy. Declaring that green was a good color for a picnic “not only to show that
the grass is green but to utilize the restful effect of green as a color,” Alexander was deeply
concerned with the control of the spectator’s mood. Simple color-wheel concepts – like red for
excitement and blue for cold – were foundational for Alexander productions. In addition,
however, the company would use color tinting to polish and perfect the display of products. In
one telling example, sepia toning was proposed for bread advertising, as it would give the crust a
pleasing and realistic brown color while leaving the loaf “a little more white and pure than any
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loaf of bread could ever be.”205 As such, Alexander’s conception of not-irritating the spectator
with an avalanche of words or a jarring transition, and their use of color for both pleasure and
product-gloss, were all designed to create a subtle and overwhelming minute of advertising – an
advertising environment in which every element of the trailer registered the dignity, comfort, and
perfection of the product for sale, regardless of whether the copy was humorous or serious. 206
The willingness of the Alexander Film Company to spare no expense to get the mood
correct was apparent in their inauguration of weekly screen tests for new work. Before any
trailer would be shipped out for theatrical usage, it needed to receive a positive verdict from the
“super-critical audience” of Alexander employees who would meet in the company screening
room, every Wednesday, at the end of the working day. If a positive response could not be
attained through editing out or replacing elements of the footage, an entire film would be
“throw[n]…in the junk pile.”207 Although the notion of a preview screening was not new in the
film industry by this time – the Motion Picture Patents Company and the Mutual Film
Corporation had experimented with it as early as 1909 and 1914 respectively208 – the existence
of the practice at Alexander is another mark of the care which they took in sending out only that
work of which they were quite proud.
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The consistently high-quality of production was designed to appeal to any potential
client, no matter how large their advertising appropriation. For Alexander, the goal was always
to produce the highest quality trailers on the market. This allowed the company to produce a
form which was priced for local merchants and yet appealed to national advertisers. Contracting
with theater chains and national brands as often as possible, demanding six-month or one-year
contracts in any case, maintaining detailed records for trailer circulation, and even pioneering the
use of private aircraft for its sales force, Alexander created a business model which was
amenable to both the largest and the smallest possible contracts, allowing for both windfall
profits and the steady accumulation of small sales.
In contracting with theaters, the company allowed for the exhibitor’s own sense of worth
to dictate the value of the space. Although their generic sales pitch was to suggest that theaters
“may average $100.00 or more per month” from screen advertising, significantly larger contracts
were signed. Two theaters in Billings, Montant (the Regent and the Strand) were charging $20
per month per advertiser, in 1920, and were offering to carry between seven and ten ads at any
one time.209 A ‘full’ contract at either theater could have resulted in twice the ‘average’ profit.
In 1921, large west coast theaters were receiving “as much as $150 per month from each
advertiser or about $20,000 per year for a full screen.”210 This represents a rate approximately
fifteen times greater than the standard $100 per month offer. While these theaters were certainly
outliers – especially the west coast contract – they are indicative of the fact that Alexander, as a
space broker, was willing and able to pay fantastically high rates for desirable theaters. The goal
was always to increase the available space, regardless of price variation. California’s T&D
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circuit, various state exhibitor associations, and even the Fox theaters across the Midwest all
signed contracts for Alexander service at one point.211 For the most part, the theaters needed do
no more than screen and return the reels and cash checks; Alexander would solicit all business,
negotiate all contracts, and send the pre-constructed reels each week. Aside from the potential
continuation of audience disapproval, it is obvious why exhibitors would have appreciated the
Alexander model; it was effectively an agreement to listen to a small number of patron
complaints in exchange for $1000 or more per year.
Contracts with advertisers were equally open to negotiation. In exchange for the
guarantee of several months’ worth of income, Alexander gave their salesmen the right to haggle
over the cost of service. The sales manual only listed “Minimum Prices of Playlet Service”
under which there would be no profit for the company; anything above the minimum was up to
the skill of the salesman.212 For example, the minimum cost for a year of bi-weekly service was
$10 per week with $20 for the dealer strip.213 However, an archived contract from 1923
indicates that the salesman, while contracting service at the minimum rate of $10 per month,
talked the advertiser into paying $50 for the dealer strip.214 The target for salesmen was,
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therefore, not a dollar amount, but the signing of one contract per day at whatever rate they could
achieve.215 (Perhaps this hazy pricing structure is the reason why Alexander discouraged its
salesmen from dealing with advertising agencies; larger average profits were likely when each
individual contract was negotiated with no knowledge of what others were paying for the same
service.) In their six-months or one-year contracts, merchants would select their preferred
advertisements by looking through a catalog and choosing the numbered ads which appealed to
them. Alexander data tracking would double check that none of these trailers had screened in
that particular town before, as the company had a standing rule that “the same animation [would]
not appear twice in the same town.”216 The advertiser would also select whether they wanted a
weekly or bi-weekly change, so that any given advertisement would not get stale. In all other
ways, Alexander operated like any trailer advertising company, offering exclusivity (no ads for
competing products in the same program) and regular screening checkup.
Thus able to suck up as many dollars as local merchants were willing to pay to get on
their local screens, Alexander provided itself with a business model which could turn a profit on
an aggregate of extremely small contracts. Large contracts, in contrast, would provide
occasional massive boosts to the cash flow. In 1920, for example, Alexander signed a contract to
produce a custom series of thirteen films (the equivalent of six-months of bi-weekly service) for
the National Builder’s Bureau. Alexander contracted for 100 prints – which the National
Builders Bureau was responsible for circulating to dealers – at a price of between three and four
thousand dollars. By January of 1921, 89 dealers had signed on, plausibly guaranteeing
Alexander additional profit from the creation of dealer strips to match the 100 prints for each
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trailer advertisement.217 While such national campaigns were undoubtedly a minority of
Alexander’s product, they were actively sought.
The result of the business model was a bewilderingly large output. While data does not
exist for the years before 1924, and an average likely skews the number upwards in early years,
Alexander produced 8,771 different trailer advertisements between 1924 and 1931 – an average
of just over 90 per month.218 That is not the number of rentals – it represents only the number of
newly produced playlets which could then start generating a profit through years of national
circulation. As such, Alexander’s business model was clearly resulting in massive cash flow.
Substantial quantities of trailers were produced regularly over the course of a dozen years, and
the company would remain in business deep into the television era.
Perhaps the most important element of Alexander’s business model – certainly the most
intriguing – is the fact that, in 1925, they began manufacturing and selling airplanes to their
salesmen. As “[b]ad roads and poor train schedules used up lots of time” in non-productive
travel, in the early 20th century, Alexander gambled that its best salesmen would leap at the
chance to cheaply purchase an airplane to simultaneously expand their zone of influence while
reducing the cost of travel to established areas.219 Selling what they named the ‘Eaglerock,’ a
two-seat plane, for $2475 to salesmen (who were making roughly $10,000 per year in
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commissions),220 provided Alexander with a second revenue stream and allowed them to profit
further from the greater reach of their best salesmen. Thirty salesmen had ordered planes before
a single aircraft left the assembly line.221 Alexander’s already broad national reach expanded
even further.
In this assembly of a national distribution and sales system for a fundamentally local
advertising medium, the Alexander Film Company became (and remained) the largest company
in the field. Using economies of scale to simultaneously increase quality and minimize costs,
Alexander perfected the stock trailer, opened itself up to income from custom trailers, and
maintained strong working relationships with all involved parties: from small town toy stores to
major goods manufacturers; from mom-and-pop theaters in small Midwestern towns, to multistate chains in the densely populated coasts. The Alexander Film Company nationalized the
stable but stagnant trailer industry, and dominated output for the next several decades.

Conclusion
The introduction and standardization of trailer advertising, over the latter half of the
1910s, is emblematic of the rapidly codifying theory of advertising in moving media. The form
was a specifically cinematic one in its aesthetics and tone, as pleasurable and humorous content
was used to create direct advertising without overtly rational argumentation. Tied to the national
shift away from ‘reason why’ advertising and towards modern electric hyperactivity, trailer ads
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were emotional more often than cerebral, mobile rather than stable, and so pleasing as to be a
form of entertainment in themselves. As such, the sense that advertising must not only occur
onscreen, but be made as a motion picture, normalized, as the notion of the passive audience (or
pacified audience, as animation proponents would have it) led advertisers to obsess over
onscreen placement of advertising, to the exclusion of the rest of the venue. A ‘captive
audience’ receiving pleasurable commercial stimulation led to the perfection of the slide in the
trailer form. As an industry grew around this form of production, it developed cost effective
methods for producing spectacularly brief and kinetic images of dancing products and jumbling
copy, producing the model for broadcasting and the online video spot of the future.
However, the nearly simultaneous increase in film length, and the corresponding decrease
in ‘gaps’ in the program, forced this impressive form into a minor role at the intermission
between turns of the program. Cultural discomfort with integrating advertising into the first
‘temporal’ entertainment medium, pushed the advertising into the closest approximation possible
of print advertising’s ‘spatial’ organization: the pre-/post-program buffer zone. As such, the
commercial ‘spot’ – effectively a form of ‘participating sponsorship’ funding local exhibitors
rather than national entertainment producers – was born and streamlined predominantly in
motion picture theaters of the latter half of the 1910s. In their eventual onscreen but marginal
position (in the intermission), the cinema ‘playlet’ helped to define the motion picture experience
– including the establishment of a time-based entry model, and reifying the idea that
commercialism was an outsider to the cinema, to be inserted only in clearly labeled and
unobtrusive areas. Early experiments in commercial broadcasting kept this ‘playlet’ form at the
margins for decades. With early broadcasting’s focus on the big network programs, and
broadcast historians’ traditional (and justifiable) focus on the same, the long but marginal history
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of the pre-broadcasting ‘spot’ has remained on the sidelines.222 By the time the ‘minute movie’
attained a place of prominence in 1950s television, its origin in the cinema went largely
unremarked.
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CHAPTER 5. WATCH THIS SPACE: PERIPHERAL ADVERTISING THROUGH
TECHNOLOGIES

You Must Invest Thousands to Make the Front of the Chair a Profit
Producer; You Need Invest a Few Hundred to Make the Back of the
Chair Bring you in as Great, if Not Greater Profits.
- Inter-state Vending Company (1914)1

In August of 1915, regular Moving Picture World columnist Epes Winthrop Sargent –
resident expert on publicity for exhibitors – felt moved to disagree with a letter from an exhibitor
defending the practice of onscreen advertising. Sargent’s response was largely identical in
theory to the bulk of published opposition to screen advertising – citing the difference between
the optionality of most advertising and that which is forced upon the patron through inclusion on
the cinema screen. His choice of counter example, however, was unique and raises the specter of
an obvious alternative to onscreen advertising which has, as yet, gone unmentioned in the body
of this study. Opting to compare the cinema not to magazines but to the stage theater, Sargent
declared that
[t]he screen advertisement is not the same as the advertisement on the wall. It is
thrust upon the patron. He must read it whether he wishes to or not. […] He
comes in to see pictures and not the advertisement of Smith’s skin cure or Jones’
grape juice. He resents being compelled to read the stuff and he resents the
interruption to the performance. […] A manager, if he wishes, may plaster his
walls with advertisements and fill up his program with them until it becomes
valueless to himself or anyone else, but the screen is his stage. He should not
permit the advertising slide any more than a dramatic theater should permit a
sandwich man to walk on and spoil the realism of a performance.2
1

Two-Page Display Ad, Motography 11.9 (2 May 1914): 30-31. Though this advertisement was for an automated
candy machine installed on chair backs, and therefore was technically not part of the movement for consumer goods
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it took to perfect the appeals of the screen, is the same as those advocating ad placement in the margins.
2
Epes Winthrop Sargent, “Advertising for Exhibitors: Advertising Slides,” Moving Picture World 25.6 (7 August
1915): 987.
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For Sargent to compare the advertising slide to a sandwich board on a theater stage is in and of
itself interesting for multiple reasons – not least of which is the conundrum of whether this
would be ‘compulsory’ or more like product placement, and why exactly sandwich men
advertising real world products did not qualify, in Sargent’s mind, as ‘realism.’ More important
for the present discussion, however, is his telling revelation of the specific spatial relations of the
theater. The screen was, indeed, not the same as the wall…but they did reach the same crowd.
Sargent’s response, though it gives no space to actual examples of such practices, is an
indicator of the fault lines in consumer goods advertising in silent era theaters. Debate over the
ways and means of in-cinema consumer goods advertising did not restrict themselves to the
screen. As such, the slide crisis of roughly 1913 (see chapter three) added impetus to not one but
two forms of counter-theorizing. The more common response to slides was that they irritated the
audience by being disjunctive, resulting in the invention of the consumer goods trailer to
approximate a ‘moving’ slide (see chapter four). A minority of advertising proponents and
exhibitors, however, stressed not the lack of motion in slides, but their unavoidable hijacking of
the screen. In order to retain the profit from sales of advertising, but move advertising slides off
the screen, a proliferation of technology patents appeared, designed to create alternative
advertising sites somewhere within the cinema venue.
Abandoning the ‘psychic infection’ theory of cinema spectatorship altogether (see
chapter two), peripheral advertising proponents reconceived the theater as a site of active
audiences. This contingent of advertising thinkers was operating in line with previous, venue
based types of advertising (like billposting and magazines), in which the advertisements were
included alongside the entertainment, to be perused or ignored at the viewer’s discretion. These
advertising proponents argued for a stress on optionality rather than temporality – using the
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cinema’s status as not just medium but venue – as a way around the problem of irritation from
compulsory attention. In theatrical performance, this mode of advertising was not without
precedent. Although advertising on the drop curtain between the acts was the most common
form of stage advertising, border drapes often included advertising signs as well, visible
throughout the performance.3 Even in motion picture venues, the idea had a track record.
Airdomes – open air ‘theaters’ designed to provide a less stifling experience in summers, in
which a vacant lot with a screen at one end was enclosed with a fence – were often funded
through the selling of space on the fences, both outside and inside the ‘theater,’ for advertising
purposes.4 Even the printing of advertising matter on handbills could be seen as a precursor of
this peripheral advertising practice, in which optional viewing theoretically defused audience
irritation.
Acting on the notion that advertising worked best when it was “visible at all times
without interfering in the least with the…motion picture,”5 cinema oriented tinkerers devised a
mass of offscreen technologies designed, between 1912 and 1927, to include advertising
somewhere other than the main screen of a movie theater. Designed specifically to blend into
3

New York’s Turner Company even encouraged early film theater operators to adopt these advertising curtains by
offering them free, presuming that the advertising income would, in short order, pay for the cost of the curtains
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4
A correspondent to the Moving Picture World noted that “[m]ost of the airdomes we have noticed up to the present
time look more like billboards than they do like theatres. It seems to be the fashion to reserve a small section of the
enclosure for an entrance and turn the remainder over to the bill-poster and sign-painter, who decorate it in their
usual crazy-quilt fashion...inside and outside.” The author of this article derided the practice for its lack of aesthetic
appeal – a critique which, as we shall see, was persistent for all offscreen advertising. “The Airdome Season,”
Moving Picture World 8.17 (29 April 1911): 934. A later article by regular World columnist Epes Winthrop Sargent
asserted that the use of airdome space for advertising was acceptable, provided “the space nearest the entrance
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“Advertising for Exhibitors: Plenty of Poster Space,” Moving Picture World 16.10 (7 June 1913): 1022.
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modern American cinema spaces, the bulk of patents were created with electricity and drew the
eye towards lighted objects in a darkened space. Much like William Leach’s description of the
rise of modern department store displays featuring glass, light, and spectacle to link consumption
and the technological future,6 theater tech was a flashy window onto a world of consumption,
bringing consumer-goods into the theater much as display windows brought them onto the
streets. These concepts ranged from stacks of glowing advertisements flanking the screen, to
seat back advertising, to complex advertising clocks.7
As this chapter synthesizes the similarities between disparate ‘media,’ it will be
structured somewhat differently from previous chapters. There will be no clear historical
progression section, as there is none to be told; many of these technologies were, at best, adopted
sporadically, and as such there is little evidence for a coherent developmental pattern for an
‘offscreen advertising’ industry. Instead, the primary material will be separated into three blocs
– ‘frame’ technologies, ‘public service’ technologies, and advertising clocks (a line-crossing
technology blending frame and public service elements). Each block will contain its own
rhetorical analysis, leading into a synthesizing analysis at the end of the chapter.

6

See chapter two of William Leach, Land of Desire: Merchants, Power, and the Rise of a New American Culture
(New York: Vintage Books, 1993).
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Early cinema analyst Siegfried Kracauer would likely have seen this differently: as an element of heightened
consumer manipulation, rather than admission that viewers were critical. Kracauer argued, in an essay published in
1926, that the opulence of palatial theaters added to an atmosphere of distraction which, rather than allowing for
viewer choice, overwhelmed the viewer with imagery thereby shutting down critical faculties. For Kracauer, “[t]he
stimulations of the senses succeed each other with such rapidity that there is no room left for even the slightest
contemplation to squeeze in between them.” However, there is no evidence in the descriptions cited throughout the
rest of this chapter that American advertisers and advertising technology inventors were thinking this way.
American advertising thinkers were not (overtly) attempting to subvert critical faculties through offscreen
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Rethinking the Theater and Its Relationship to Advertising
By the mid-1910s, though filmed advertising was still developing, the positives and
negatives of lantern slide advertising seemed relatively clear to most film men. They provided a
small amount of income which could be inflated further by trading in monopoly contracts and
keeping the total number of ads small, but they annoyed patrons and, if inserted into the program
in larger quantities, cut the amount of time that could be devoted to running films. From the
advertisers’ perspective, onscreen advertising was also problematically impermanent – or, as it
would be termed in later critiques of radio, ‘fleeting’8 – and required extremely memorable copy
in order to make a lasting impression in the few seconds that the audience could see it. For those
exhibitors who did not mind the intrusion of advertising into their theater, but wanted to avoid
the issues of impermanence and irritation that came with placement onscreen, several inventors
concocted technologies which allowed an entire collection of advertisements to crowd around the
theater without landing on the screen itself. Allowing for most slide conditions to persist –
roughly a dozen ads, contracted space, ease and cheapness of replacement – but moving the ads
off of the screen was a possibility requiring only a reevaluation of the motion picture theater as a
venue.
In this light, the theater was reconsidered not as a single ‘window’ through which one
viewed an unceasing flow of images, but as a venue capable of a multiplicity of entertainments
and distractions. As such, the theater, for these men, was more like travel down a busy street or
like a precursor of broadcasting’s multiple channels. Road travel, either on foot or by car, was
coming more and more to be defined by an atmosphere of multiplicity. Billboards were
springing up with greater and greater frequency as distractions breaking into a journey to which
8
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they were otherwise unrelated. In the commercial districts, more and more eye catching window
displays disrupted a stroll down the sidewalk in an attempt to draw attention away from the
perceived goal of the walker. Reconceiving the cinema experience as a metaphor for travel, the
advertising literally became theatrical billboards – marginalia littering the environment in an
attempt to turn one’s thoughts from the goal to a sales pitch.

Frames
The simplest means of retaining all cinema advertising theory and practice, but
repackaging it as a form of ‘billboard,’ was a concept which I would term the advertising
‘frame’: a collection of inventions which shared a single goal – the creation of an array of lighted
advertising signs placed around the central film image. The concept of the frame arose, like all
of these technologies, as a direct response to the slide crisis and the audience’s growing desire to
get slides off the screen. Indeed, in the middle of 1912, as the slide industry was suffering
through the low ebb of its public image, the operator of the New Isis Theater in Denver first
proposed the frame concept. The man, unnamed in the publication of his letter, declared his
desire to use a slide projector – presumably showing a single slide with a large blank space in the
middle for the motion picture – to create “a border around the picture, announcing the big
features.” While he was proposing ‘coming attractions’ content rather than consumer goods
advertising, this Denver man produced the first clear historical example of the concept of
framing the film screen with advertising matter. The response by Moving Picture World
exhibition specialist F.H. Richardson was, in keeping with his loathing of all forms of in-cinema
advertising, “I do not believe I would like that very well.”9 This ‘call and response’ between a
technologically inflected advertising concept and Richardson’s dislike of ‘distracting’
9
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advertising matter in the vicinity of the screen, would be the hallmark of frame technology
throughout the 1910s, as new technologies were patented, built and used…and irritated
Richardson to no end whenever he encountered them.
At least four versions of the frame concept were filed for patent in the United States
between 1915 and 1920, although it is probable that many other versions were sold and installed
without patent protection. New Yorker Frank C. Thomas was, to my knowledge, first on the
scene with a patented design specifically for this purpose, filing his ‘light diffusing’ array for
patent in 1915 – a patent which he then “assigned” to the United Exhibitors’ Advertising
Corporation of Wilmington, Delaware, for production and sale. Diffusion of light is
technological shorthand for completely shielding a light source from view and reflecting it back
into the room off of a surface, resulting in a ‘softer’ form of light. Thomas used the notion of
diffusion to create what he considered to be unobtrusive advertising, as it provided “a sufficient
but not a brilliant” lighting of advertising signs to make them visible without making them a
distraction. He suggested, in his patent, the placement of a stack of light diffusers on each side
of the screen which would produce two towers, with a quantity of slots “adjusted to the needs of
the advertisers” interested in the theater – in the patent, the presumed standard number of slots
was eight per side.10
Harry Verran and Alfred R. Groetz, of Minneapolis, patented a concept effectively
identical to Thomas’ in 1919, with the same strengths and weaknesses. Using light box
technology rather than diffusion – in which a light bulb was placed directly behind a sign, with
the light passing through cut out letters – Verran and Groetz attempted to streamline the
10
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rhetorical appeal of the concept by directly linking it to the slide model of advertising. They
adopted the term ‘slide’ for their own light box slots, on the grounds that these too were ad
images held between two plates of glass. Though Verran & Groetz proposed ten slots per side of
the screen as their standard size, inexplicably calling this size ‘preferabl[e],’ their system, like
Thomas’, also allowed for variation to meet the needs of a given theater. Although the cost of
materials would have been greater, in all important respects the design of Verran & Groetz
differed in no way from Thomas’. It was a cheap (the advertiser could simply “cut [letters] out
of a sheet of opaque paper”) means to retain advertising while moving it off the screen.11
Silent era director T. Hayes Hunter – working in Hollywood by the date of his invention
– filed for patent a third variation on the theme. In Hunter’s patent, which was geared
(predictably) towards production companies rather than exhibitors, he proposed a new means of
printing films which would mask part of the image and create a space for advertising on the
edges of the screen. Designed to produce a permanent iris, Hunter’s concept was to print the
film with an oval mask which would have kept the four corners of the negative from registering
on the positive print. Running the film through the printer a second time, one could then append
“a still picture or scene in the border or corner of the motion picture, which w[ould] persist
unchanged in the vision of the spectators…without breaking into the thread of the drama,” as in
product placement or in unrelated advertising slides between the reels. The result would have
been an oval shaped entertainment film with from one to four advertising messages perpetually
hanging from the corners. Hunter effectively created the earliest version of what we now know
as the television advertising ‘bug’ (with his direct mention of “still picture[s]” implying that
11
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moving corner ads were a plausible variant). Hunter had the much broader intention of not only
replacing slides as an advertising medium, but also amplifying the quality of sponsorship
advertising (by producing “a much more lasting impression” than a brief opening title
announcement), and improving product placement (by removing the need for direct connection
to the narrative).12 Its problems were two fold, however. Firstly, it was a producer oriented
technique; as film prints circulated to multiple theaters, it was the producer, not the exhibitor,
who would have been signing advertising contracts and (presumably) retaining the dollars.
Hunter’s technique, therefore, did nothing to defuse exhibitor hostility toward advertising on
their screens for which they were not being paid. Secondly, the advertisements were permanent;
once an ad was printed into the corners of the film, that print could never be changed. As such, it
was likely a much more expensive form of advertising, as the national advertiser would have
either had to pay for each individual screening of a print, or simply buy the copy outright. In
each case, the popularity of the film (as yet unknown and difficult to estimate in advance) would
have become a major factor in advertiser interest. Hunter’s concept was, therefore, probably
unworkable for traditional Hollywood releases, and was unlikely to have been adopted by film
production companies for use with entertainment films. However, had the American film
industry been less hostile to advertising, popular older films could have been re-released with
significant advertiser funding (as a form of sponsorship) – allowing them to circulate cheaply to
low-end theaters for a break in ticket price, or to free-admission venues. In either case, the mode
was a frame technology, with “the advertising matter…[not] covering any portion of the film
necessary to show the action of the story.”

12

T. Hayes Hunter, “Advertising Film and Method of Producing the Same,” U.S. Patent 1,426,567, filed 6
November 1919, and issued 22 August 1922.

229
Evansville, Indiana’s Henry Miedreich patented a projector based concept in 1920, which
evaded many of the problems of the Hunter patent. In Miedreich’s patent, the ad boxes would
have been created by an independent device, allowing them to be altered at will, and allowing the
exhibitor to draw the revenue. Miedreich’s invention was, effectively, a modified magic lantern
– designed to project the image of eighteen to twenty ads simultaneously (the two drawings in
the patent were not made in the same scale). In the center was a gap for the film to unspool
unmolested – like the proposed frame from the operator in Denver discussed above. When in
operation, Miedreich’s stereopticon would have had an appearance between Hunter’s iris and
Thomas’ diffusers. The film would be crowded by advertisements sharing the screen, but the ads
would have been unrelated squares, rather than an oval shadow obscuring part of the frame.13
Like Verran & Groetz, Miedreich directly played to slide advertisers, using ‘slide’ as the term for
each individual ad in his projector. However, his technology was also the most problematic.
Advertisers would have needed a different copy style for slides projected at a smaller size, and
audiences would have had to deal with the potential problems caused by the overlapping of two
beams of light in roughly the same space.
The patents – the only real source of pro-frame rhetoric available – put forth a compelling
argument for the use of wall space as a way to preserve association with the screen without
forcing a pause in the entertainment. The most boisterous advocate was Frank C. Thomas; this is
not entirely surprising, as he was the inventor the first technology known to be placed on the
market for sale, and the originator of a concept is always faced with a higher level of inherent
doubt than his imitators. Thomas asserted that onscreen advertising was a natural irritant which
would cause “[a]ttendance…to fall off rapidly…[so that] the pecuniary return for the advertising
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d[id] not compensate for lost patrons,” Thomas asserted that his invention was the solution to
this “most complicated” problem. In attempting to pull advertising dollars away from the
faltering slide industry, Thomas was bald faced about his invention’s appeal to advertisers more
than spectators, as he asserted that the goal of the technology was that “the display of advertising
[would be] so associated with the main screen that…the illuminated display [could not] fail to
attract the eye” at some point during the show.14 The technology allowed for the placement of
sixteen or so contracted advertisements (conspicuously an ‘improvement’ to the typical number
of lantern slide ads: twelve per program), while simultaneously bowing to the desires of the
audience not to be “tricked into reading advertising matter when expecting other things.”
Inventing a site which was used exclusively for advertising, yet was still very near the focal point
of attention, allowed Thomas to seemingly have the strengths of all concepts: (almost) certain
attention, perpetual visibility, and a supposed absence of ‘trickery.’ Verran & Groetz, two years
after Thomas, made nearly identical claims about onscreen compulsion versus marginality, and
the value of permanent visibility, asserting that the value of the device was the ability avoid “the
unfavorable impression…produced by having the advertisements forced upon them to the
exclusion of the pictures.” They likewise asserted that the audience could thus attend to the
advertising at a time of their choosing, whether it be during a reel change, after they had seen the
entire program, while taking a pause to relieve eye ‘fatigue,’ or even at a moment when a
“particular portion of the picture exhibition does not prove of interest.”15 Miedreich also
suggested that his technology allowed the advertising to occur “without interfering in the least
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with the moving picture.”16 Though Hunter’s phrasing has few parallels, his obsession with
permanence as an avenue to ‘subconscious’ impact differs little from the rhetoric of permanent
visibility expounded by others.17 In short, the bulk of these inventors implied that a bad film was
like an onscreen advertisement: a compulsory experience to be assiduously avoided. Openly
engaging in a parasitical relationship, the inventors offered a means to prey on moments of
frustration, boredom, and eye strain through the offer of alternative material.
In short, there is an admission, across the patents, of both the strengths and weaknesses of
cinema theater advertising: it was desirable enough as a medium that exhibitors were being
encouraged to see major expenses and changes to their venue layout as plausible ways to retain
it; however the audience was reluctant enough to the notion of temporal force (showing nothing
but an ad at a given point in the program) that pulling the ads out of the flow of the program was
also seen as central to advertising’s cinematic future. Frank C. Thomas openly declared that the
integration of a commercial marketing message into a stream of entertainment required such a
jarring change of mindset that it would “caus[e] one naturally to resent the drawing of one’s
attention so abruptly to advertising matter.” For Thomas, resentment was practically
biological.18 There was also a nearly unanimous interest in cheapness of production, implying
that advertisers needed to be lured to in-cinema experimentation by a comparatively low cost per
thousand.
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Regardless of the success of any given application of the concept, it is clear that the idea
was persuasive for at least a brief time, as variants of the frame model became quite common in
some locations between 1915 and 1917. As this timeframe corresponds to the years when selfadvertising, philanthropy, and war were combining to push slide and trailer advertising into the
margins of the program, it is possible that the frame concept was less a response to the slide
crisis, that to the problem of continuing to integrate, and profit from advertising after the
encroachment of film studios and politics on the intermissions. (Indeed, it is telling that T.
Hayes Hunter used “Buy War Saving Stamps” as the sample image in his patent, directly
connecting his studio-oriented technology to the patriotic advertising which the industry had
recently been pushing.19) Whatever the reasons, the Moving Picture World uncovered multiple
uses of advertising signage near the screen in 1917. Indeed, no less a person than ‘Roxy’
Rothapfel even proposed, in 1916, that exhibitors deal with spectator irritation at onscreen
advertising by “establishing a regular billboard” around the screen.20
However, the bulk of the information comes from F.H. Richardson – the World’s expert
on projection – who was sent on a tour of American cinemas in 1917…and who manifestly
despised the practice. Richardson, without fail, asserted or implied that positioning of lighted
advertising matter near the screen was tactless and distracting. In an April 1917 issue of the
Moving Picture World, he heavily criticized Nashville’s Strand theater for placing alongside the
screen “an advertising announcement board with…five or six lines of letters in white lights”
(along with a clock and two exit signs, both also lit). The habitually cranky author called the
scene damaging to the eyes and “distracting immensely.”21 The very next week, he found the
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same problem at Pearce’s Tudor theater in New Orleans, which also had “an announcement
board containing…six lines of illuminated white letters.” Noting also the presence of a lighted
clock (with advertising), and six other inexplicable red lights, he walked out of the theater
complaining of their attempt to “murder the picture.”22 In July, he discovered that “most of the
houses” in Topeka, Kansas were running an advertising stereopticon (magic lantern) “[b]eside
the screen,” rotating the slide every thirty seconds. An extraordinarily simplistic version of the
frame concept, Richardson called it “very, very bad…from the projection point of view.”23 Later
that month, he mentioned the “‘shadow box’ of light colored advertising cards” surrounding the
screen at the Orpheum in Centerville, Iowa. Although he offered no direct condemnation, it is
very clear, from his subsequent description of the Majestic as a “fine little house,” that he
disapproved of the Orpheum’s practice.24 By early 1918, the ‘frame’ at the Crystal Theater in
Chicago – in which “several bright lettered illuminated signs advertis[ed] future programs…on
the wall not far from the screen” – received a simple condemnation as “not good practice,”
despite the lack of any obvious light leakage.25 By this point, Richardson was so fed up with the
concept that its very existence was deemed a problem in need of correction. Richardson, though
accepting of variations in practice from house to house, was not willing to give an inch to
advertising that had even a highly circumscribed impact on the projection of the program. If it
impacted the viewing of the film in any way, it was a poor practice. With one of the foremost
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projection experts in the country vehemently critiquing the practice, it is no wonder that even
lower-end theaters abandoned the practice before long.26
Despite the number of examples Richardson discovered on his tour, the dearth of any
national advertising of technologies like this in the trade presses implies that adoption was never
great. The failure of the technology to catch on can be explained in a number of ways. First and
foremost was the opposition of Richardson. Both technological failures leading to light
pollution, and the threat of annoying one’s audience with the distraction, were likely to keep
many exhibitors from taking the plunge (especially in the wake of Richardson’s perpetual public
condemnation of the practice). A further issue was apparent, however: for exhibitors, there was
an inherent cost barrier. All of the technologies would have required a significant start-up cost
for use despite the dearth of any positive testimonials. While any company selling such a device
may have had testimonials which they shared in private, there were no publically known
examples of the concept working as promised. Indeed, only ‘Roxy’ Rothapfel spoke publically
of the concept without complete derision. Though the wording of Frank C. Thomas’ second
patent implied that he had personally operated a theater in which this technology had given
favorable results,27 it seems unlikely that many theaters would want to go to all the installation
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expense for a technique that was not proven to reduce spectator irritation at advertisements.
Verran & Groetz technology would have been even more expensive, as it would have required
not just lighting and ad-card holders, but the multiple panes of glass and the cost of materials to
construct closed boxes so as not to lead to the common problem of light ‘smears’ across the
screening space. Meidreich’s tech required the exhibitor to purchase an entirely new projection
device. Even Hunter’s patent – which would have been adopted by studios not exhibitors –
would have required an additional stage of printing, adding significantly to the cost of any
negative. In no case would it have been easy to try-out these technologies without potentially
putting the user in financial danger, should the tech fail immediately.

‘Public Service’ Tech
The most pronounced issue with frame technologies was their encroachment on the
screen without added anything of value to the film experience aside from moving the advertising
off the screen. For those viewers and exhibitors opposed to advertising on grounds larger than
opposition to a compulsory pause, practices both less encroaching and more justifiable were
required. Other technologies, therefore, were invented in the same era which covered their
advertising nature with a patina of practical use value. An old concept – tied to the same logic as
using advertising slides for political information, and describing industrial films as ‘educational’
– providing either valuable information or some other supposed convenience was assumed to
weaken audience resistance to advertising. In the case of these technologies, it was intended that
the audience be convinced that advertising was necessary to fund an experiential improvement.28
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Slide, film, and ‘frame’ advertising rhetoric may have achieved a notion of utility from the
exhibitor’s perspective – as the income could offset cost of operation – but the audience was
unlikely to recognize the added benefit of a mountain of advertising signs shining directly at
them. The advertising content would likely have seemed disproportional to the financial value,
especially if they did not see either a sharp rise in show quality or, more likely, an even sharper
break in ticket prices. Many diverse products and technologies were designed in the silent era
with this problem in mind, and which therefore attempted to foreground the use value of the
object, while appending advertising only as a side feature. These marginally located items were
intended to act as an object of interest not only if the viewer became bored with the current film,
but if they wished to investigate or appreciate the other elements of the theater in which they
were sitting. These technologies, in order to downplay the advertising content and seem to stress
the wishes of the audience first-and-foremost, tended to be placed farther from the screen and
blatantly stressed their own utility.
Perhaps the simplest example of ‘public service’ technology was the ad-branded trash
can. Though I have as yet found no patents specifically encouraging their use in motion picture
theaters, such items had been patented for years in the United States (and would continue to
be).29 Though most were designed for outdoor use, at least two patents openly stressed
placement “in stores.” In 1914, Eugene B. Cooke and Chauncey O. Lewis, of New Philadelphia,
Ohio, created a waste-basket enclosure offering advertising card holders on multiple sides,
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allowing for quick and cheap replacement of advertising signs.30 Samuel Leveen, of Anderson,
Indiana, had a similar product filed for patent almost exactly a decade earlier, which not only
offered space on the sides for advertising but which also included lighting to illuminate the signs;
Leveen’s design could, therefore, easily have been adapted by the earliest permanent theaters in
ways distinctly similar to the frame technologies.31 By the 1910s, with the rise of the motion
picture theater as a venue where such items might be profitably used, it is implausible to presume
that they were not intentionally experimented with as a form of cinema advertising.
As with all other forms of peripheral cinema advertising technology, however, most
‘public service’ technology was electric; in a cinema, objects of attention were objects of light.
Tacoma, Washington’s Gloss H. Fowler, owner of the Fowler Sign Company, concocted the
earliest known concept along these lines – a ‘light diffusing’ wall unit. Filed for patent in 1912 –
and therefore predating Frank C. Thomas’ remarkably similar ‘frame’ patent32 – Fowler’s
technology was designed to provide the soft and “more restful” ambient light required in a silent
era motion picture theater. At this time, it was believed (according to Fowler) that turning off
the theater lights completely, even during projection, was said to make the theater “uninviting for
the timid, particularly women and children.” Designing his device around a commonly felt
audience need, Fowler used advertising as a means solely to reduce operating costs. In order “to
suitably light a motion picture theater…with the least interference with the exhibition on the
screen…and with the greatest comfort to the audience,” Fowler proposed placing his diffusers
along the walls of the theater, at intervals. Almost as an afterthought, Fowler contended that,
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rather than diffusing light by reflecting it off unadorned wall space, advertising signs would do
the job equally well and provide a little extra income for the theater. An added benefit was that
the signs, requiring no more expensive printing than a standard poster, could be changed at will
with little expense to either the advertiser or the exhibitor.33 As such, the advertising – requiring
more effort to see than the light – would hopefully have come across as unobtrusive and
acceptable, while also allowing inexpensive change of copy which would have pleased
advertisers.
A similar lighting patent was the glowing seat-back advertisements of Francis T. Hayes
from Richmond Hill, New York. Comparatively late – not filed for patent until 1927 – Hayes’
patent was an adaptation of old fashioned seat-back signs, a concept which predates motion
picture theaters.34 In Hayes’ patent, the signs were created with luminous “radium paint,”
allowing them to glow without the need for electricity. It is evident that Hayes had a more
complex notion of theatrical lighting needs than Fowler. The signs were designed to add to the
theater in two ways. First, they were an added “artistic and attractive lighting” element for the
house, designed to “brea[k] the monotony of a darkened theater.” They were, in short, an
attraction in their own right. Secondly, they were a cost-saving device. The seat-backs, rather
than simply providing general ambient light, were intended as a replacement for ushers.
Working from the notion that it was difficult for spectators to find a seat in a darkened theater,
Hayes’ glowing seat backs were designed as a simple way to reveal empty seats; the
phosphorous paint would have been visible to a standing patron, if there had been no spectator in
the seat to block the light. The seats at the edge of the aisles would also have provided a lighted
33
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path for entrance and exit, as they would have been visible regardless of seat occupancy, due to
the patron’s position to the side. As such, glowing signs, according to Hayes, would have
“eliminat[ed] the present overhead expense necessary in darkened theaters in the employment of
ushers with flashlights” to lead patrons safely into and out of the theater, even in the event of a
loss of electrical power.35 The seat-backs therefore provided a middle ground between the
‘frame’ advertisements and Fowler’s wall units: the advertising still seemed to serve a practical
benefit, and could still be changed rapidly and cheaply, but was less possible to ignore as it was
placed directly in front of the spectator. It was, unfortunately for Hayes, also a much more
limited form of advertising, as any given sign could be seen by, at most, a few spectators. As
such, it would have required either extreme cheapness of sign production – which is unlikely due
to the need for special paint – or the renting of a massive number of spaces to a single
advertiser.36 Both of these problems would have rendered Hayes’ technology troubling to incinema advertisers accustomed to a low cost-per-thousand views as the most prominent
description of the venue.
A much flashier – and in hindsight significantly less useful – technology was Norman T.
Whitaker’s elapsed-time tracker. According to Whitaker, one convenience that motion picture
theaters were not then providing was a revelation of the duration (both elapsed and remaining) of
a given film. Whitaker’s invention was from the waning days of the dominance of short films,
when a culture of ‘transient’ patrons were first learning to coordinate their entrance and exit from
the theater to the ‘start’ and ‘end’ of the program (or, at least, to the feature). Whitaker argued
that a patron might choose to delay entry until one film finished, and that a patron already within
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the theater, but with time constraints, “might stay somewhat longer if he knew there were only a
few feet more of the [current] film to be shown.”37 As such, he invented a device which, when
synchronized to the projector, would deliver periodic updates via a box onstage. The updates
would have been rendered visible as light shining through cuts in a rolling paper strip. Whitaker
then suggested that in the interim moments one could scroll other messages in front of the
audience (like the patent’s example “Eat Smith’s Good Eats”).38 Whitaker’s concept was
admittedly a bit more intrusive – as one would have been encouraged to read the box expecting a
message about length and would instead have received an advertisement.39 It was, of course,
also woefully impractical – as the modern day practice of a printed list of start and end times
would have been cheaper and could even have been included in the handbill (resulting in the
need only for a clock within the theater). Despite these problems, the idea remains the paragon
example of ‘public service’ technologies, as it combined flashy technology, a beneficial
convenience, and advertising all in one place.
In broad terms, these technologies of convenience were designed with a very different
notion of both advertising and the cinema audience in mind. As mentioned at the outset of this
section, these technologies attempted to invade the space not by crowding the entertainment, but
by providing a service. As such, they tended to be much farther from the screen; with the
possible exception of Whitaker’s elapsed time box (which may or may not have been placed
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directly beside the screen), the advertising integrated into such inventions was on the side walls,
by the doors, and on the seats. As such, the inventors discussed advertising much more
positively. For example, though Francis T. Hayes’ patent appears, at first glance, to echo the
audience definition of Thomas, Verran, and Groetz, in asserting that his glowing seat-backs
would “break the monotony of a darkened theater,” note the decided lack of cynicism in the
phrasing. For Hayes, the cinema audience simply wanted pleasure – which could have been
provided by the film, advertising, or simply by noticing clever lighting techniques. As such,
these inventors were not only explicitly responding to spectator complaints about advertising –
moving it decidedly to the periphery and making it more clearly voluntary – they were trusting
that voluntary advertising would still be attended to. Their faith in the audience to seek the
greatest pleasure, wherever it may be found, placed all elements of the theater on an even
footing. The possibility of poor quality films on the screen (so vital in frame tech patents) was a
non-issue for these inventors. The goal was a cost-effective improvement of the space.
At least one – Hayes’ phosphorous seat-backs, or a knock off – was put into use, though
not particularly effectively. Reports of a lawsuit reveal that Hal Hodes had signed two-year
contracts with theaters resulting in a total of 225,323 seats in 1928. The theaters were to be paid
one dollar per seat per year, with the Thayer Advertising Corporation acting as space broker and
retaining all income above that price. Alleging that he had not been paid commission for this
work, he asserted that Thayer had erroneously claimed to have contracts with multiple national
advertisers – including the Coca-Cola Company, the Wrigley Chewing Gum Company, and the
Ward Baking Company – in hand. As Hodes won the suit (and was awarded, in 1932, a 23%
commission – $104,900 for the $450,000 worth of contracted space) it can be presumed that
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Thayer drastically overestimated the potential of the technology.40 That said, upwards of 1,000
theaters signed on with Hodes for this service. The failure was on the broker’s end, not the
exhibitors’. Flashy peripheral ‘public service’ tech was, thus, still a workable technique as late
as 1928.

Clocks
Perhaps the single most important peripheral advertising concept proposed during the
silent era was the advertising clock. The advertising clock blurred the lines between the
advertising ‘frame’ and ‘public service’ technologies, and appears to have been the offscreen
advertising technology most commonly integrated into the silent era theater experience. An
advertising clock, as it was marketed to silent era theaters, was a high tech, peripherally
projected variant of a lantern slide projector. Advertising clocks consisted both of a visible clock
face, and a rotating sequence of advertising slides, which were projected simultaneously (often
overlapping the clock image), on the theater wall. Nothing in their designs required a hijacking
of the motion picture screen, or even placement on same wall – though, in fairness, all extant
example drawings and descriptions placed the clocks right next to the screen in a position
echoing frame technologies.
Although the concept of projecting ads within the wheel of a clock face had patent
antecedents dating back to 1905,41 clocks specifically designed for cinema usage arose from one
direct and one indirect cause in the early 1910s. Indirectly, they emerged in the wake of the slide
crisis of the early 1910s, and may well have been inspired by the clock slides which had become
40
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popular in 1912 and into early 1913 (see chapter three). Directly, a growing sense that
overcranking during projection was a way for the theater to ‘chase-em-thru’ led F.H. Richardson
to propose that theaters install clocks in plain view of the audience, so that they could see that the
‘one hour program’ promised was delivered.42 Although Richardson would come to loathe the
light pollution caused by in-theater clocks, if his call in 1912 resulted in actual increased
demand, then the appearance of advertising funded variants should not be surprising.
The earliest to directly offer a slide based advertising clock to motion picture theaters was
the J.H. Genter Company, of Newburgh, NY, which offered its “Announceoscope” in the pages
of the Moving Picture World during 1913.43 The General Sales Company of America, from
Pittsburgh, offered a more basic contraption – dubbed the Wonder Clock – late that same year.44
It is easy (though perhaps inaccurate) to infer that neither product met with much success in the
market: Genter’s Mirroroid Screen remained his most heavily advertised item as the
Announceoscope drifted slowly out of the company’s self-advertising; General Sales abandoned
the Wonder Clock little over a year later, selling their remaining stock for a cut rate at the end of
1914.45 However, at least five further companies would pick up the baton. The Kineto Machine
Company of Chicago, and the Publicity Clock Company and Standard Manufacturing Company,
both of New York, were all advertising the availability of their own advertising clocks, also in
the Moving Picture World, by the latter half of 1915.46 Though they would not nationally
advertise until 1917, in Printers’ Ink, New York’s Wonder Clock Advertising Company (no
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relation) also appeared in a 1915 New York directory.47 In 1917, the Kalck Safety Specialty
Company, of Amityville, NY, received a small write up in Motography offering advertising
clocks as well.48 At least one of the above companies – the Publicity Clock Company – was still
actively selling space on the clocks of cinema theaters into the 1930s.49 As such, advertising
clocks, like slides and trailers, persisted in cinema theaters long past the transitional era and
were, for some filmgoers, a recognizable and regular element of their cinema experiences.
In general, there were three different types of clocks which could be purchased for use in
motion picture theaters, ranging from the extremely simplistic to the relatively complex. The
earliest was also the most complex. J.H. Genter’s ‘Announceoscope’ was an exceptionally
useful technology – almost excessively so, as though Genter was attempting to provide as much
‘use value’ as possible to justify its inclusion in theaters. The Announceoscope could project a
clock (either as a standard dial face or digital, depending on the model), while projecting a list of
further information. In the sample layout on the patent, Genter provided a long space for the
name of the current film to be displayed (thus labeling the screen so that patrons could follow
along in the printed program, much like Whitaker’s elapsed time clock), along with two smaller
squares for advertising messages.50 Slides, of apparently American standard size, would rotate
automatically through the clock at whatever rate the theater chose – presuming they were
47
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labeling the films, the slides would likely only change every fifteen minutes. Although no
information survives indicating the number of slides or advertising messages that the machine
could hold, the flexibility of use of the device is indicative of both a creative mind and an
unconventional product.
Rapidly, the machines streamlined. The General Sales Company’s Wonder Clock was
the influential model. Projecting a round image with the advertisement contained within the dial
of the clock, custom designed slides would rotate automatically through the projector.51
Although it is difficult to make out the images in the display advertising for the General Sales
Company, the slides were presumably round, so as to fit neatly inside of the clock dial. This
same round-slide design was adopted by Kineto, Kalck, Publicity Clock Company, and the later
Wonder Clock Advertising Company. Although not all companies listed official numbers of
slides slots within their machines, eight and twelve slot models appear to have been the norm.
The most simplistic – the second, New York based Wonder Clock – used no rotation mechanism
at all, allowing “but one product at a time [to] take advantage of th[eir] service”).52 Kineto and
Publicity Clock both offered eight and twelve slot models, while the Kalck patent indicated an
eight slot model as well.53 The Standard Manufacturing Company’s clock, though it used square
slides, only offered six slots, and did not overlap the clock face and the advertisement (the maker
opted instead for a stacked image), varied in no mechanical respects.54 All clocks which offered
multiple slide slots also offered the convenience of infrequent winding, and the ability to select
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the speed at which slides would change (for Publicity, the standard speed was a change every
thirty seconds55).
Unlike slides and trailers, either an exhibitor or a local agent was usually expected to
purchase an advertising clock. Only the Wonder Clock Advertising Company gave any
indication that they sold the space on their own clocks after installation. Offering, in their only
known advertisement, to rent space on their clocks “in 75 leading moving picture houses” in
New York, the company treated local cinemas like newsprint – integrating as much of New
York’s filmgoing populace as possible and reaching them all simultaneously.56 For all other
companies, clocks were likely a one-off. Whether or not assistance was offered in gathering
advertisers, each clock was an individual item, purchased, owned, and operated primarily by the
theater or regional representative. The costs of clocks for such exhibition varied unexpectedly
widely. The General Sales Company claimed their wonder clock to be “a One Hundred and
Twenty Five Dollar instrument,” but then sold their remaining inventory for the clearance price
of $35 each in the very same ad.57

The Standard Manufacturing Company, however, sold their

clocks for “$35 complete” – no clearance needed.58 A Minnesota lawsuit reveals that an
agreeable price, in 1917, for Kineto clocks was $95 for the eight slide version, and $120 for the
twelve slide model.59 Publicity Clock offered a profit to cost ratio of “$75 Weekly from a $500
Investment,” though this was clearly a dealer price and it is impossible to know whether this was
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a profit and cost estimate for one clock or many.60 The costs, therefore, could be relatively
exorbitant, and the assistance in rounding up advertisers to fill the spaces could be slight or
nonexistent.
For such an investment, profit similar to that of slide and trailer advertising was
promised. Genter promised “anywhere from 20 to 50 dollars weekly” in his 1913 ad.61 In 1915,
Standard Manufacturing suggested charging “$2 to $5 weekly” for each of the six slide slots,
producing “$600 to $1500 yearly profit.”62 The aforementioned, indecipherable promise of $75
from the Publicity Clock Company gets no clearer with two such extraordinarily different profit
quotes. However, the fact that they were selling space in Brooklyn theaters for $1.25 per week
in 1932 and $1.50 per week in 1938 implies that the initial profit estimate of $75 per week was
for multiple clocks.63 In either case, the purchaser of these clocks was intended to see them as a
gravy train – effectively like buying their own medium to place within cinema venues which,
once the device was paid off, would print money unfettered into a golden future.
Although the initial cost was an entry barrier, such clocks were used remarkably often.
The Wonder Clock Advertising Company, of course, claimed to have 75 clocks scattered
throughout New York in 1917.64 The General Sales Company claimed that “hundreds of
theaters” were using their ‘Wonder Clock.’65 The aforementioned Kineto lawsuit was for a
broken contract which initially called for the purchase of 242 clocks to cover the Minnesota
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territory.66 While none of these claims can be taken entirely at face value, persistence is also an
indicator of success. As the Kineto Machine Company was in operation for at least five years –
in Chicago, a hub of advertising dollars – and its head, George Willens, invented similar clocks
for years to come, one must assume that the device was relatively profitable. The Publicity
Clock Company likewise seems to have turned a tidy profit for its owners, as the company
persisted, as has been mentioned, into the late 1930s.67 Publicity Clock was profitable enough,
in fact, that it suffered not one, but two forms of theft, without collapsing under the weight of
financial losses or advertiser distrust. In 1916, salesman Harry Smith was caught “collecting
money of the firm and appropriating it to his own use.”68 In an unknown year, the company
circulated a card to its advertisers offering a reward for the capture of man who was collecting
the business names from active clocks, and then presenting a bill for continuing the service –
absconding with the funds.69 The fact that either of these acts of criminal behavior could provide
enough income to be worth the risk indicates that Publicity Clock was turning quite a bit of
profit. The weight of scant evidence implies, then, that the advertising clock found a
comfortable niche in a small subset of theaters and had a reasonably long and profitable life.70
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The advertising clock phenomenon was, in fact, widespread enough that installations and
territorial contracts were occasionally reported in the Moving Picture World. In 1916, the
Empire Theater of Auburn, Indiana, installed an 8 slot model from an unidentified company.71
John C. Green, manager of the Temple Theater in Galt, Ontario, purchased the distribution rights
for Kineto machines for the entire province.72 In February of 1916, F.H. Richardson had already
given his blessing to the adoption of almost any such advertising clock by declaring that such a
device was “the way” to integrate advertising into the cinema theater, as “several theater
managers” had installed them and communicated a favorable impression.73 If even the
notoriously anti-advertising Moving Picture World was willing to report clocks this often and
this favorably, they were a blessed form of advertising indeed.
In any case, the sales rhetoric was simple and, as such, we can relatively safely assume
that those exhibitors who did adopt the clock did so for one of two reasons: they needed a clock
but couldn’t afford the added expense, or they needed the income from advertising but could not
tolerate, or could no longer justify, an onscreen advertising break. Kineto sold its product under
the former argument. Their self-advertising described the Kineto clock as “designed to meet a
long felt want in furnishing theatres with an attractive time-piece that could be seen at all times
by the entire audience.”74 Kineto and General Sales even went so far as to imply that such a
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clock would draw business: Kineto called its clock “a decided and distinct attraction” for the
theater opting to use it; General Sales called their ‘Wonder Clock’ a “crowd puller” and praised
its ‘startling,’ looming size as a novelty that would, itself, attract a crowd.75 Kalck used the
latter, arguing that their clock could bring advertising revenue “without the delay that
intermissions often occasion.”76
Printed opposition to advertising clocks was very limited, and skewed entirely towards
either technical malfunctions or inherent light pollution. All of the public criticism of
advertising clocks comes from Richardson’s nationwide critical tour of theaters in 1917. In one
particularly memorable week in April, three clocks – only one of them an advertising clock –
raised Richardson’s ire. An advertising clock in Pearce’s Tudor Theater in New Orleans was
chastised for including “an illuminated green-letter sign, presumably advertising the jeweler who
supplied the clock,” and for causing “a smear of white light…clear across the front end of the
auditorium over the screen.” A second clock, from the Empire theater in Mobile, Alabama
(“more light on the wall than is on the clock dial”) and a third clock, from the Globe Theater in
New Orleans (“smeared all over with white light”) were also given harsh reviews.77 In October,
the Graphic Theater in Bangor, Maine, raised Richardson’s blood yet again with an advertising
clock, by including “two or three [brightly illuminated] advertisements beneath its dial.”78
Although we cannot interpret such comments to be outright condemnation of all clocks,
Richardson’s critiques clearly imply both the difficulty of confining the light from an advertising
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clock to its desired region (the constantly invoked ‘smears of white light’) and the fact that their
placement right next to the screen may well have been distracting in the best of circumstances.
As such, the lack of clear growth in the field of advertising clocks is also not surprising, as
audience irritation once again kept the industry as a whole from prospering.

‘Active Audience’ Rhetoric and the Cinema as Venue
The multiplicity of peripheral advertising techniques – resulting in permanently visible
but optionally viewable advertising – added an important wrinkle to the terms of the in-cinema
advertising debate. The then increasingly common notion, on the part of advertisers and the
general public, of the film audience as a passive collection of sponges, soaking up the onscreen
material, was partly counterbalanced by peripheral advertisers’ more realistic approach which
acknowledged what the film studios and exhibitors had known all along: that viewers were
thinking, unpredictable individuals, whose attention was given rather than compelled. Peripheral
advertising functioned by rigorously dividing advertising content from the entertainment – rather
than trying to ‘slip it through’ – and then justifying it’s presence as a service or an alternative
diversion. As such, these early 20th century inventors described viewers who were subject to
their own tastes and whims, and whose motivations and interpretations were therefore individual.
Operating under this definition of an audience, attention was redefined as something for which
advertisements could compete without describing it as a completely unwanted presence.
Attention was, in theory at least, closer to a meritocracy. The bulk of the companies and
inventors working in the arena of advertising marginalia would, therefore, repeat the standard
critiques of onscreen advertising – that it was “a source of more or less dissatisfaction to your
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patrons”79 – before defending their own technology as a site from which advertising would be
willingly and voluntarily read. Rather than attempting to force the audience’s attention at a
specific time, then, these men encouraged advertisers to place their ads “in full view of the
audience during the entire exhibition” as this would provide “the assurance that at least a
majority of the persons in the audience [would], at some time before they le[ft], read the
advertisement.”80
Frame tech designers – perhaps evidenced by their desires to crowd advertising as close
to the screen as possible – were frequently pessimistic about advertising’s ability to draw
attention on its own merits. The advertising needed, at the very least, to be “associated with the
main screen” to be considered viable; as such, positioning, even if the screen was off limits, still
implied that the audience needed to be nearly, if not entirely, forced to read an ad. Reading of
ads would then happen almost naturally when the spectator became bored or otherwise irritated
with the films being projected. Frank C. Thomas, for example, asserted that nearness to the
primary image was a virtue on the grounds that “the pictures being displayed upon the screen
[might] fail to interest anyone in the audience.” Harry Verran and Alfred R. Groetz claimed
nearly the same thing when they argued that the audience might voluntarily look away from the
screen if “any particular portion of the picture exhibition [did] not prove of interest.” As such,
active audiences were acknowledged, by frame inventors, negatively – their attention was
something that an entertainment film could lose, leaving it up for grabs. As such, there was an
element of cynicism and fearfulness to these inventors’ takes on audiences.
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The problem with this description is that, in abandoning the need for compulsion by
stressing the possibility of a crummy film, they abandoned not just the value of a compulsory
screen, but also the sense of the ‘receptive mood.’ If as the above thinkers implied, the ads were
being perused at moments when the audience was bored, or disappointed in the films on the
program – so bored that they were more interested in their surroundings than the show – how
would the advertising have been received? If the uniform happiness of the cinema audience
could no longer be assumed, was there even any value to advertising in the venue? Such claims
are the only point in the historical record of silent era cinema advertising where the proponents
relied overtly on a cynical view of the audience.
The bulk of the proponents of peripheral advertising, perhaps realizing the danger of
stressing a bored or irritable viewer, took a more optimistic approach, and asserted that their
technologies were an alternative but no less valid way to appeal to the viewer’s attention. Kineto
company head George Willens almost imperceptibly slipped from the valuable notion of
compulsion to an acknowledgement of choice. Indicating first choice, and then compulsion,
Willens claimed that the placement of an ad placed upon his invention “compels one to see an
advertisement when looking at the time on my clock.”81 Frank C. Thomas, possibly in an attempt
to overcome the cynicism of the rest of his patent, included perhaps the most over-zealous claim
for the appeals of quality advertising, when he argued that patrons could “look at the
advertisement several times…[and] thoroughly assimilate the idea” if they found the ad
particularly interesting or amusing.82 Put simply, the quickest and most compelling way to sell
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peripheral advertising was to treat advertisements as miniature entertainments which could
appeal just as well to a spectator.
As such, patent inventors took a wholly different approach to the debate – not just
defending cinema audiences as desirable and reachable, but defending advertising as, itself, a
part of the modern entertainment environment which could enter an entertainment venue without
necessarily being pre-judged as an unwanted intrusion. The choice of rigidly separating the
theatrical sites of ‘art’ and ‘commerce’ into ‘screen’ and ‘margin’ paradoxically allowed these
men to describe the two in fundamentally similar experiential terms. The advertisements at the
margins became potential alternative diversions – something else to see if one was inclined to
appreciate one’s surroundings, or if the screen failed to entertain. Implicitly conceiving of
cinema advertising not in the temporal terms assumed by others, but as yet another site where
advertising was an element of personal selection, their notion of the cinema was experientially
parallel to magazines and billboards. These men argued that, though one may not have had any
control over the progress of the main entertainment (no ability to ‘turn the page’ or, in a vehicle
metaphor, skip past the less beautiful pieces of landscape), one could, at least, look to the
advertising for alternative material.
Unfortunately for these advertising proponents, the notion of ‘breaking the monotony of a
darkened theater’ by adding secondary attractive elements was, even then, running in the
opposite direction. The picture palace movement arose in the early 1910s, alongside an embargo
on ‘scandalous’ films in favor of ‘high-class’ dramatic films, and became part of the industry’s
appeal to upper class audiences, in an attempt to turn them from censorship advocacy into film
fans. The ‘palatial’ architecture of massive first-run theaters encouraged the building of intricate
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and beautiful structures, rather than bland environs filled with tacky advertising lights. 83 The
same theaters that were leading the attack against onscreen advertising – refusing to include it in
their high class entertainments – were, therefore, also filling all the offscreen space with
sumptuous architectural flourishes. The type of active audience then being solicited by the film
industry was one which purportedly would choose to turn their attention to the ornamental
curlicues and faux Grecian columns on the theater walls, rather than to an advertising sign. In
attempting to shift to a high-art aesthetic, anti-advertising snobbery would have rendered
peripheral signage less and less likely in more and more theaters. As such, off-screen advertising
was a dead end at the time that it arose, as the periphery was becoming the venue of ostentation
and beautification rather than technological gimmickry.

Conclusion
Advertising at the margins of the theatrical experience has, unfortunately, left the fewest
historical traces. It is difficult to know just how many of these technologies were put into use.
Of those technologies which were adopted for use, it is almost impossible to know if any were
widely used nationally, regionally, or locally. Indeed, the historical traces of such technologies
are often grotesquely unhelpful; witness the following news report – reproduced in its entirety:
Central City, Neb. – The Donelson theater has recently installed an advertising
machine.84
For the historian of such material, this is a frustrating tease. What type of machine? What did it
do and when? Although this is an extreme example, the bulk of the analysis in this chapter has
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been extrapolated from primary documents only marginally more helpful – either patents with no
connection to actual usage, two-sentence dismissals from F.A. Richardson, or trade materials
(like business cards) with little more content than a slogan. In terms of actual usage, advertising
clocks were clearly the most commonly available concept (particularly in New York), while the
placement of lit signage next to the screen appears to have been a Plains state fad. Any further
analysis about adoption patterns is impossible.
Despite the lack of clarity about the actual use of the objects, the concept of peripheral
advertising is vital to our understanding of silent era debates about advertising. It provides our
only direct evidence of attempts to respond to concerns about the ‘commercial caesura’ in ways
other than simply removing all consumer goods advertising from the theater, and provides us
with the most tantalizingly unfulfilled glimpses of how the cinema experience might have been
different. The motion picture theater, still connected to (at least the perception of) lower-class
and immigrant audiences, could have metamorphosed into a circus-like riot of lighted
entertainment and advertising elements – a technological rather than architectural wonderland –
with the film itself privileged only in its central placement. The decision to pursue a high-class
ambiance foreclosed this possibility just as it was being conceived. However, the existence of
the idea, and the implication that it was incompatible with ‘high class’ cinema, reveals that
‘class’ and ‘advertising’ were drifting more firmly into separate spheres in early 20th century
American media.
Peripheral advertising was simultaneously backward looking (inherently non-temporal
and ‘print-esque’) and forward looking (it would take decades for the ‘active audience’ to
become second nature in media research). Its existence vividly displays the subtlety of
American advertising thinking at the time. While there were significant historical barriers to its
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adoption – including the cultural pretensions of the film studios and the swelling opposition to
cinema advertising caused by onscreen methods – peripheral advertising techniques are the
strongest evidence of the inherent complexity of the cinema as an advertising venue, and they
presage the difficult rethinking of advertising in the wake of digital media.
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CHAPTER 6. “INTEMPERATE PROCLAMATIONS”: EXHIBITION, TICKETS, AND THE
BIG CHILL OF CINEMA ADVERTISING

Think of it! People will pack your house day after day,
and night after night, because it costs them nothing to see
your show, still you are paid cash for every admission.
- The Robyn-Kander Service (1915)1

In early 1915, Moving Picture World columnist W. Stephen Bush sarcastically reviewed
the avalanche of in-cinema advertising tactics which had hit his beloved film industry in the
preceding few years. In deriding “the screen advertisement” as the greatest “[o]f all the follies of
the screen,” Bush worked himself up to a quite a lather, revealing, mid-tirade, that he felt that
advertising men are not and cannot be moved by appeals to their aesthetic
sensibilities. They have none. They climb…our own glorious mountains and
upon those awe-inspiring heights, when man is nearest to the blue vault of
heaven, they paint the name of some tooth paste with an adjuration to use the
same. […] Men to whom Nature, in her most solemn moods, fails to make the
slightest appeal cannot be expected to stand in awe of the screen. I am often
surprised that our great dramas are not interrupted at tense moments by the
intemperate proclamation of the merits of so-and-so’s cigarettes and of so-andso’s cheese.2
Bush’s article, regardless of its intent as condemnation, points to the myriad ways in which
consumer goods advertising, had it been allowed, could have fundamentally altered the standard
business and aesthetic models of motion pictures. Though the advertising-filled intermission
between turns of the program was, and remains, an important interweaving of advertising content
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with the film program3, the possibilities for interpenetration with the cinema were much more
vast.
The following year, the Edison Film Company’s young acting star Edward Earle, in an
interview with motion picture advertising proponent Ernest A. Dench, restated Bush’s hypothesis
– though without the vitriol – as a legitimate theory of the future of cinema. Earle asserted:
[i]f I am not mistaken, there will spring up a chain of photoplay theaters in the
large cities to which the public will be admitted free. At these ‘billboard stations’
short, regular photoplays will be sandwiched in between the ad. films so as to
attract the folks inside.
Accepting that “compulsory” advertising in a ticketed environment was “abhorrent to the people
of this democratic country,” Earle presumed that – for good or ill – the way around the
moviegoer’s reluctance was to do away with admission prices.4 Reading through the logic leaps
in his comments, Earle’s rational differentiation between ‘optional’ print advertising, which one
could skip past, and ‘forced’ cinema advertising, which the spectator had to wait through even if
disinterested, was the breaking point for a dual-market system. If the advertiser was going to
hijack the viewer’s attention rather than ask for it, then the spectator must be ‘paid’ for his time;
a free show would fit the bill. Earle was not alone in this belief. For many of the proponents of
connecting the cinema to consumer goods advertising, the problem was ticket prices.5 For
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cinema advertising to function, perhaps the entire film industry needed to be freed from the
burden of consumer cost.
Earle’s comments were not without precedent. Various means of delivering cinema free
of charge had been, and would continue to be, attempted during the silent era. Indeed, in the
wake of the mainstream film producers’ turn away from nonfiction just before 1910, the film
reform community developed a cottage industry of ‘non-theatrical’ screenings, often in an
attempt to influence the film content which their patrons would consume. Church shows were a
common form of this ‘community theater’ concept – an offering of educational, religious, and
eventually even mainstream studio pictures, as “ministers sought to recapture the attention of
their straying parishioners…by adopting the movie theater’s products and appeal.”6 Children’s
matinees (often held in legitimate cinema theaters) and school affiliated shows were also
common forms of community cinema.7 Free ‘censored,’ targeted, and otherwise non-theatrical
shows became common enough by 1920 that the Motion Picture Theater Owners of America
were compelled to publically criticize the non-theatrical ‘free cinema’ as “unfair competition,”
and discourage mainstream film producers from circulating films to non-theatrical venues like
churches and schools.8 In short, the notion of a cinematic experience with no admission fee was
a growing trend at this point – though exhibitor distrust of the form was also growing.9
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Even the notion of an advertising-supported ‘free cinema’ was not out of the ordinary.
Screenings funded in the name of particular consumer goods had been tried numerous times.
Both theatrical and non-theatrical free screenings of advertising films were a regular occurrence.
Manufacturers would often simply rent out theaters – a practice common enough for nonmainstream films (advertising, educational, and exploitation) that it would eventually earn the
industry nickname ‘four-walling.’10 In the absence of a theater to rent, advertisers would pay
traveling film trucks, or have films screened in store windows or other places of business.11
Under the auspices of Camilla Donworth, of the Films-of-Business Corporation, New York’s
Rialto Theater even inaugurated a regular tradition of free morning screenings of advertising
films in mid-1920. Begun on July 1st, with a screening of four industrial films, showings were to
occur every Tuesday and Thursday morning from 10:00 til 12:00.12 Evidence for similar
screenings at the Rialto exists as late as the 9th of December that year.13
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Alternatively, many merchants – having negotiated the privilege with a particular theater
– offered free tickets to regular film screenings in exchange for purchases.14 E.H. Hill’s Rex
Theater of Arkansas, KS, even adopted the idea for its own use, and offered free tickets to
children who brought in 1,000 dead flies – a philanthropic ‘advertisement’ for summer pest
control.15 The ‘free ticket’ option was so common that at least two nationwide services formed
in the mid-1910s to capitalize on the movement: the Robyn-Kander Ticket Service16 and the
National Free Movie Picture Ticket Company.17 Robyn-Kander’s model was promising enough
that a major film studio, Universal, offered to back the company, with the product then renamed
Universal Moving Picture Tickets.18
All of these commercial precursors, however, were slightly incomplete iterations of
Earle’s concept of the ‘billboard station.’ Screening advertising films for free was not really an
attempt to provide free film; it was an admission that industrial films were almost impossible to
screen in any paid venue. Meanwhile, free tickets, while directly linking consumption to free
cinema, were a scattershot affair which did not produce a free theater so much as a single,
random free admission. Earle’s notion, though uncommon, was much more grand and seems to
presage advertising formats central to entertainment in the twentieth and twenty-first century.
14
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Participating Sponsorship as a Model of Cinema Exhibition
Earle’s perspective encouraged an interleaving of the ‘rented theater’ approach and the
community screening, combining both mainstream entertainment films and advertising content
into a form much like the later ‘participating sponsorship’ model of television, where advertisers
bought “interstitial ‘pages’ of time” in an otherwise unrelated program.19 When he spoke in
1916, the breaking-up of a sequence of film reels with advertising slides had been relatively
common in movie houses across the country for several years, though it was then a waning
exhibition model. The one or two-reel advertising short was by then also well known, and the
advertising trailer was in its early stages of development. Trailers, shorts, and slides all provided
possible models for a pause in the entertainment – an interleaving of entertainment and
advertising. If one then adds the snide 1915 comments of W. Stephen Bush, about “interrupt[ing
great dramas] at tense moments,” to the theory espoused by Edward Earle, it is plausible to
imagine a free cinema in which the advertisements were not simply inserted in between short
reels, but between reels of a feature, and at moments of the keenest interest. Indeed, the
popularity of serials had recently crested, as both The Perils of Pauline and The Exploits of
Elaine were initially released in 1914. With serials, the multi-climax narrative structure, in
which pauses were inserted at moments of heightened tension, was known. Bush’s comments
provide direct evidence that transitional era film theorists were able to conceive of a link
between dramatic high-points and the retention of viewer interest across an advertising break.20
It is, therefore, possible to see in Earle and Bush’s comments a template not just for participating
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sponsorship of a program, but indeed for proto-television, in which a larger narrative was
provided free of charge but broken up by advertising material. At the very least, Earle was
willing to gamble (and even Bush may have been willing to admit) that a ‘variety program’ of
shorts, fully underwritten by advertising would have drawn urban crowds. The theory of
‘participating sponsorship’ is, therefore, nearly as old as cinema advertising itself.
Importantly, the ‘free cinema’ was not entirely theoretical. Several iterations of the
concept were, in fact, attempted in the ten years between 1911 and 1921.21 Often these were
simple one-off attempts in theaters otherwise operated on a ticket basis. In 1914, Atlanta’s Gem
Theater funded free Saturday matinees for ten weeks through the sponsorship of local
merchants.22 In mid-1916, clever Tennessee exhibitors in both Memphis and Nashville were
running free, advertising slide supported screenings on Sundays as a means to evade local blue
laws.23 A few years later, in 1921, Atlanta society women even attempted to fund a children’s
matinee screening via the inclusion of an ‘educational’ short advertising the Biliken Shoe
Company.24 Although these were not fully ‘billboard stations’ – and possibly were not even
successful, one-time ‘billboard screenings’ – they are evidence that even established urban
exhibitors were aware of, and in some cases intrigued by, the concept.
The most prominent and consistent usage of the concept was in the creation of free ‘open
air’ exhibitions, providing community performances through private advertising funding rather
21
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than donations or government dollars. The concept appears to predate its common reportage in
the film trade press. The Moving Picture World’s resident cinema advertising curmudgeon, F.H.
Richardson, confidently asserted, in late 1911, that no one with experience in exhibition would
attempt to completely fund a touring open-air show through advertising slides. Writing as
though from real-world experience, Richardson asserted that any such attempt would be beset
with the following problems:
where he…figures one dollar expense it would really take nearer five. The local
papers would knock you. The local showman would inspire local authorities to
make things unpleasant for you in the way of license holdups, etc. Bad weather
could smite you. Breakdowns and delays would conspire to make life miserable
for you. Railways would lose your stuff and break what they couldn’t manage to
lose. Verily, your joys would consist mainly of anticipating the day of your
return, a chastened, sadder, and wiser man – oh yes, and a poorer one too.25
To hear Richardson tell the tale, ‘free cinema’ had already left a trail of broken hearted and
impoverished men in its wake. At least one recent, real-world example could have inspired
Richardson’s account. Three months earlier, an open-air free theater in Jackson, Tennessee drew
the ire of two local exhibitors – Capt. W.D. Ament (of the Elite) and D.L. Williamson (of the
Marlow) – on the grounds that it operated without paying rent to the city for the park in which
the films were shown. Ament and Williamson asserted that the license for the free show should
not have been granted on the grounds that it “permit[ted] the use of public property by
individuals to the great harm of other citizens engaged in a legitimate and useful business.”26
Though it is unclear how this conflict ended, the circulation of moral (“unfair competition”) and
financial (bad business concept) arguments from Ament and Williamson in the trade press may
have helped to put a stop to the practice – though only for a few years. By mid-decade, free
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open-air community theaters ran wild in a three-state region consisting of Illinois, Kentucky, and
Tennessee.
Perhaps the first free show in the area appeared in mid-1914 in Chicago Heights, Illinois
(a suburb of Chicago). In Chicago Heights, a man named Delmar Lee was said to have been
showing films “on the streets” (presumably on a screen erected on the back of a truck), funding
the screenings through merchant advertising.27 In June 1915, enterprising individuals in
Louisville proposed using a downtown site for “a free motion picture house” where “the cost and
a profit [were to be covered] by showing a number of advertising slides” in between each short
subject reel; the originators of the plan even attempted to financially justify it by claiming that
downtown theaters in the city earned between $2 and $10 per week from each slide screened – a
price presumably, therefore, high enough to completely fund the project via a manageable
number of slides.28 In February 1916, the small town of McClure, Illinois – with “practically
unanimous” support – got on the bandwagon, and inaugurated weekly free screenings “to
improve the social life of the community and the church and give merchants a chance to exploit
their wares.”29 In June of 1916 free park-screenings hit two major cities in Tennessee. In
Nashville, the Crescent Amusement Company began using city parks for screenings which were
two-thirds entertainment and one-third “advertising matter” – which likely included industrial
films, as the Company had “been instructed…to secure…pictures having an educational value
along with comedy and other subjects.”30 Nearby, a “[m]ain street moving picture man” from
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Chattanooga started a similar open-air theater in Warner Park, but remained determined to fund
the screenings entirely with slides, putting an embargo on “travel stuff and…educational pictures
dealing with the manufacture of this and that.”31 By 1917 the concept approached the Missouri
border, as promoter Ed Batts persuaded the Park Board of East St. Louis, Illinois, to show films
“from one to three times a week” in five different parks (Jones, Emerson, Franklin, Virginia, and
Edgemont), funding the screenings with advertising slides.32
Though the practice was, if reports can be trusted, relatively contained in this one region,
it was not solely an urban and suburban phenomenon. A Wisconsin entrepreneur attempted to
tour free, ad funded screenings through local small towns. In 1916, the Open Air Dome
Company of Green Bay, after “several weeks” of screenings in Green Bay, began a touring show
with trips to West De Pere and Kaukauna – two towns on a line southwest of Green Bay.33
Despite F.H. Richardson’s 1911 warning (which effectively critiqued exactly this action), the
notion of free, ad supported cinema – even as a model of itinerant exhibition – was persistently
enticing.
The bulk of these screenings likely failed to turn a profit. Indeed, the 1915 Louisville
proposal admitted that “[t]he plan has not proven successful in other cities” before optimistically
asserting that a downtown location might work better.34 However, the important thing to note is
not whether or not such screenings were successful, but whether or not they were attempted. The
31

“Free Films in Parks,” Moving Picture World 28.13 (24 June 1916): 2276. As these were reported only one
month prior to the report of free Sunday screenings in Nashville and Memphis, it’s possible that the traditional
exhibitors were attempting to steal the thunder of these free screenings, by offering the same thing in an indoor
setting.
32
“Free Films in East St. Louis Parks,” Moving Picture World 32.11 (16 June 1917): 1823. It is possible that the
practice did extend into Missouri, though the shows would have been on wheels rather than in parks. Two months
prior to the East St. Louis plan, the city of St. Louis, Missouri, received a proposal, by “[a]n advertising concern,” to
tour free performances through town showing films on screens mounted on the backs of moving vans. Local
exhibitors, in attempting to file a complaint, were told that free shows operating out of a truck, required no license.
A.H. Giebler, “What is Doing in St. Louis Film Circles,” Moving Picture World 32.3 (21 April 1917): 478.
33
Frank H. Madison, “Wisconsin Film Notes,” Moving Picture World 29.11 (9 September 1916): 1735.
34
“Free Picture Show With Ads,” Moving Picture World 24.10 (5 June 1915): 1647.

268
concept of participating sponsorship of a free electronic medium was alive in 1910s cinema
circles, even if it was never perfected.
Edward Earle was thus both spectacularly correct and incorrect, depending on your
perspective. In the end, motion pictures did not widely develop into ‘billboard stations’; the rise
of the feature film and the palatial theater discouraged alternative models of cinema, as desires
for both ‘respectability’ and profit encouraged an increase, rather than a decrease, in ticket
prices. However, if one thinks of the mass electronic media as interrelated and mutually
influencing, rather than rigidly demarcated, then Earle was highly prescient…though a decade
ahead of his time. In the 1920s, American broadcast radio developed a business model which
provided entertainment free of charge and profited entirely from advertising dollars. By the
advent of commercial television, the concept of visual entertainment, provided at no cost through
advertising dollars collected from participating sponsors, was a reality. Earle had predicted not
the future of motion pictures, but of broadcasting – where the ‘billboard stations’ were on dials
in our living rooms, rather than the downtown shopping district.35

The Incredible Shrinking Field of Cinema Advertising
In the wake of the auteur theory (a screen rather than audience based theory), the advent
of television (which compelled the industry to stress the aesthetic elements of color, widescreen,
and 3-D rather than the venue), and the recent mobility of film texts (first to television, then
home video, and now onto portable devices), it can be difficult to remember just how important
the structures of both the venue and the program were to the silent era experience of motion
35
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pictures. Studies of regional viewing habits, segregated theaters, and non-theatrical screenings
remind us of the importance of these structural elements of the cinema. The unsettled conditions
of both film programs and theaters also gave rise to the variety of cinema advertising tactics in
the transitional era.
The institutionalization of the American cinema experience under the narrower thinking
of the mainstream studios, however, ultimately condemned cinema advertising to a long life at
the periphery of film culture. During the American cinema’s period of greatest novelty and
appeal as a potential advertising venue – the decade prior to the commercialization of American
radio – the film industry went through a transition to features, vertical integration, and a large
scale campaign to elevate the perceived status of the medium. The shift to feature dominated
programs limited the screening options for advertising. As W. Stephen Bush indicates (and
Edward Earle implies, with his assumption that ‘billboard stations’ would screen only “short”
entertainment films), fragmenting a single plotline with advertising breaks was perhaps the least
likely option for cinema advertising in a culture which was hostile to the form under even the
least intrusive circumstances. As the industry underwent simultaneous vertical integration and
the picture palace revolution, the film industry erected even broader barriers to cinema
advertising. In a picture palace, and even a smaller town theater with pretentions to palatial
esteem, the screen was to be dominated by high end feature dramas, and remain unsullied by an
association with commercialism. The offscreen space was to be kept dignified and opulent to
match. The cinema theater itself became an advertisement for the quality of the content
projected on the screen and, as such, high-brow considerations drove a wedge between studio
production and exhibition and the desires of advertisers. There was no place left for cinema
advertising in the mainstream theaters. Direct advertising thus became a trait of rural and mom-

270
and-pop theaters, and product placement began its slow rise as the method favored by an
oligopoly of producers. At exactly the moment when in-cinema advertising was at its most
vibrant, then, and when advertising itself was experiencing phenomenal growth (post World War
I), the studio-dominated film industry declared it unacceptable.
This is not to say, however, that cinema advertising was solely the victim of the cinema’s
growing cultural pretentions. While cinema-cultural preconceptions that advertising was
‘lowbrow’ were undoubtedly important to the marginalization of cinema advertising, abusive
practices were equally important in declaring cinema advertising an irritant. The early hostility
created by excessive quantity, broken, endlessly reused, or simply ugly slides was persistent.
Indeed, deriding the shoddy work of extant and defunct competitors was even a part of the sales
pitch at the Alexander Film Company as late as 1921. As such, it is clear that the sense that
cinema advertising was generally low quality and unlikeable remained common nearly a decade
after its emergence in the specific context of the price-cutting conflict in the slide industry.
Slides created a reputation that was difficult to live down. The major studios thus also wanted
the cinema to be free – free of advertising, not ticket prices.
Functional difficulties with the form also kept advertiser interest in the cinema low.
Circulation was a persistent problem, as there was no central authority through which one could
purchase national space from multiple cinema advertising space brokers. Money was also an
issue, as the production costs for trailers, for example, were relatively high, even if the cost-perthousand viewers was low. Even the quantity of available forms may have had a negative impact
on advertiser interest, as the multiplicity of options may have made cinema advertising seem
even more unsettled than it already was. It is likely, therefore, that the film industry was fighting
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a lopsided battle against cinema advertising, as advertisers themselves did not rush to the new
medium in support.
In short, consumer-goods advertising for the American cinema was born in a hole – one
which it took decades, rather than a few years, to climb out of. Local exhibitors were hesitant
about the impact advertising might have had on their small profit margins. National production
and exhibition companies – with greater financial flexibility – were more concerned with freeing
cinema from its low cultural esteem, than creating open access. With the advent of a national
plan for commercial radio, the cinema’s slim hold on the advertising industry evaporated along
with its novelty. Rather than escalating acceptance of consumer goods advertising in the
mainstream experience of cinema, then, the American film industry’s interest went from hesitant
to hostile, while advertiser interest went from moderate to indifferent. The American film
industry opted to consider a ‘dual product’ business model (in which the films were sold to
audiences in order to sell the audiences to advertisers) to be synonymous with the lowbrow
aesthetic they were attempting to avoid. In the studios’ definition of culture, overt advertising
did not suit the feature film experience.

Cinema Advertising as Media Development
The history of silent era advertising provides evidence of multiple possible models of an
ad supported cinema (ranging from minimal to full funding, via onscreen and offscreen tactics),
and multiple plausible arguments for why such models would succeed or fail. The appeal of the
communicative powers of what was then the most up-to-date medium led advertisers to theorize
both temporal and spatial flows of attention, and to conceive of restrictions on cinema
advertising effectiveness ranging from the financial (ticket prices) to the psychological (the
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‘combative spirit’ or ‘ill will’ caused by compulsory attention). Advertising could have led to a
cinema program with frequent direct advertising caesuras, a proliferation of viewing choices
within the theater, or even ‘free cinemas’ (possibly including both spatial and temporal ads).
Instead, due to the lack of easy national circulation through theaters, combined with the
relatively unified bloc of opposition from exhibitors and filmgoers (citing both ticket cost and
issues of opulent theatrical spaces), the silent American cinema became a site of only infrequent
and restrained advertisements, restricted in most cases to appearances in intermissions and on
clocks and handbills, and much more common in small town or neighborhood theaters than
urban palaces.
Despite marginalization of advertising in the mainstream American silent cinema, the
experiments in and debates over cinema advertising were an important stage in the development
of 20th century advertising. Indeed, although Michele Hilmes was correct to assert that the
structure of television could only be understood by acknowledging that it “grew directly out of
three decades of radio broadcasting, from which it carried over not only its economic, regulatory,
and institutional structures but also its familiar program forms,”36 the cinema’s influence should
also not be forgotten. The concept of an advertising supported medium of imagery (and/or
audio) was an idea with a long gestation. The cinema experience set the terms for early radio,
which then set the terms for television, which, paradoxically, set the terms for the rebirth of
cinema advertising at the close of the 20th century.
Although a study of the cinema’s direct and indirect influences on later media is beyond
the scope of this dissertation, one clear link between cinema advertising and early radio is
commonly known – although the importance of cinema to the equation has never been stressed.
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As mentioned in chapter two, in the 1925 book Broadcasting: Its New Day, cinema exhibition
guru ‘Roxy’ Rothapfel asserted, in a direct quote of Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, that
“if you try to sell…some brand of shoes or anything else over the radio [then] you’ll have no
radio audience.”37 This restatement of the cinema myth of the vanishing audience, in a book by
a cinema exhibitor, is an absolutely clear indication that radio theorizing began where 1910s film
theorizing left off. Importantly, this was not a minority opinion in early American radio. A
sense of the fragility of audience attention to a temporal medium, and the claim that direct
advertising would shatter that audience, was widely held in early radio. AT&T rented time to
advertisers for ‘selling talks’ in the early 1920s under the provision that direct advertising
(specific information on product qualities and prices) was forbidden.38 Hoover made his
comments in 1924, declaring, in short, that direct advertising would “kill broadcasting.”39 As
networks arose, this opposition to direct advertising was institutionalized; NBC specifically
declared that radio must function through indirect good will advertising, and could not be “a
selling medium.”40 As should be apparent from the preceding chapters, this was a lesson
advertisers and the entertainment industry believed had been learned from experiences with
motion picture related advertising. The fact that Rothapfel, AT&T, NBC, and Hoover believed
direct advertising on radio to be a dead end should come as no surprise, considering that
opponents of advertising in motion pictures had rallied around the rhetorical claim that slide and
photoplaylet advertising was likewise incompatible with ‘moving’ entertainment. Although the
film industry was not ultimately allowed to directly control and develop the new medium, early
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radio advertising theory did not diverge from the developed film sense. Mainstream commercial
radio history in America is, therefore, predicated on cinema advertising theory.41

Gone Today, Here Tomorrow
Early conclusions about the non-suitability of advertising to the motion picture theater
became standard presuppositions of the mainstream film industry for decades – with some
persisting to the present – and have appeared in studio claims routinely whenever cinema
advertising discourse has increased. Indeed, film historian Christopher Anderson has asserted
that the American film industry, after the establishment of television, explicitly differentiated
itself as a highbrow entertainment on the grounds that film screenings did not contain
advertising.42 Film industry hostility to overt advertising remained a point of pride. It was not
until a late 1970s crisis among independent exhibitors that cinema advertising would have its
renaissance – finally flowering into the mainstream in spite of persistent attacks on its lack of
‘taste.’ However, this story remains slanted towards the top-flight, urban theaters. A more
complete sense of the growth of cinema advertising is more complex.
The eventual expansion of the onscreen advertisement – predominantly the trailer –
began relatively quickly after the institutionalization of silent era split between the first run
theaters and the rural and neighborhood theaters. By 1938, in the words of the J. Walter
Thompson Company’s Fred Fidler and Wallace Boren, “more or less regula[r]” advertising film
screenings had expanded to “over half” of the 16,000 theaters in the country, but this half was
41
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disproportionately made up of “the country theatres or hole-in-the-wall type of 10-cent movie
houses.”43 By the late-1950s, the differentiation of advertising vs. non-advertising theaters had
become even more polarized. A second J. Walter Thompson Company research team indicated,
in 1959, that the urban/rural divide had grown in importance, with “theatres in the eight major
metropolitan cities” having become so hostile to screen advertising, that they were omitted
completely from the research report.44 Opposition had clearly not abated. Although neither
report clearly indicated reasons for the obviously increasing usage in lower end and rural
theaters, these two J. Walter Thompson Company studies were completed conspicuously near
two historical events: the transition to sound, and the rise of national television. As such, it is
possible that a widening gap between the fortunes of top-flight and lower-end theaters was acting
to increase advertising consistently over the years, with transitional moments in media acting as
flash points for significant increase.
In the latter decades of the 20th century, old hostilities have persisted. In the late 1970s,
Norman Levy, executive vice president of Columbia, and Irving Ludwig, of the Walt Disney
Company’s distributing subsidiary Buena Vista, continued to voice silent era perspectives on
cinema advertising. Levy asserted that such advertising was “in terrible taste” and suited only to
“low class theaters.” Ludwig repeated the obsession with ticket prices, declaring that “a patron
[who] has paid $3.50 for a seat…[should not receive] three minutes of commercials before my
picture.” As recently as 1990, both Warner Bros. and the Walt Disney Company refused to
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circulate their films to theaters which used direct, pre-film advertising content.45 Exhibitor
concerns from this later era are strikingly similar to silent era concerns as well. Kim B. Rotzoll,
perhaps unwittingly, used a silent era phrase to describe 1980s exhibitor concerns when she
declared that many theaters were holding out “based on some sense of ‘good faith’ with the
audience.”46 Concerns from the perspective of advertisers, though often given much more up to
date language, likewise sound familiar. The ‘absent audience effect’ (viewer’s intentionally
arriving late to avoid advertising content), or more perilously the possibility of a theater
committing ‘suicide-by-advertising’ (viewers abandoning the theater altogether to avoid
advertising content), along with concerns about audience irritation continued (and continue) to
arise in the literature on cinema advertising.47
Despite the entrenched reluctance of both the producers and exhibitors in the American
film industry, and the continuing fears of advertisers to adopt a medium which might produce ‘ill
will,’ cinema advertising experienced a surprising renaissance in these recent decades. As Deron
Overpeck has observed, the decreasing output and increasing profit-percentages demanded by
major studios in the late 1970s may have been a key factor in the return to prominence of cinema
advertising, despite ongoing hostility from certain producers and exhibitors. Both independent
exhibitors and large theater chains experimented with pre-film advertising as a means to boost
receipts, resulting in the formation of Screenvision and National CineMedia. The combination
of national chain circulation, a smaller number of tactical choices (only slides and trailers), and
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simple persistence appears to have increased both viewer and advertiser acceptance of the form.
Even the agencies jumped onboard quickly; the J. Walter Thompson Company was a partner in
the acquisition of Screenvision, in 1981. Over the course of the 1980s, pre-film advertising,
under the auspices of the large-scale space brokers Screenvision and NCM, became the norm in
American theaters.48 The fragmentation of the television market in the wake of the multichannel transition, and the subsequent havoc wrought by DVR and online video, only added to
the trend, as advertisers sought out new media markets.49
In light of this surprising turn of events, it is revealing to note that rhetoric in support of
cinema-advertising likewise continued to parallel silent era claims. Twenty-first century scholars
Michael Ewing, Erik du Plessis, and Charles Foster reference the appeal of ‘mood carryover’50 –
effectively a contemporary version of the old theory of the ‘receptive mood.’ Joanna Phillips
and Stephanie M. Noble’s research into current issues in cinema advertising acceptance includes,
among a number of issues, frustrations about captivity (fear of losing your seat or missing some
of the film if one leaves), repetition (seeing the same advertisement at successive visits to the
theater), unexpected delays prior to a film, preconceptions that ticket price ought to buy “the
right to view a movie in a commercial-free environment,” and even the assumption that
advertisements in a cinema should be entertaining in content.51 Each of those concerns was
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voiced in the American transitional era as well. Cost rationalization likewise occurs with
familiar tortured reasoning. For example, compare the following two arguments:
Francis T. Kimball (1921): [T]he cost of one page in one issue is about threetenths of a cent a possible prospect. And the ‘possible’ is used advisedly,
because it is far from certain that every individual in the total circulation is
going to get the message. […Meanwhile] the trailer costs the manufacturer
about six-one-hundredths of a cent a prospect – and here the ‘possible’ is
advisedly omitted, since in a motion picture theater there is but one attention
focus!52
Kim B. Rotzoll (1984): Although cinema advertising’s costs…are four or more
times those of prime time television…cinema advertising is shown to deliver
recall scores 3-5 times greater than that of television ads, so the initial cost
disadvantage rapidly turns into a cost efficiency as measure at the more
meaningful level of cost-per-thousand-impressions.53
Despite the shift from magazines to television as the point of comparison, and Kimball’s elision
of the fact that cinema advertising required a larger outlay to reach the superior ‘cost-perprospect’ number, the two rationalizations, separated by decades of experience, are nearly
identical – greater expense is countered with a claim of greater attention and memorability. Even
the voluntary limitations are familiar, as a limit of “two or three” commercial advertisements,
rather than a half hour onslaught of advertising, has been proposed repeatedly and even adopted
as a working practice during the renaissance of cinema advertising.54
In sum, all involved parties appear to hold positions remarkably similar to their silent era
counterparts, and yet cinema advertising is significantly more common now that it was in the
mid-1920s. The pertinent question, then, is: what has changed? Overpeck is, of course, correct
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to point to the changing structure of media ownership, and the fall-from-grace of the television
spot. With the same conglomerates owning television and cinema outlets, decreasing reluctance,
by company heads, towards cinema advertising is plausible. As the diminishing returns from
television advertising encourages multimedia campaigns, advertisers’ attraction to the ‘captive
audience’ of the cinema is also less surprising than we might, at first, be inclined to believe.
Cultural preconceptions are perhaps even more important. Even in the 1930s, the J. Walter
Thompson Company’s Fred Fidler and Wallace Boren had begun to feel that persistence, even in
the face of hostility, could create an “appreciative tolerance” in the audience.55 Overpeck points
to the fact that those who grew up in the United States in the 1980s and beyond have done so in
an environment in which advertising has been more widespread; that the young display a general
indifference to the question of cinema advertising is part of a trend away from
compartmentalizing life into elements where advertising is and is not expected.56 As the young
continue to dominate cinema attendance, their across-the-board tolerance of ubiquitous
advertising is an important one. Television and advertising in the broader culture may have
begun to outweigh the film industry’s own precedents.
However, cultural changes – important though they may be – are only a part of the story.
More concrete, institutional changes have also been instrumental to cinema advertising’s
changing fortunes. One important element is the increasing centralization of distribution,
culminating in the digital distribution of cinema advertising through the massive systems of both
Screenvision and NCM. The ability of advertisers not only to buy significant space from a single
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company, but also to have the advertisement broadcast to theaters – rather than having to send
individual slides or prints and rely on hundreds of projectionists – has both reduced the costs and
increased the reliability of cinema advertising. Technological improvements and national
oligopoly have, thus, removed some significant barriers to the circulation of cinema
advertisements.57 Oligopoly has not just been a factor in distribution, however; it has also
simplified tactical choice. Early cinema advertising, as a young theory in a transitioning
medium, was awash with competing tactics and theories of the audience. The array of options
may have been bewildering and kept adoption low. The recent claim that “low…environmental
clutter” contributes to a heightening of viewer ‘captivity’ (there are fewer options when a viewer
desires to turn from the screen) not only suggests that simplified architecture of the multiplex era
is important, but also implies that the absence of offscreen advertising technologies as an option
– there are no more lighted clocks or wall advertisements – is driving renewed faith in the
‘captive’ spectator.58
In short, new electronic delivery technologies, cultural acceptance of advertising
intrusions into temporally bound entertainment, the increasingly corporate conditions of the
American media, and fears that television’s advertising value was eroding all helped to awaken
cinema advertising from a long coma. However, the practices, concerns, and effects have
remained remarkably unchanged over a century. Both the means of integrating advertising into
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the cinema space, and the reluctance advertisers have attempted to overcome in order to do so,
are legacies of the transitional era American cinema.

Implications for Further Research
While this study has added significantly to our understanding of both the American
cinema and advertising industries, especially in the transitional era, it raises many questions. As
indicated above, the conditions of cinema advertising at mid-century require more scrutiny.
While Deron Overpeck provides good reason to believe that the late 1970s cinema advertising
renaissance originated in the changing conditions of American film production and exhibition
associated with ‘New Hollywood’ practices, the research reports of the J. Walter Thompson
Company indicate a greater continuity in cinema advertising history than has yet been
acknowledged. Specifically, significant material may remain undiscovered in the Alexander
Film Company records in Colorado Springs, which contains multiple boxes of material from the
1930s and beyond. More work needs to be done before we can completely understand the
developmental trajectory of American cinema advertising; Kerry Segrave’s 100 year history of
Product Placement in Hollywood Films is only a small piece of a larger history.
For the transitional era itself, this study begs the question of what a study of indirect
advertising, similarly structured and with similar goals, would reveal about the other practices
and theories of cinema advertising in the transitional era. As mentioned at the outset, the two
wings of cinema advertising can be separated cleanly, as they were produced by different
companies, operated on different fundamental theories of the audience, and funded different
players in the film industry. However, the fact that they can be separated does not mean that
there is nothing to be learned from studying them side by side. The theory and practice of direct
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advertising in the American cinema is only one half of dialectic. Indirect and direct cinema
advertising both emerged together at the dawn of cinema, both went through a period of
experimentation in the 1910s, and both experienced a renaissance around 1980. This is not
coincidence; their fates have been tied together all along, despite their differences. Knowledge
of the shifting conditions of indirect cinema advertising in the transitional era would provide a
more complete understanding of the ebbs and flows of cinema advertising acceptance, and the
breadth of advertising practices experienced by transitional era American cinema audiences.
The two above suggestions would add breadth to our understanding. This particular
study would also withstand deeper probing. As stated at the outset, this study was designed to
draw the broad contours of direct cinema advertising over the course of the transitional era
American cinema. But broad contours are never the whole story. A study of the regional
differentiation of production would be helpful. Divergences in theory and practice between
Chicago, Philadelphia, New York, and other production and reception cultures in silent cinema
advertising would give us a better understanding of the flow of the idea around the United States.
Why, for example, did so many of the slide patents emerge from New York? Company by
company specificity would also help. Why was Joseph Coufal central to American government
slide production during World War I? What was the working relationship (or conflict) between
the Kansas City and Neosho Slide Companies? Did other trailer makers suggest that their
salesmen deride the competition, or was that a practice exclusive to the Alexander Film
Company? How creatively autonomous were slide and trailer filmmakers from company to
company? This study, through limitations in source material, has drawn attention to the general
trends and most commonly espoused beliefs in the era. Local studies in newspapers, archives,
and even with family descendents (the Erker Bros. Optical Company remains a family business)
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could add significantly to our understanding of the likely hundreds of companies active in this
field during this era. This dissertation is a step into a surprisingly vast arena of the transitional
era film experience.
Beyond studies focused on cinema advertising, this research compels us to give greater
attention to the ways in which transitional era cinema, in both its national and local contexts, was
informed by commodification and consumption. The rise of the star-system and palatial
cinemas, the advent of popular film magazines, the adoption of advertising practices and
experienced professionals to market the cinema, and the creation of film related products are all
part of the larger interaction between the institutionalizing American cinema and modern
consumer culture. Palatial cinema architecture both nationalized the local (by appealing to
cinema trends) and localized the national (by appealing to cinema audiences). Jackie Coogan’s
star image sold hats as well as it sold tickets. Photoplay Magazine sold film to fans and sold
their collected attention to advertisers. And the entire industry became one long commercial for
California. Consumption is a web of practices, and the film industry – as evidenced by its
response to cinema advertising – was attempting to negotiate a particular position for film
between commodity, gallery, and trend.
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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Advertising Slide Companies
The following is a complete list of all 104 lantern slide companies which I know to have
been willing and able to produce advertising slides for use in American motion picture theaters
between the years of 1908 and 1922. The company name(s) and home city are provided.
Undoubtedly countless additional companies slipped through the cracks of my research, either
because they did not place self-advertising material in national trade journals, or because they
placed them in periodicals to which I had no access.

Adfilm Company – Kansas City, MO
Advertising Slide Company – St. Louis, MO
Advertising Specialty Company – Louisville, KY
A.J. Clapham – New York City
Alfred L. Simpson, Inc. – New York City
American Advertising Company – Columbus, OH
American Motion Slide Company – Chicago, IL
American Slide and Poster Company – Chicago, IL
American Slide Company – Columbus, Ohio
American Song Slide & Poster Company – Chicago, IL
American Typo-Pad Company – Raleigh, NC
Art Slide Company – (unknown)
Auerbach Advertising Agency – Butte, MT
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Battershall & Oleson – Chicago, IL
Best Slide Company – Kansas City, MO
Brayton Manufacturing Company – Chicago, IL
Brite Lite Film Advertising Company – New York City
Burden & Salisbury Company, Inc. – Rochester, NY
Business Efficiency Company – (unknown)
Clarice K. Rogalla – Chicago, IL
Columbia Slide Company – Chicago, IL
Curtainyline Curtain and Producing Company / New Process Film Title Co. – Chicago, IL
Denver Theater Supply Company – Denver, CO
Des Moines Slide Company – Des Moines, IA
D.P. Shull – Long Beach, CA
Economy Supply Depot / Economy Film Exchange – Chicago, IL
E.L. Dyer Slide Company – Kansas City, KS
Erker Bros. Optical Company – St. Louis, MO
Emnkay Moving Picture Company – Terre Haute, IN
Enterprise Optical Manufacturing Company – Chicago, IL
Excelsior Slide Company / Excelsior Illustrating Company – New York City
Flashagraph Company – Chicago, IL
Florida Photographic Concern – Fort Pierce, FL
F.M. Tisdale Enterprises – Chicago, IL
George Birt – Indianapolis, IN
Genre Transparency Company – Chicago, IL
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Grant Carder Slide Company – Portland, OR
Gunby Bros. – New York City
Greater New York Slide Company – New York City
Harold Ives Company – New York City
Hill & Orr – Chicago, IL
Houston Slide Company – Houston, TX
Ideal Amusement Company – Louisville, KY
Illinois Motion Picture Advertising Corporation – Chicago, IL
Independent Advertising Company, Inc. – New York City
International Film Products Company – Cincinnati, OH
J.E. Naylor & Company – Chicago, IL
Kansas City Slide Company – Kansas City, MO
Keeshen Advertising Agency – Oklahoma City, OK
Kleine Optical Company – Chicago, IL
Kurtz & Mack – Sandusky, OH
L.B. Adkins Company – Columbus, OH
Lee Lash Company – New York City
Manhattan Slide and Film Company – New York City
Marshaw Slide Manufacturing Service – Kansas City, MO
McFerran-Knopf Company – Louisville, KY
Metropolitan Slide Company – New York City?
Mica Non-Breakable Slide Company – Philadelphia, PA
Midland Transparency Company – Omaha, NE
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Motion Picture Advertising Company – New York City
Mott-Le-Gaige Animated Advertising Company – New York City
National Moving Picture Advertising Company – Charlotte, NC
National Song Slide Exchange – Chicago, IL
Ned Cleaveland – Washington Court House, OH
Neosho Slide Company – Neosho, MO
New York Advertising Slide Company – New York City
Niagara Slide Company – Lockport, NY
No-Destructo Slide Company – Philadelphia, PA
North American Slide Company – Philadelphia, PA
Northwestern Amusement Syndicate – Seattle, WA and St. Paul, MN
Novelty Slide Company – New York City
Ohio Transparency Company – Cleveland, OH
Paris Slide Company – Philadelphia, PA
Peerless Slide Company – (unknown)
Perfection Slide Company / Levi Company, Inc. – New York City
Photo Specialty Company – Keenesville, NY
Premier Slide Company – New York City
Premo Company – Philadelphia, PA
Preston Lombard – Boston, MA
Quality Slide and Photo Makers – Chicago, IL
R. Naylor & Company – Chicago, IL
Radio Ad Slide Company – (unknown)
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Scott & Van Altena – New York City
Seattle Slide Company – Seattle, WA
Shepherd’s Song Slide Service – New York City
Shreveport Advertising Slide Company – Shreveport, LA
Slidene Manufacturing Company – Columbus, NE
Specialty Slide Makers – Chicago, IL
Standard Slide Corporation – New York City
Superior Advertising Slide Company – Cleveland, OH
Thornton Advertising Company – Chicago, IL
Three Star Slide Company – Chicago, IL
Tilley Bros. – Austin, TX
Troy Sign and Slide Company – Troy, OH
Unique Slide Company, Inc. – New York City
U.S. Slide Company – Kansas City, MO
Utility Transparency Company / F.H. Richardson – Brooklyn, NY
Vitaslide Company – San Francisco, CA
Well’s Moving Picture Enterprises – New York City
White Specialty Company – New York City
William A. Lochren Film & Slide Company – Minneapolis, MN
Wm. H. Swanson & Company – (unknown)
Williams Advertising Slide Company – New York City
Young Advertising Service – Manning, SC
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Appendix B: Advertising Trailer Companies
The following is a list of the 31 companies I know to have been making or encouraging
the use of commercial advertising trailers in the United States between the years of 1914 and
1922. As with the slide producers, a significant number may have slipped through the cracks
during the research process. As before, the company name(s) and home city are provided.
A caveat is warranted here: It can be very difficult to determine what, specifically,
individual companies were making in the early years of advertising film production, as length
and style of product were frequently veiled by indistinct terminology. This list includes 8
debatable, but plausible, inclusions. Companies which definitely specialized is advertising
cartoons but did not overtly refer to them as trailers have been included as theatrical cartoons
were predominantly, then as now, half reels or less; thus, all advertising cartoons would have
been de facto trailers, even if they were significantly longer than the typical one-minute in
duration. Five companies are known to have offered animation but did not overtly describe their
products as ‘trailers’: the American Cartoon Film Corporation, the Dra-Ko Film Company, the
Metropolitan Company, the Pacific Coast Film Advertising Company, and the Standard Motion
Picture Company. A sixth company – the Quality Film Company – was even more vague,
offering only “animated advertising along commercial lines” in its 1918 publicity blurb. In early
film discourse, ‘animated’ was often simply a synonym for ‘motion picture.’ However, 1918 is a
late enough date that the implication of the term was more likely ‘cartoon,’ and as such they are
also included here. Two other concerns offered only a product ‘superior to slides.’ As trailers
were the only celluloid product I have run across which were marketed as a replacement for
slides, I presume these companies were making trailers rather than longer films or offscreen
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technologies. In this list, American Commercial Film and James P. Simpson describe their
wares in this way.

Alexander Film Company – Colorado Springs, CO
American Bioscope Company – Chicago, IL
American Commercial Film Company – Chicago, IL
Animated Cartoon Film Corporation – (unknown)
Artfilm Studios – Cleveland, OH
Brite Lite Film Advertising Company – New York, NY
Camel Film Company – Chicago, IL
Dra-Ko Film Company – New York, NY
Effankay Film Company – Austin, TX
Federal Development Company – Alliance, OH
Fort Wayne & Northern Indiana Traction Company – Fort Wayne, IN
Fox-Burgh Syndicate – San Francisco, CA (and possibly Chicago)
Industrial Moving Picture Company / Rothacker Manufacturing Company – Chicago, IL
James P. Simpson Company, Inc. – Dallas, TX
Kansas City Slide Company / Kansas City Film Ad Company – Kansas City, MO
Manhattan Slide and Film Company, Inc. – New York, NY
Metropolitan Company – Detroit, MI
National Advertising Motion Picture Weekly, Inc. – [somewhere in New England]
National Motion-Ad Company – Chicago, IL
Nelson Motion Picture Studios – Detroit, MI
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Pacific Coast Film Advertising Company – (unknown)
Quality Film Company – Davenport, IA
Ray – New York City
Raymond Anderson Company – Louisville, KY
Real Publicity Company – Kansas City, MO
Scenic Film Company – Atlanta, GA
Screen Advertising, Inc. – Washington DC
Southern Film Service, Inc. – Houston, TX
Standard Motion Picture Company – Chicago, IL
Tilford & Tilford – Chicago, IL
Triograph Film Manufacturing Company – Atlanta, GA

Appendix C: Offscreen-Advertising Companies
The following is a list of the 10 companies I know to have been offering offscreen
advertising technologies for use in American cinemas in the 1910s and 1920s. I suspect that
more examples have been missed in this category than in either of the others, as offscreen
advertising tactics were frequently ‘home-brewed’ adaptations designed either by an exhibitor
for his or her own use, or sold in a limited region by the original inventor. Trade press
advertising was extremely rare for these products. As always, company name and home city are
provided.

Fowler Sign Company – Tacoma, WA
General Sales Company of America – Pittsburgh, PA
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J.H. Genter Company – Newburgh, NY
Kalck Safety Specialties Company – Amityville, NY
Kineto Machine Company – Chicago, IL
Publicity Clock Company – New York City
Standard Manufacturing Company – New York City
Thayer Advertising Corporation – New York City
United Exhibitors’ Advertising Corporation – Wilmington, DE
Wonder Clock Advertising Company – New York City

